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The subject of this dissertation is, "A Legal History of Inter-local Conflict of Laws 
in Africa South of the Sahara, from Earliest Times to 1960". Although inter-local 
conflict of laws is a frequent legal experience in Africa, the subject is rarely examined 
by African lawyers. Indeed, although the various customary law rules are often 
pleaded in court, judges often fail to characterise with the same rigour that is found 
with international conflict of laws. 
The examination of the subject starts with an introduction explaining the purpose of 
the study of the subject and goes on to explain the terminology used in the study. Law 
in Africa differs in many ways from law in Europe, especially in the terminology 
used. "Customary law", for example, assumes an importance unfamiliar to most 
European lawyers. 
To appreciate the importance of inter-local conflict of laws in Africa, it is essential to 
understand the characteristics of African legal systems. African legal systems derive 
from agricultural communities, which are often collective or communal in nature. 
These communities usually have their own legal rules on various issues, rules which 
may differ from those of a neighbouring community, thus creating a source of conflict 
of laws. 
The political organisation of African societies also explains why inter-local conflict of 
laws is so important in African legal systems. African societies are organised in small 
units on which a superstructure is imposed to look like one kingdom or empire, such 
as Ghana or Mali were. Chapter two explains these various types of societies, which 
most often, have different legal norms on various issues such as succession, status, 
family law and so on. This is the major source of inter-local conflict of laws in Africa. 
The arrival of Islam, along with its own legal system, has also added to the sources of 
inter-local conflict of laws. In West Africa, the power of Islamic law or the Sharia, is 
limited mainly to the northern regions of Nigeria. This is due to the fact that Islam 
was introduced to West Africa by missionaries, except in Northern Nigeria, where it 
was introduced through a jihad or holy war. Although the hold of Islamic law on West 
xvii 
Africa has remained weak, nevertheless, it is a source of conflict of laws. In East 
Africa, Islam was introduced by settlers from the Middle East, who practise the 
religion and legal system among themselves and the converts they have made. In East 
Africa, these conflicts situations were dealt with mainly by legislation but sometimes, 
they were also dealt with by the courts. 
Another source of conflict of laws were European legal systems, introduced by 
England and France. Although British and French colonial governments permitted 
African legal systems to continue functioning, there were areas of conflict. 
In this thesis, inter-local conflict of laws is treated as a variant of private international 
law. Thus, the rules of private international law are examined to demonstrate that they 
do not differ from those of inter-local conflict of laws. The two types of conflict of 
laws are the same, except that their theatres of operation differ. 
Approaches to choice of law in the British and French colonial period differ in many 
ways. To the French, choice of law was part of colonial policy. Each person in a 
French colony had a status, which was his or her personal law. Race was the main 
factor in acquiring a status but often, Africans were encouraged to assimilate into 
French culture and civilisation. British colonial policy was not that well organised, 
especially in West Africa. There were only two types of status, "native" and "non- 
native". The connecting factor for a "native" was his or her customary law and for the 
"non-native" the common law. Race was not the deciding factor, as foreign blacks did 
not necessarily qualify as "natives". These approaches to choice of law produced 
radically different results, some of which have survived to the present. 
The examination of the subject stops in 1960, on the eve of the independence of most 
African countries. However, the main reason for choosing that date is the enactment 
of Ghana's post-independence choice of law rules, the first post-independence choice 
of law rules in Africa. These innovative rules, discussed in Chapter Six, demonstrated 
a departure from the colonial approach. A new connecting factor "community" was 
created to replace "tribe" and similar usages, which were applied in the colonial era. 
The "repugnancy clauses" which, in the colonial period prevented or limited the 
application of certain local customary law rules, were removed, thus restoring the 
xviii 
court's inherent right to apply "public policy" to refuse the application of a "foreign 
law". 
The hopes generated in 1960 did not last long. Very few African countries followed 
Ghana's example to enact new choice of law rules, as shown in the appendix to this 
dissertation. The few new choice of law rules which were enacted, departed little from 
the colonial format. Thus, most African lawyers would still need to refer to the 
colonial rules for guidance. Even Ghana itself has enacted a new set of choice of law 
rules, reproduced in the appendix, and has brought back the "repugnancy rules", 
although most of the 1960 rules have been retained. In the circumstances, an 
examination of the colonial choice of law rules is appropriate, mainly to discover how 
they can be applied in modern times. 
Most modem states in Africa today are of colonial creation. Thus, they contain a 
number of cultural units which, left alone, could have developed into states of their 
own. Nevertheless, even if colonialism had never come to Africa, there were state 
formations in progress, such as the Ashanti or Zulu empires, which would have 
created similar inter-local conflict of law situations that colonialism brought with it. 
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Virtually every country in Africa has a plural legal system. Consequently, there are conflicts 
between the legal systems and laws of general application. The conflict occurs when a 
legally relevant event takes place in various law districts, subject to different legal systems 
within the one sovereign state and the judge is called upon to decide which of the competing 
laws is to govern the issue. In Africa, there are ample opportunities for an event to take place 
in various legal systems. The reasons are mainly historical. The political organisation of 
African societies is such that a state unit, such as Ashanti or Yoruba, is composed of several 
autonomous smaller units, complete with their own legislative and judicial machinery. 
Secondly, the partition of Africa and the creation of the modem state system has increased 
the number of local legal systems, since modem states are usually larger and incorporate 
several state units. The partition and colonisation of Africa also introduced European legal 
systems into Africa. 
Thirdly, there is a constant movement of people from one legal district to another, mainly in 
search of employment and this has led to intermarriage and acquisition of property in the 
"foreign" law district. 
II. Purpose of this Study 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the evolution of choice of law in Africa, to 
ascertain the principles which underlie the choice of law rules in African inter-local conflict 
of laws in the pre-colonial (wherever possible), the colonial and part of the post-colonial 
period. Choice of law rules in operation before the colonial period are difficult to obtain but 
European and Arab traders have left some insight into the period and whenever possible, 
these will be examined. For the purpose of this study however, the more important periods 
are the colonial and Ghana's immediate post-colonial experience. 
2 
The choice of law rules in inter-local conflict of laws have changed little in Africa since the 
colonial period. Indeed only a small number of countries have enacted new choice of law 
rules and even those which have, have retained some of the salient concepts of the old rules. 
The result is that most African countries would still have to rely on the colonial rules for 
guidance in inter-local conflict of laws. To be able to apply the colonial rules to modem 
social needs, it is suggested in this dissertation that the rules of private international law be 
relied upon for interpretation purposes. 
III. Focus of Study 
This study focuses on choice of law in English-speaking and French-speaking Africa south 
of the Sahara. Due to language difficulties, Portuguese-speaking Africa has been excluded 
and so has South Africa, due to the complex history of that country. 
Inter-local conflict of laws is not popular with private international lawyers, perhaps because 
it occurs so rarely. Indeed some have even argued that conflict of laws in a unitary state is 
not conflict at all. This study seeks to show that the conflict situation in inter-local conflict 
of laws is as real as that in the international situation. A short history of private international 
law has been sketched to demonstrate that rules of the same nature apply to the two types of 
conflicts. This may prove important for African lawyers who may have to adapt outdated 
colonial legislation to modem needs. 
Emphasis has been laid on events in Ghana and Senegal for several reasons. First, the 
earliest choice of law rules in British African colonies were enacted for the Gold Coast 
(Ghana) in 1876, rules which were widely copied all over the British colonies. In the same 
way, the French also used Senegal as a platform to legislate for the rest of their colonies. 
Thus, the law of a colony would simply refer to the Senegalese version and apply it as it was 
applied in Senegal2. 
Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 of 1876. 2 See Chapter Five, "Reception of French Law". 
3 
Second, it is hoped that by emphasising colonial policy in the Gold Coast and Senegal, the 
difference in British and French colonial attitudes would be more clearly exposed. British 
and French colonial policy differed in many ways and Ghana and Senegal appear to mirror 
these differences more closely than most other colonies. 
Third, because judicial activity began in the two colonies much earlier than in others, it has 
been found easier to collect court records and case law on these two countries. 3 
IV. Terminology used in this Study 
i) Conflict of Laws 
Although not all legal writers are agreed that international conflicts rules should apply to 
internal conflicts, they agree, however, that the designation "conflict of laws" can be applied 
to inter-local conflict of laws, for the teen; 
"Conflict of laws must be understood in the figurative sense, it is a simile which 
indicates that the fact or legal relation governed by the law is attached to several 
legal systems and what has to be decided is which of the legal rules of several 
systems has to be applied to the actual case. This multiplicity of legal systems may 
imply the legal systems of two sovereign states or it may refer to two legal systems 
in force within one sovereign territory"4. 
See Chapters Five and Six. 4 Szaszy; The Conflict of Laws in Western, Socialist and Developing Countries, 1974, p. 
ii) 'Inter-local' Conflict ofLaws 
The term `inter-local' conflict of laws has been used in this dissertation in preference to 
other designations which Professor Zsaszy has suggested, such as inter-zonal, interstate (for 
federal, states), or inter-sectorial5. 'Inter-local' has been found more appropriate for this study 
because it reflects the existence of law districts based on the historical experiences of Africa. 
NO 'Customary Law' 
The term 'customary law', which is used in most legal writings on Africa to describe African 
legal systems, will not be used in this dissertation to reflect law in Africa but will be used, 
where appropriate, to describe particular legal systems or where the African legal system 
6 itself uses the term in its legislation . According to the Oxford English Dictionary, custom 
is: - 
"An established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of 
law or right". 
Defined this way, every legal system derives some source from custom but for some reason, 
legal writers on law in Africa tend to see African legal systems as being comprised entirely 
of customary rules which evolve slowly and perhaps, randomly. If that were the case, 
African legal systems would take long periods to evolve but this is not the case. Gluckman 
observes that: - 
"The view that customary law was ancient and immutable retaining its 
principles through long periods of time, its origins lost in the midst of 
antiquity, has been discarded" 7. 
25. 
ibid, at p. 233. 
6 See Native Courts Ordinance 1944, Cap. 98 for the Gold Coast which defines "native 
customary law". 
7 Gluckman; Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law, 1969, p. 9. 
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and he continues, 
"Not only are customary laws changing today but also they were subject to constant 
8 change in the pre-colonial past". 
Nevertheless, Gluckman refers to African legal systems as 'customary law' throughout his 
book. It is reasonable to assume that laws which are constantly changing can only do so 
through a mechanism specially created for the purpose. The process is unlikely to be left to 
the random and leisurely pace of custom. 
One of the major characteristics of African legal systems is their uncodified nature. 
Gluckman, like most other writers on law in Africa, fails to distinguish between the 
uncodified nature of African legal systems and the unwritten nature of customary law 
y' law is used, what is meant is generally. Indeed quite often, when the term 'customar 
unwritten not uncodified law; 
"Lorsqu'on dit que les droits africains sont des droits coutumiers, en realite 
9 on veut dire qu'ils sont des droits non ecrits. 
Customary law may be unwritten but unwritten law is not necessarily customary law. 
Custom is only one source of law and there is substantial evidence that African legal 
systems know other sources of law, one of which is legislation. Indeed Elias argues that 
legislation has been known to African legal systems since ancient times; 
"... the absence of ancient codes or written laws in Africa does not necessarily 
presage a static condition of customary law, nor are we justified in refusing 
the name of legislation to such processes of legal change as are found to be 
8 ibid, at p. 9. 
9 Gonidec, P. F; Les droits africains - evolutions et sources, 1968, p. 15. 
6 
operating in African societies at various stages of their legal life"10. 
Legislation ought not to be so narrowly defined that it can apply only to a written piece of 
law. Most African societies know different methods of producing legislation and Elias has 
identified at least five of these; 
(a) as the personal decree of the reigning king or chief; or 
(b) as joint resolution of the king's advisers in consequence of deliberation in executive 
council; or 
(c) as the ad hoc proclamation by a spokesman of certain internal bodies, such assecret 
societies and market guilds; or 
(d) as the authoritative declaration of specific regulations arrived at after due debate at a 
public concourse of chiefs, elders and the general public summoned together for the 
purpose; or 
(e) as the judicial modification of old rules in the course of settling disputes arising out of 
new circumstances" 
The importance of custom, as a source of law, diminishes as legal systems grow and become 
more complex. The persistent reference to African legal systems as customary law systems, 
resembles the situation which once existed in England when "... the identification of the 
common law with customary law remained the accepted doctrine long after it had ceased to 
retain any semblance of truth"12. "Customary Law" as a term includes all customs which are 
applicable in a society but not all of them may be enforceable by a court of law. This study 
concentrates on law which is enforceable in the forum's court and treats custom only as 
source of law. It is however important to examine what was understood under `customary 
law' during the colonial period and since the enactment of Ghana's Courts Act 1960. . 
Although colonial legislation often referred to `native law and custom' or `customary law', 
no attempt was made to define the expression until 1927, when the Gold Coast Colony 
10 Elias, T. 0; The Nature ofAfrican Customary Law, 1956, p. 189. 11 ibid, at p. 191. 
12 Salmond; On Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. 1966, p. 189. 
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Native Administration Ordinance was enacted13. Section 2 of the Ordinance defined native 
customary law as follows; 
`Native customary law' means a rule or a body of rules regulating rights and 
imposing correlating duties, being a rule or a body of rules which obtains and is 
fortified by established native usage and which is appropriate and applicable to any 
particular cause, action, suit, matter, dispute, issue or question, and includes also any 
native customary law recorded as such in a statement which shall have been declared 
under section 123 to be a true and accurate statement of such native customary law. " 
The provision was re-enacted as the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance of 1944 of the Gold 
Coast14. The Eastern Region of Nigeria adopted it in abbreviated form as the Eastern Region 
of Nigeria Customary Courts Law 195615. Tanganyika (Tanzania) also adopted it as 
Tanganyika Local Government Ordinance'6, later amended by the Local Government 
Ordinance'. It was also adopted by the Sierra Leone Local Courts Act of 196318. When the 
Gold Coast became independent Ghana in 1957, the provision was replaced in 1958 by the 
Local Courts Act 195819, Section 2 and finally by the Interpretation Act 196020 which now 
provides as follows; 
"18 - (1) Customary law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana, consists of rules of law 
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana not being rules 
included in the common law under any enactment providing for the assimilation of 
such rules of customary law as suitable for general application. " 
In the colonial period, the Gold Coast provision remained the most helpful, although other 
13 No. 18 Of 1927. 
14 - __ nn ný 
15 
uap. ya, J. L. 
S. 2, Cap. 32. 
16 Section 53A (4) (b), Cap. 299. 
17 (Amendment Act 1962) No. 4 of 1962, S. 13. 18 No. 20 of 1963, S. 2. 
19 No. 23 of 1958. 
20 C. A. 4. 
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definitions were also attempted. The Bechuanaland Native Courts Proclamation21, for 
example, provided a short definition which merely stated that `Native law or custom' and 
`Native custom' meant in relation to a particular tribe. The Northern Nigerian Native Courts 
Law22 defined `native law and custom' to include Islamic Law'. Thus, it was left to the 
Nigerian court to determine, without guidance, when Islamic law or `customary law' was 
applicable. Largely however, customary law remained undefined generally or for particular 
purposes. 
Faced with the notion of `customary law' which colonial courts were required to enforce, 
the colonial judges, who were English, had little option but to rely on the principles 
developed in England regarding custom as law. The practice in England had been, that to be 
enforceable, a custom must have existed since time immemorial, which was fixed at 1189 
AD. Clearly this date was of no significance in Africa and judges would often rather refer to 
the legislation which provided for the application of customary law. Hence, a custom which 
did not exist when, for example, the Supreme Court Ordinance was enacted in the Gold 
Coast in 187623, would not be enforced. Thus in Welbeck v Brown 24, Smalman Smith, J, 
clarified the situation as follows; 
"We must of course conclude that the native customs to which the Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 1876 requires us to give effect in the administration of the law of this 
colony, must be such as in the contemplation and according to the principles of 
English jurisprudence would be regarded as customs, that is to say, such as have 
existed in the colony from time immemorial, or `to which the memory of man 
runneth not to the contrary'. It cannot, therefore, be contended that an observance or 
course of conduct which may have sprung up within the last fifty or sixty years, and 
which native chiefs choose to designate a custom, should have the effect of law in 
this colony, or should be, so to speak, crystallised into law by the action of Courts of 
this colony. The intention of the Legislation was, in my judgment, to give the force 
21 No. 13 of 1942, s. 1 (2). 
22 1956, Cap. 78, s. 2. 
23 No. 4 of 1876. 
24(1882) Sar. F. C. L. 185 (G. C, F. Ct). 
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of law to such customs of general and long-continued usage and observance as can 
be proved to have been in existence at the date of the Ordinance, and to have had at 
that date the essentials as well as the force of customs as by law established. "25 
Thus, 1876 became the date of `time immemorial' for custom to pass as enforceable law. In 
Mensah v Wiaboe26,1189 was formally abandoned as time immemorial and 1876 
substituted in its place. However, since the Courts Ordinance had been reviewed a number 
of times, does that mean that the date of recognition also changed with the date of a new 
enactment of the Ordinance? The Korsah Commission on Native Courts felt that at the time 
of their deliberations, 1951, the effective date for recognition of customary law in the Gold 
Coast was 1935, the date of the then current Courts Ordinance27. 
The situation was clearly unacceptable, if we accept that customary law evolves like any 
other type of law. A better approach should have been that a custom is recognised from time 
to time as it is pleaded at court, or as Allott puts it, customary law as is `existing at the time 
of the litigation'28. This more flexible attitude to the date of recognition of `customary law' 
began to be applied only after 1960 and is outside the scope of this study29. Nevertheless, 
"the wind of change" had begun to be noticed even as far back as 1931, when the Privy 
Council observed in Eleko v Officer Administering the Government ofNigeria30 that; 
"the more barbarous customs of earlier days may under the influence of civilisation 
become milder without losing their essential character of custom "31. 
2s At p. 188. 26 .,,. , ý. .ý,.. .,. ý.., .... 
ýý 
(i Y/-D) 1J. l; t. `L 1-"LJ, 1/ U, at p. 1/L. 
" Report of the Commission on native courts, General Post Office, Accra, 1951, at 
p. 16. Cited in Allott, p. 152. 
28 Allott, p. 152. 
29 It is worthwhile to note however the case of Musa Kitonto v Kabaka's Government, 
(1965) E. A. 278, in which the East African Court of Appeal overruled the court 
below which had held that in determining what customary law to apply in Buganda, 
the Buganda Courts Ordinance, 1940, Cap. 77 (1951 Revision), was the effective 
date. The Court of Appeal held that customary law can grow and the Ordinance did 
not apply a cut-off date to that growth (at p. 281). 30 [1931] A. C. 662. 
31 ibid, at p. 673. 
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A few years later, Gray, C. J. was able to observe in Kajubi v Kabal32 that the Eleko Case 
applied equally to Buganda and that all that needed to be done was to substitute for 
"barbarous" "original" and for "milder", "modified". He went on; 
"The native community may assent to some modification of an original custom, but 
the modification must be made with the assent of the native community. It cannot be 
made by an individual or a number of individuals. Least of all can it be made by a 
33 court of law" 
Although matters appeared to be moving in the right direction, the continued reference to 
local law as `customary law' is a drawback to its development. Unfortunately, modem 
African legislation, such as the Ghana Courts Act 1960, continue to distinguish local law as 
`customary law' even though, in the case of Ghana, it is now part of the common law of 
Ghana. 
In this study therefore, `customary law' as a term will be used only when appropriate. 
iv) "African Law" 
Another term frequently encountered in legal writings on law in Africa is "African Law". In 
the colonial period, the term was synonymous with "native law and custom", that is, the law 
which applied almost exclusively to "natives". In the post-colonial period, when law has 
general application, there is hardly any need to use the term to apply to African legal 
systems. None the less, Allott claims that the term is quite appropriate as there is 
"... substantial similarity in the range of legal possibilities though substantial diversity 
34 in their combination, in the various customary African legal systems" 
32 (1944) 11 E. A. C. A. 34. 
33 ibid, at p. 37. 
it 
With respect, similarity between the legal systems alone is not sufficient to justify the use of 
the term "African Law", just as similarity between European legal systems, by itself, could 
not justify the use of the term "European Law". The term "African Law" will therefore not 
be used in this study except in a quotation. 
V. Summary of Arguments and Conclusions 
In order to understand why inter-local conflict of laws is so important to Africa, it is 
necessary to understand the nature of indigenous African legal systems. This is dealt with in 
Chapter Two, "Characteristics of African Legal Systems". African societies are complex in 
the sense that various ethnic groups occupy the same space. Inevitably, there are bound to be 
conflict of laws situations. The arrival of Islam in Africa only went to increase the number 
of instances in which legal rules may conflict one, with the other. 
The colonisation of Africa brought the most challenging difficulties for African legal 
systems. These systems were not equipped to deal with the new foreign colonial systems 
and in time, the influence of European legal systems became remarkable. Nevertheless, the 
3s local legal systems persisted, especially in the British colonies 
Chapter Three deals with the "Relevance of Private International Law to Inter-local Conflict 
of Laws". Here, it is argued that the rules of private international law and inter-local conflict 
of laws are the same. A short historical sketch is provided to demonstrate that the humble 
beginnings of private international law resemble those of inter-local conflict of laws. The 
connecting factors, domicil and nationality, have analogies in inter-local conflict of laws, 
such as personal law or "community" in Ghana's 1960 choice of law rules. 
Chapter Four discusses "The Choice of Law in Africa". Attempts are made to discover the 
atmosphere in which inter-local conflict of laws operate and their relevance for Africa. Short 
34 Allott; New Essays in African Law, 1970, p. 3. Cited hereafter as Allott. 35 See later Chapter Six. 
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glimpses are made into pre-colonial African choice of law rules, ending with choice of law 
rules which were applied in pre-colonial West Africa to European traders and settlers. This 
may have established the basis of legal relations between West Africans and Europeans 
during the colonial period. 
Chapter Five deals with "Choice of Law in French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa". The 
chapter traces the French settlement in Senegal in 1638 to modem times. French colonial 
policy is analysed and the African reaction to it discussed. The main aim of French colonial 
policy was to assimilate the African and turn him or her into a French person, albeit, a 
second-class French citizen. In this, the French largely failed but their domination is still 
visible. Local legal systems and laws were severely suppressed but the local legal systems 
have survived. The French created a hierarchy of norms, with French law at the apex. A 
status (statut) was created for all residents in the colony, with, again the French in the 
supremacy. The idea was to encourage local people to strive for French status but the 
exercise failed badly and few Africans opted for French citizenship. 
Chapter Six discusses "Choice of Law in English-speaking Africa". Choice of law rules 
were enacted for the Gold Coast colony in 1876, permitting local "law and custom" to be 
pleaded at any court, not only in the "native courts". This legislation was taken over by most 
British West African colonies and some of the colonies in East Africa. The concept of 
indirect rule, practised in some colonies, further enhanced the development of local legal 
systems. There was no hierarchy of norms and no social status was prescribed. There were 
only "natives" and "non-natives" but "natives" was not defined racially, so that a Sierra 
Leonean African or a West Indian did not qualify as a "native". Nevertheless, the Common 
law and `customary' law sometimes mixed and race was not the paramount issue, at least in 
West Africa. As Allott observes, conflict of laws between the common law and customary 
law arose because the two systems were not kept in watertight compartments. 
"With the development of colonial administration the connexion between the two 
kinds of law grew even closer and more complex.... In some territories, it was even 




In Eastern and Southern Africa, where the colonial policy was the settlement of Europeans, 
colonial policy was not that liberal. 
Chapter Seven examines "Choice of Law in Post-Independence Africa". Ghana was the 
first African country to gain its independence in 1957. In 1960, the entire legal system was 
reformed, including the enactment of a set of new choice of law rules. In many ways, the 
new rules were revolutionary. The choice of law rules introduced a new connecting factor 
`community' into Ghanaian law as the, basis of legal . relations. The significance of the 
connecting factor is that it is a recognition of the territorial nature of African legal systems. 
People would be expected to continue to live in "communities", even though they were 
living away from home. Certain concepts, such as `native' or `non-native' were discarded. 
Chapter Eight deals with two specific topics, Contract and Public Policy. The contract 
section deals mainly with Ghana, because the old Supreme Court Ordinance had provided 
for contractual relations and the post-independence Courts Act did the same. In the French- 
speaking countries, very little was done to promote the development of the local legal 
systems in the area of contract. The French had created a dual court system, so that droit 
coutoumier could be pleaded only in the `native courts', thus limiting the development of 
local legal systems.. By 1972, Senegal, for example, abolished the application of local legal 
systems and replaced them with the law of nationality37. 
Public Policy discusses the British concept of `repugnancy' and the French idea of ordre 
public. Public policy is not frequently applied in inter-local conflict of laws but the arrival of 
European legal systems meant that there would be conflicts between African and European 
systems. To solve the problem, the British introduced the concept that `native law and 
custom' would be enforced only if it was not "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience". In Eastern and Southern Africa, the concept was limited to personal relations 
36 Alloff; pp. 107 - 108. Z7 
" Law No. 72 - 061 of 12 June 1972. 
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but in West Africa, it applied mostly to property rights. 
The French application of ordre public to conflits coloniaux, as they referred to inter-local 
conflict of laws in the colonies, was uncompromising. A local legal rule would not apply if 
it conflicted with civilisation francaise. This application of ordre public further frustrated 
the development of local legal systems in French colonies. 
Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter, "Evaluation and Conclusions". The chapter 
discusses the view that since few African countries have enacted choice of law rules, the old 
colonial rules would still be applicable. This would mean that the modem court has to refer 
to the colonial rules whenever necessary and interpret them to suit modern needs. With 
progressive judicial activism, the court would have to rely on the rules of private 
international law as a guide. The arguments made in this dissertation are also summarised. 
Appendices have been added at the end of this study mainly for reference purposes. A 
number of countries have enacted choice of law rules since becoming independent after 
1960 and even Ghana has adopted a set of new choice of law rules. However, the major 
reason for reproducing the legislation is to demonstrate how close they are to the old 
colonial rules. The repugnancy rules have been retained and in certain instances, even the 
connecting factor "tribe" has remained. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In approaching law in Africa, it might be useful to ignore the political boundaries, in 
existence at the present and concentrate on characteristics which are common to African 
legal systems. 
The first observation to be made is that African societies before colonialism, were 
essentially agricultural societies and the legal systems were based on agricultural production. 
Very little has changed today, except that there are now urban centres. African societies are 
still basically agricultural and are based on the village system. A community consists of 
several villages, each autonomous with its own legal and administrative machinery. The 
Chief is the custodian of the land, which generally cannot be purchased on an individual 
basis38. Agriculture has influenced every major institution. Thus the payment of a dowry by 
the prospective husband's family to the bride's family was to compensate the bride's family 
for the loss of a farm hand 39 
Another characteristic shared by African legal systems is that they operate in societies which 
are communal or collective in nature. Often, individual rights are subjected to the collective 
rights of the community. The individual and the group complement each other. 
Nevertheless, as Elias points out, the individual is still largely responsible for his or her legal 
responsibilities, even if help is given by the family or the community40. Nevertheless, the 
group is not an abstract entity, just as much as the individual is not autonomous. It is this 
corporate nature of the African community and the individual's place in it which accounts 
for the uniqueness of the African connecting factor - the ancestral home. Even if a member 
38 Elias,. T. 0; Nigerian Land Law and Custom, Second Edition, 1953, p. 6. 
39 See generally Kouassigan; L'homme et la terre, 1966. 
40 Elias, T. 0;. The Nature of African Customary Law, 1956, pp. 87 - 90. Cited hereafter 
as Elias. 
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of the community has lived abroad all his life and by the law of another forum acquires a 
new domicile, his legal connection with his African community is never severed. He and his 
descendants remain part of it. The African domicile of origin cannot be easily displaced41. 
However, the most striking feature of African legal systems is that, except for Islamic Law, 
they are all based on the oral tradition. As Elias points out about law in Africa; 
"It is of course necessary to remember that the absence of writing rules out the 
existence of documentary codes of law such as are the enviable possessions of the 
Assyrians, the Babylonians and their imitators and successors in the art of codified 
law42. " 
It is possibly this oral nature of African legal systems which confuses foreign legal writers 
into classifying all African legal systems as customary law systems. 
II. The Customary Law Court System 
In every town or village, there is a tribunal in which the Chief or headman presides. Higher 
or appeal tribunals also exist, which hear appeals from lower courts. In the case of Ghana, 
there is also a state council43. All these tribunals were recognised by the Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance 188344. Thus, what became known as the Customary Law Courts or Native 
Courts under British colonial administration derived their juridical power from statutes and 
not from indigenous authority 45. They differed in their constitution, powers and modes of 
execution of orders from the indigenous tribunals they came to replace and resembled the 
41 Date-Bah argues that there has never been a decision in the Ghanaian courts to the effect 
that a person had lost his or her personal law. (1971) 5 R. G. L. p. 138. 42 
Elias, p. 188. 
43 Danquah, J. B; Akan Laws and Customs, 1928, Chapter IV, p. 66. 44 ibid, p. 66. 
45 Ollenu, N. A; "The Structure of African Judicial Authority and Problems of Evidence 
and' Proof in Traditional Courts " in Ideas and Procedures in African Customary 
Law, Ed. Gluckman, M; 1969, p. 110. Cited hereafter as Ollenu. 
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District Magistrate's Court in the English system46. However, they retained some major 
characteristics of the indigenous African tribunal. For example, cases coming before them 
were principally cases involving customary law; second, practice, procedure and giving 
evidence were regulated by customary law47. In giving evidence, for example, the holder of 
traditional office would speak in the first person of events which took place long before his 
time, for in African culture, an office holder identifies himself with his ancestors and 
predecessors 48. However, this does not mean that all forms of hearsay evidence are 
admissible. Gluckman reports on the Barotse that a witness was warned in the following 
words; 
"What you heard with your ears, what you saw with your eyes, tell us. Hearing and 
seeing the quarrel are good. Do not tell us anything you have been told about the 
fight"49. 
The customary law court may also admit authentic documents which may appear to it as 
relevant, even though such documents would be inadmissible at a common law court 
50 
At the lowest level of the court system is the arbitral court, or informal investigations held 
by the head and elders of a family or by a Chief in camera. These traditional tribunals 
continued to exist, despite the recognition of the higher courts by legislation. These tribunals 
came to be called courts of arbitration51. The proceedings at these courts are held almost 
exactly as before a formal tribunal52. There is a judicial investigation on the merits, except 
that it is held in an informal manner, and judgment is pronounced for one party or the 
other 53 
46 ibid, p. 110. 
47 ibid, p. 110. 
48 Busia, K. A; The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System ofAshanti, 
1961, p. 73. 49 , --, m) 1..,. w .., .. ----- 
GA 
uiucxman, ivi; t ne uazczai Process Among the lfarotse of Northern Rhodesia, 19.: )1, 
republished 1967, p. 51. 
" Ollenu, p. 110. 
51 ibid, p. 111. 
52 Danquah, J. B; Akan Laws and Customs, 1928, p. 83. 53 ibid, p. 86. 
Is 
During the hearing, either party may swear the National Oath. The other party may (i) 
withdraw and have judgment pronounced against him. Or, (ii) he may proceed without 
swearing, in which case the proceedings continue unless the first party swears an oath to 
have the matter heard by a recognised tribunal; (iii) the second party may reply to the oath 
54 and the case then has to go to a Chiefs tribunal. There are two types of arbitration 
proceedings; 
(i) arbitration properly so called which decides who is right and who is wrong, and 
(ii) reconciliation or negotiations for settlement. 
If an award is made at the arbitration proceedings, it can only be enforced at a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The award is then recognised as "... definite evidence of liability 
before competent witnesses"55. Although Danquah was writing about the Akans of Ghana, 
similar arbitration tribunals have been identified in Freetown56 and in the Bechuanaland 
s Protectorate. 
The essence of arbitral proceedings is to decide who is right and who is wrong but there is 
also the family or domestic settlement, at which elders negotiate a compromise and persuade 
the parties to accept it, without going into the merits, as in boundary disputes but such an 
award is binding only if accepted by both parties. It is described by Sir Mark Wilson, C. J., 
as an attempt by a Chief and his elders or others, to negotiate a settlement agreeable to both 
parties so as to obviate violence and the growth of bad feeling in a community58. 
For an arbitral award to be binding, the Appeal Court of Ghana held in Isifu v Donkor 9 that; 
(i) the parties must have voluntarily submitted the dispute to the arbitrators to have 
54 ibid, pp. 85 - 86. 55 ibid, p. 84. 
56 Banton, M; "Tribal Headmen in Freetown", Journal of African Administration, vi, 3, 
1954, p. 10. 
57 Schapera, I; "The Ngwato of the Bechuanaland Protectorate", in African 
Political Systems, Ed. Fortes, M and Evans-Pritchard, E. E, 1940, . pp. 63 - 64. rr- -- 58 Ankrah & others v Debrah, L. A. No. 93/53.31 March 1954. Unreported. Cited in 
Ollenu, p. 116. 
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it decided informally but on its merits, and there must be evidence that the full 
implications were explained to, and agreed to, by the parties; 
(ii) they must have agreed in advance to accept the award; 
(iii) the award must be arrived at not arbitrarily but after hearing both parties in a 
judicial manner; 
(iv) practice and procedure for the time in the Native Court of the area must have 
been followed as nearly as possible; and 
(v) there should be publication of the award. 
What appears to be important is that the award of a negotiated settlement must be accepted 
by both parties before it can be said to be binding on them. In Ghana, when the award is 
accepted by both parties, each of them must give aseda or a gift in cash or in kind to the 
tribunal to signify their acceptance 60 
An important feature of the African traditional legal system is that there is no distinction 
between the executive and the judiciary. The Chief and the elders, who hold political power 
in traditional society are also the judges who sit at the tribunals. This has the advantage of 
giving judgments and awards of the tribunals both political and judicial authority. 
III. The Use of Legal Fiction in African Customary Law 
Legal fiction is a tool employed in legal reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates. It 
assumes that something is true even though it may not be the case. The constructive trust in 
the common law is a good example of a legal fiction. Every legal system employs legal 
fiction to effect necessary adjustments to legal rules in order to do justice and to strengthen 
the legal system. 
"Legal fiction is the mask that progress must wear to pass the faithful but blear-eyed 
59 n r.. !, " ", .I-.,,,. .,. .- ----- -- 
LA '. ut. t-, wit Appeai iNo. I/Z, 13 May 1963. Unreported. 
°" Ollenu, p. 118. 
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watchers of our ancient legal treasures"61. 
African legal systems are no exception to this practice and legal fiction is used freely 
whenever the court finds itself in difficulties in adjusting a law to current needs. In the 
words of Driberg; 
"But Africans are ingenious people and have devised another and easier way of 
getting out of an impasse. If any custom or law begins to feel oppressive, they do not 
care to abrogate it at once on account of religious sanction. But being masters of 
legal fiction, they devise a ceremony which in any particular case will absolve them 
from the operation of the old law. I may cite as an example a Thonga ceremony 
which breaks down the blood-tie and thus authorises a form of marriage legally 
incestuous. In course of time the ceremony becomes an important thing and takes the 
place of the obsolete law"62. 
Elias cites several examples of legal fiction in various African societies to demonstrate how 
widespread the practice is. For example, the penalty for murder in most traditional African 
societies was death but to avoid revenge killing, the family or clan of the deceased would 
employ a total foreigner to carry out the execution, under the legal fiction that the guilty 
party was killed by an enemy during a battle63. Revenge killing is socially disruptive and in 
hiring a foreigner to carry our the execution, the peace is preserved. 
In civil matters, it is not unusual that a complainant would deliberately commit a public 
infraction, which would bring him before the elders or the chief. In the investigation into his 
offence, the complainant's real. grievance is revealed64. To an outsider, such deliberations 
must seem lengthy with irrelevant and inadmissible evidence being adduced but the aim is 
61 Cohen, Morris R; Law and the Social Order, 1933, p. 126. 62 Driberg, J. H; "The African Conception of Law" in Journal of Comparative and 
International Law. Nov. 1934, pp. 242 -3. Cited in Elias, T. O; The Nature of African 
Customary Law, 3n1 Impression 1972, p. 177. Cited hereafter as Elias. 63 Elias, p. 178. 
64 Rattray, R. S; Ashanti Law and Constitution, 1929, p. 288. 
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to always do justice. 
Among the nobility of the Baganda in Uganda, the fiction was employed that a male 
adulterer was a mussi or a murderer. The one-time Attorney-General of Uganda, Hone, 
reports, it as follows; 
"We may pause for a moment to state that, apart from the fact that among the better 
classes of the Baganda, the chastity of married women was carefully guarded, the 
justification for the exaction of the extreme penalty in such cases of adultery is 
authoritatively stated to be based on a legal fiction, the very existence of which is, to 
say the least, remarkable"6s 
The reason for referring to the adulterer as a mussi was that a member of the upper classes 
would always go armed with a spear to visit his married mistress and would not hesitate to 
use the weapon if he was discovered. He was therefore regarded as a potential murderer and 
if found guilty of adultery, was executed for murder66. During the colonial period, the 
repugnancy rule outlawed such a punishment and heavy fines were imposed instead 67. 
In the administration of justice some African societies employ legal fiction to secure the 
immunity and impartiality of judges. The Baganda usually appoint a chief to act as a chief 
judge in important cases coming in from any village under his jurisdiction. The heads of all 
families signify their acceptance of his judicial authority by ceremonially cutting down some 
of the judge's banana trees in the presence of others68. The entire town in which the chief 
lives, becomes the offended town and must never be attacked. If any of the judge's future 
decisions should go against the fictional offenders they could not attack him or the village69 
In this way the stability of society is maintained and the security of tenure of the judge is 
guaranteed. 
65 Hone, H. R; "The Native of Uganda and the Criminal Law" in The Uganda Journal, 
Vol. VI, No. l July 1938, p. 5. 66 Elias, p. 179.. 
67 ibid, p. 179. 
68 ibid, p. 180. 
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The legal fiction is based on the notion that the fictional offenders had first offended the 
judge by cutting down his banana trees and since it is accepted principle that a second 
offence could only be entertained after the first had been heard, the complainant's case 
against the judge's verdict cannot be heard until the first offence against the judge had been 
resolved70. 
Among the Sesuto of Botswana, "all children born to a man's wife, whether begotten by 
him or not, and even if begotten after death, are regarded as his legitimate issue" 71. It could 
happen that the pregnant woman was never properly married to the deceased. In that case, 
the woman is declared "married to the grave" of her `deceased husband' and by custom, gets 
married to the younger brother in the name of the deceased. `By a legal fiction, her children 
are regarded as the deceased's children and the eldest son should succeed him"7Z. 
In modem times, a brother no longer "inherits" his deceased brother's children, generally the 
courts would award the children to the mother's family73. Ashton reports that the practice 
has almost died out. It was once a social and economic insurance for aged widows but is 
now seen by the younger generation as immoral74. 
The extensive use of legal fiction in African legal systems is due probably to slower 
development of legislation. As society develops from rural to urban lifestyle, the familiar 
legal rules are not always able to deal adequately with new problems which arise. Legal 
fiction is quick to develop on case by case basis as a means of extending or modifying strict 
rules of law in the light of changing society. One major usefulness of legal fiction is that it 
conceals the fact that a rule of law has been changed or modified. That is a useful 
contribution to the stability of society. 
69 ibid, at p. 180. 
" 
70 ibid, p. 180. 
71 Ashton, H; The Basuto, 1952, p. 194. 
72 ibid, p. 195. 
73 ibid, p. 182. 
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IV. Sources of Conflict in African Legal Systems 
(i) The Political Organisation of African Societies. 
The earliest mention of the political organisation of African societies is that of Al-Yaqubi, 
an Arab geographer and traveller, who visited the kingdoms of Ghana, Gao and Kanem in 
872 AD 75. He observed that these kingdoms had other kings under their authority. Al- 
Yaqubi had unwittingly discovered the basic structure of political organisation in West 
Africa. Large empires and kingdoms are in fact, superstructures imposed over smaller 
kingdoms and chiefdoms. Elias has classified political organisation in West Africa into 
76 three main types. 
Group A. Consists of highly centralised authority in which loyalty is owed to one supreme 
ruler or King-in-Council. Elias further divides this group into two sub-groups: - 
(a) strong centralised kingdoms, such as the Ashanti, Yoruba or the Baganda in Uganda. 
Although these are centralised, a good deal of power is devolved to the various territorial 
units which owe common allegiance to the king; 
(b) a loose federation of kingdoms, united under an overlord, mainly for administrative 
purposes. The majority of West African societies fall into this group. 
Group B. Here the societies generally have neither monarchies, centralised authority nor 
organised judiciary but recognise certain elders as traditionally qualified to participate in the 
settlement of disputes. The social units are territorially independent of each other. 
74 Ashton, H; The Basuto, 1952, p. 82. 75A1-Yaqubi; Kitab al-Tarikh, Ed. by Houtsma,. 1863-6, pp. 219-20. Cited in the 
Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 2.500 - 1050 AD, p. 667. The principal sources of 
the early history of West Africa are from Arab geographers and historians until about the 
fifteenth century. Among the Arab authors whose accounts show knowledge of the 
northern parts of West Africa are al-Khwarizmi, al-Fazari, al-Yaqubi, Ibn al-faqih and 
al- Bakri; Bibliographical Essays to the Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 2, p. 716. 76 Elias, p. 11. 
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Group C. Comprises of societies organised on general principles of Islam, such as Northern 
Nigeria, Northern Ghana, most of The Gambia, Senegal, Guinea and all the societies of the 
Sahel region. These are usually strong centralised semi-feudal organisations, except where 
the hold of Islam is weak, such as Northern Ghana. However, this group is closer to Group 
A than to North African theocracies, except that religion plays a more important role in their 
legal systems than in the other groups. 
In Group A societies, a chief is the territorial head of administration and of the judiciary. He 
is the final authority within the territory over which he is chief. Islamic territories in Group 
C also have the same organisation. 
In Group B, on the other hand, each territorial unit is independent of the other and no single 
authority has overall jurisdiction. Power is confined to each territory. 
The common feature of Group A societies in West Africa is the devolution of power to the 
regions and districts77. To avoid tyranny and absolutism by the king, an array of mechanisms 
have been evolved to limit his power. Institutions such as the King's Council of Chiefs, the 
Queen Mother's Court and powerful secret societies in which the king is primes inter 
pares78, have seen to it that the king does not become an absolute ruler. If he abuses power, 
he could be deposed (destooled) or the subordinate chiefs could secede from the federation. 
Elias reports that among the Yoruba of Nigeria, the king could be required to commit 
suicide by swallowing poison. 79 
The devolution of power to the regions and the federal system have made conflict between 
the laws of the various legal systems inevitable. 
76 Elias, p. 11. 
77 Rattray; Ashanti Law and Constitution, 1929, p. 81. 78 Discussed in Butt-Thompson, F. W; West African Secret Societies, cited in Elias note 
16. 
79 Elias, cited note 16. 
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(ii) Conflict between Islamic Law and Local Customary Law. 
(a) Historical background of Islam in West Africa. . 
Islam was first introduced into West Africa by Berber and Arab traders but by the end of the 
ninth century, Al-Yaqubi was still able to say that the King of Ghust (Awdaghust), "did not 
follow any religious practices nor possess any revealed law80". In other words, the king was 
a non-believer. Gradually, however, a few leaders in the Sahara region became islamised 
although their Islam remained diluted with their own practices and laws81. 
The turning point seems to have arrived when the first disciples of Malik b. Anas arrived in 
Ifrigiya (the Maghrib) and established the fuqaha , or the Maliki school of law. The 
Malikites won the sympathy of the common people who admired their strict adherence to 
the holy Koran and the Sunna82. In the Sahara region of West Africa, the centre of Islamic 
learning came to be established at Kairouan from where the Malikites propagated the study 
of Islamic jurisprudence (flqh) and though they were ascetics, they did not withdraw 
entirely from the world. They became the defenders of the common people's rights and 
challenged the rulers over the people's rights83. By the tenth century Kairouan had become 
such an important centre for the study of Islamic law that almost all important Islamic 
84 lawyers of the Maghrib studied there at some point. 
However, the major achievement of the Malikites was the conversion to Islam of the first 
major Empire of West Africa, the Ghana Empire85. In 1076, the Almoravids conquered the 
Ghana Empire and converted many to Islam. By the beginning of the twelfth century, Ghana 
80 Al-Yaqubi; Buldan, p. 300. Cited in Cambridge History of Africa Vol. 2,500 BC - AD 1050, p. 655. Most of the discussion in this section is based on material in Volume 2, 
Cambridge History of Africa. 81 ibid, at p. 655. 
82 ibid,, at p. 656. 
83 ibid,. at p. 657. 
84 ibid,. at p. 657. 
85 Ca AD 300 - 1070. 
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was able to expel the Almoravid invaders and to reassert her independence but the Moslem 
influence remained. 86 
The Islam which the West Africans came to accept was rather rudimentary. The King of 
Malal,. a Malinke kingdom, was converted to Islam only because a Moslem appeared in his 
kingdom and prayed for rain during a drought which had lasted several years. It rained and 
he agreed to be converted but "... while the common people remained polytheists87". The 
islamisation of the leadership became the pattern in West Africa. The leadership needed the 
literary skills of the Moslem scholars to keep records, write letters and to communicate with 
foreigners and, to please them, the king would convert to Islam. But the king had to lead a 
non-Moslem population and in mobilising national resources, he had to turn to the 
traditional religions and law which were relevant to his people rather than the universalistic 
appeal of Islam; 
"That the king of Malal was taught only those religious obligations which no one 
might be excused from knowing might indicate the superficial islamization of the 
chief, whose ties with the traditional religion were not totally severed". 88 
By the fourteenth century, the Mali Empire, which had replaced Ghana, was at its height and 
the reigns of the Emperors Askiya Mansa Munsa and his brother Sulayman Mansa are 
hailed in the Arab annals as the age of Islam in West Africa. Mansa Munsa is described as 
"... a pious and righteous man" who... "made his empire a part of the land of Islam, built 
mosques ... and instituted the public prayer on Friday.... He attracted Maliki scholars... and 
was devoted (himself), to Islamic studies". Nevertheless, Mali only had an appearance of a 89 
86 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, p. 349. 87 Al-Bakri; Kitab al-masalik wa'1-mamalik, Translated and edited by M. G. de Slave 
(Algiers 1911), p. 178. Also cited in the Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 2, p. 672. Al- 
Bakri is credited with the most detailed and accurate accounts of these parts of West 
Africa. He was the first from the Western Moslem world (Spain and the Maghrib) to 
have had access to information about the Sahara and West Africa. Al-Bakri's accounts 
are regarded as indispensable for the study of the period of the 1050s. He wrote 
extensively on the West African states of Takrur, Ghana and Gao. 88 Cambridge of Africa, Vol. 2, p. 672. 
89 Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 3, c. 500 B. C - AD 1050, p. 390. 
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Moslem State, a thin layer beneath which traditional beliefs and law prevailed. Ibn Battuta 
reported that he was present at two Islamic festivals which were turned into non-Moslem 
national feasts when the King arrived90. Thus, although the people learnt the Koran by heart, 
this was merely an external trapping. The only link the people had with Islam was their 
membership of an Islamised Empire. The Sharia (Islamic Law), was almost totally 
ignored, especially in family law and sexual behaviour. The King and the nobility combined 
Islam with traditional practices and only the 'true Moslems', Arab traders and clerics, 
remained fully committed to Islam. 
This approach to Islam continued into the Songhai Empire, which succeeded Mali. Moslem 
traders, clerics and Arab travellers were treated with respect because of the powerful magic 
which their religion was thought to possess but even more so because they were literate and 
could communicate with foreigners from North Africa and Europe and their commerce 
contributed to the economy91. For these reasons, the Emperor and the lesser kings allowed 
themselves to be Islamised. The attitude of the Emperors to Islam is demonstrated by the 
behaviour of the Songhai Emperor Sonni Ali, in the seventeenth century. Sonni Ali's mother 
was non-Islamic. He observed the fast of Ramadan and gave contributions to the mosque 
"... but at the same time, he used to worship idols, sought the help of sorcerers and 
sacrificed to trees and stones"92. Although he observed the Moslem prayer, he did not 
observe the time and would often postpone a prayer until night or the next day; 
"... then instead of performing the prescribed ritual of prayer, he only indicated it by 
slight inclinations, and merely repeated the name of the prayer, instead of reciting 
93 the fatiha and other sunas, which he did not care to learn" 
Sonni Ali's was not an isolated case. Most of the ancient Emperors and many local leaders 
today practice a dual role. They allow themselves to become islamised but only for 
90 ibid, at p. 390. 
91 ibid, at p. 423. 
92 ibid, at p. 424. 
93 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, p. 424. 
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functional reasons, for their legitimacy is derived from local religion and law94. Most 
probably it is this mixture of Islam and traditional religions which gave the British colonial 
administration the view that Islamic and customary law were much the same thing. 
By the eighteenth century, Islam had arrived on the fringes of the forests of West Africa but 
again, its effect was not uniform. While Islam remained the exclusive religion of North 
Africa, it only had marginal effect in West Africa. The literary usefulness of Moslems 
continued to be exploited and this practice continued south. Thus, Gonja chiefs (in modern 
Ghana), absorbed islamic influence but refused to be converted to Islam or practice the 
Sharia 95 In Borgu, northern Dahomey (now Benin), the chiefs were so reluctant to accept 
Islam that they agreed to satisfy their Moslem clerics by reciting Islamic prayers twice a year 
96 
Thus, by the eighteenth century, Islam had become integrated into the socio-political 
systems of the savannah states97 but the lukewarm attitude of the nobility to Islam 
displeased devout Moslems and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a series of 
jihads were unleashed on the northern belt of West African kingdoms in an attempt to 
compel them to accept and practice Islamic law and religion. The jihads however, did not 
reach the southern savannah states 9ß. 
The Jihads came to be lead by the Fulanis, who originated from the Halpular Valley in 
Senegal and for many centuries, had been nomads. Most of them adopted the Islamic 
religion and became sedentary. In the fifteenth century, some of them began a slow 
migration from the Senegambia towards the East, into Hausaland (now Northern Nigeria), 
where they settled in small communities among non-Moslems99. It was among the Fulani 
left behind in the Senegambia that the Jihad began in 1680. A certain Malik Si declared a 
94 ibid, at p. 424. 
95 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4, p. 194. 96 ibid, at p. 196. Savannah states border, roughly the southern forests and the beginning 
hotter desert climate. 
97 ibid, at p. 197. 
98 ibid, at p. 199. 
99 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 5, pp. 129-30. 
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followed in 1725 by Alfa Ba who declared a Jihad against the non-Moslem Fulani of Futa 
Jalon and founded a Moslem dynasty which survived until the nineteenth century, when it 
was destroyed by the Frenchl01 There is no indication that Islamic law was strictly enforced, 
102 especially upon the non-Fulani elements in the conquered areas 
The most prominent jihad leader however, was Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, who was born 
near Sokoto (now Northern Nigeria), in 1754, of a scholarly Fulani family which had settled 
there. Dan Fodio was a strict believer in the Maliki rites and slowly came to believe that he 
was the Mujaddid, a 'Renewer of the Faith', whom God sends once every hundred years to 
reform Islam and prepare the way for the Mahdil03 
The main result of the jihad was that the Moslem religion and law came to be firmly 
established in Sokoto and the Sharia was imposed on the towns and larger villages but in 
the countryside, the pre-Islamic ways persisted. Thus, pre-Islamic law applied, and still 
does, in most parts of the country, while the Sharia applies in the towns104. 
The reasons why the Fulani jihadists refused to follow up their victories and impose strict 
Islamic law throughout the country appears to lie in the motives which may have prompted 
the jihad in the first place. The Fulani had been nomadic people, most of whom had decided 
to become sedentary only after becoming Moslemsios However, the land tenure system in 
West Africa is such that an individual has free access to land use only if he or she belongs to 
the community which owns it. Elias describes the pattern as follows: 
In Nigeria as in practically all British West African colonies, ownership of 
land in the accepted English sense is unknown. Land is held in community 
106 ownership, and not, as a rule by the individual as such 
101 ibid, at p. 130. 
102 ibid, at p. 130. 
103 ibid, at p. 134. 
104 ibid, at p. 1'49. 
105 ibid, at p. 138.. 
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This form of ownership of land is common to most of West Africa. Thus, a nomadic Fulani 
leader and his followers would enjoy the hospitality of the local ruler and settle on the 
community land but without being able to acquire title to it. In Haus aland, the pattern was 
wide-spread and the local leader usually imposed restrictions on the Fulani settlers regarding 
grazing concessions, limitations on the use of water, penalties for grazing across crops and 
so on107. In time, the Fulani clan leaders came to resent the escalating restrictions and when 
Dan Fodio rose to overthrow their Hausa hosts, most of the settlers joined him. 
Another reason for the success of the jihad in Hausaland was slavery. Slave raiding had 
become part of the Hausa economy and while Moslems would, as a rule, not enslave another 
Moslem (it being forbidden by the Sharia), the Hausa would enslave anyone they could 
capture 108. This may have united the Moslems against Hausa rulers and most likely, 
encouraged non-Moslems to convert so as to obtain protection. It is also believed that the 
jihadists attracted the support of escaped slaves and of the underprivileged 109 
The jihads were thus not only the result of asceticism but also of complex social and 
economic conditions. After the jihadists had succeeded in obtaining their goals, much of 
West Africa returned to the status quo ante, mixing Islam with traditional ways11°. The 
notable exception was the Sokoto jihad, led by Dan Fodio but even here Islam did not 
extend far into the countryside. Islamic law has come to be seen in West Africa as a variety 
of the local legal systems and not necessarily as a separate system with separate rules as is 
the case in the Eastern African countries of Somalia, Kenya and Zanzibari 11 
(b) Historical Background of Islamic Law in East Africa 
The mode of arrival of the Islamic religion in East Africa was different from that of West 
106 Elias, T. 0; Nigerian Land Law and Custom, 2nd Ed 1953, p. 38. 107 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 5, p. 138. 
108 ibid, at p. 138. 
109 ibid, at p. 138. 
110 ibid, at p. 149. 
111 Anderson, J. N; "Relationship between. Islamic and Customary Law in Africa", 
Journal ofAfrican Administration, Vol. 12,1960, p. 228. 
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The mode of arrival of the Islamic religion in East Africa was different from that of West 
Africa. While Islam was brought to West Africa by missionaries and traders, religious 
persecution figures as the main reason for migrants leaving the Persian Gulf to settle in East 
Africa1.12. More recent arrivals were also attracted by trade and the prospects of well-watered 
lands waiting to be inhabited'' 3. 
The earliest information on East Africa comes from the Arabs writing in the ninth and tenth 
centuries11'. According to Al-Masudi15, the people of the area kept cattle and were of 
Ethiopian (Cushitic) stock. The Arabs called the people of East Africa the Sanj, who had 
kings who were elected and troops under their command 1 6. 
According to In al-Mujawir, the earliest Moslem settlement was from the Yemen when the 
Bantu Majid people, East Africans who had settled there, were expelled. A section of these 
people settled in what is now Mogadishu in 1159'17. They were joined later by merchants 
from Abyan and Haram in the Gulf region. Mogadishu was inhabited solely by these 
foreigners who were divided into clans, each with its own Shaykh or leader. A visitor had to 
stay with one of the elders of the clans, who would sponsor him'' 8. Islamic religion and 
" trade then spread south to the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar 9. 
The major migration however started from Oman to the land. of the Sanj. The brothers Said 
and Sulayman b. Abbad were defeated by the Umayyad Caliphate forces and they emigrated 
20 with their families and followers to the area now known as Mombasa1, Kenya. In the 
112 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, c. 1050 -c 1600, p. 199. 113 ibid, at p. 199. 
114 This historical narrative is based on the Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, pp. 
188 - 201, at p. 188. 115 Al-Masudi; Murz j al-dhahab. French translation, Les prairies d'or, Edited and 
translated by Pellat, C, 1962 -71, p. 32. 116 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, p. 188. 
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Twelfth century, more foreigners emigrated from various parts of the Persian Gulf and 
settled in Mogadishu and other parts of the East African coast. By the Fourteenth Century, 
several towns had been established on the coast, all of them inhabited by Moslems121. The 
settlers were very different from the people in the hinterland who were non-Moslem. 
Between the ruler of each city state on the coast and the chiefs of the hinterland, there were 
agreements as to rights and obligations. There were no attempts by the coastal people to 
penetrate the interior or to convert its inhabitants to Islam'22. 
The inhabitants of the coastal cities fell into three groups. The ruling class, usually of mixed 
Arab and African ancestry (the "dark moors" as the Portuguese called them), who were the 
major landowners, merchants and religious leaders. On the second level were the pure- 
blooded Africans, probably captives from the mainland who were in a state of slavery. They 
cultivated the fields and carried out other menial tasks123. Distinct from these two classes 
were the transient or recently settled Arabs and Persians, not yet assimilated into the 
24 society' 
There appears to have been a form of association between the immigrant Arabs and the Sanj 
in the area now known as southern Somaliland. Each Arab trader or group of traders had a 
Sanj who acted as his patron (Sahib) and who, with his people, would defend the Arab if he 
had a dispute with another Sanj125. The Arabs, on the other hand, provided military 
protection. If an Arab absconded with the goods of a Sanj, the Sanj was entitled to take the 
16. goods of any Arab until the debt was settled 
Relations between the settlers and the mainland people must have been cordial as only one 
town on the coast, Gedi, was ever defended by walls before the Sixteenth Century 127. The 
religion of the coastal towns was exclusively Islam of the Sunni sect and of the Shafii 
121 ibid, at p. 207. 
'22 ibid, at p. 208. 
123 ibid, at p. 209. 
124 ibid, at p. 209. 
125 ibid, at p. 209. 
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school. The Africans of the interior were not converted to Islam and there was no significant 
penetration of the interior except in the Zambezi region 128. 
The British colonial administration in East Africa faced a situation which was quite different 
from their experience in West Africa. In West Africa, Islamic law was referred to simply as 
"native law and custom" possibly because the Islamic law found in West Africa was not 
alien to traditional legal systems129. In East Africa, on the other hand, there were immigrant 
Moslem communities and indigenous Moslems whose attitudes to Islam may not necessarily 
coincide with those of the immigrants. It was therefore more difficult to enforce Islamic law 
as "native law and custom"130. Thus, the Kenya Colony Order in Council of 1921 provided 
that; 
"In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives are parties, every court (a) shall be 
guided by native law, so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and 
morality, or inconsistent with any Order in Council or Ordinance, or any regulation 
or rule made under any Order in Council or Ordinance and (b) shall decide all such 
cases according to substantial justice, without excessive regard to technicalities of 
procedure and without undue delay 131" 
In Article 3, the Order in Council defines "native" as "indigenous inhabitant of Africa or 
Arabia", thus taking into consideration the needs of the immigrant communities. 
The coastal strip, referred to as the Protectorate of Kenya, remained the dominion of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar until Kenyan independence 132 and yet, the Kenya Protectorate Order in 
Council, 1920, merely provided that; 
"The Courts now or hereafter established in the Colony shall have in respect of 
128, ibid, at p. 21-1. 
129 A ,_. 11 r, ....,. - -°-- - -- ... - 
130 Anderson, p. 3. 
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matters occurring within the Protectorate, so far as such matters are within the 
jurisdiction of His Majesty the same jurisdiction civil and criminal, original and 
appellate as ... 
occurring in the Colony133 
No reference was made to Islamic Law but the concession granted to the Imperial British 
East Africa Company on 9 October 1888, provided that the Qadis, or Islamic Court judges 
would be appointed by His Highness the Sultan134. Likewise in Tanganyika, no special 
provisions were made for the enforcement of Islamic law although Islamic courts existed 
and were enforcing Islamic law135 
The Uganda Order in Council 1902 also-provided for the application of native law but made 
no reference to Islamic law136. However, the Marriage Ordinance and the Divorce of 
Muhammadans Ordinance, 1906137 made important provisions concerning Moslem 
marriages. It provided that the Marriage Ordinance and the Marriage of Africans Ordinance 
shall not apply to marriages between persons both of whom professed the Moslem religion 
and neither of whom is a party to an existing marriage under or declared valid by the said 
Ordinance with any person other than a Moslem 138. It also provided that every marriage 
"... previously celebrated between Moslems shall be deemed to have been a legal and valid 
marriage"139. The legislation went on to recognise future relationships by providing that; 
"All marriages between persons professing the Muhammadan religion, and all 
divorces from such marriages celebrated or given according to the rites and 
observances of the Muhammadan religion customary and usual among the tribe or 
sect in which the marriage or divorce takes place, shall be valid and registered as 
133 Article XII. 
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herein provided'ao 
The Ordinance went into considerable detail which included the provision that in case of a 
divorce between persons of the Shia sect, there must be two witnesses that a divorce, 
known as khul, is distinguished from other forms, which require registration of the divorce 
141 by both husband and wife. 
The Ordinance provided for "a fine or imprisonment if they [the parties] failed to register 
their marriages or divorces"142. Nevertheless, it stated that: 
"Nothing in this Ordinance shall be construed to (a) render invalid, merely by reason 
of its not having been registered, any Muhammadan marriage or divorce which 
would otherwise be valid; (b) render valid, by reason of its having been registered, 
'as any such marriage or divorce which would otherwise be invalid " 
Detailed as the Ordinance was, it left out succession but covered marriage and divorce and 
catered fully for other family relationships by providing in Section 3 for the recognition of 
relationships "according to the rights and observances of the Muhammadan religion and 
usual rites among the tribe or sect". The use of the expressions "... and usual rites among the 
tribe or sect" appears to suggest that the various Islamic sects and customary law systems 
were included" 144 . 
The Marriage Ordinance, 1902145, however remained in force and according to Anderson146, 
would have the following consequences: 
(1) "A Muslim man who marries a Christian woman under the Marriage Ordinance may 
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neither contract another legal marriage nor divorce his wife except under the terms of 
the Divorce Ordinance - although he would be free to many up to three more wives or 
divorce his wife for any or no reason under Islamic law". 
First, it is not clear what Anderson means by "... contract another legal marriage.... " If a 
man who marries under the Ordinance converts to Islam and marries a second wife, as 
Islamic law permits him to, then that second or subsequent Moslem marriages are legal. 
Second, why is emphasis placed on the wife being Christian? Suppose the wife were subject 
to some regime of customary law or Jewish law, would she lose the protection of the 
Ordinance? Christianity, as a religion, offers no legal-protection enforceable at law, thus, a 
Christian wife is not any better protected in law than wives belonging to other religions. 
What appears to be the case is that Anderson is attempting to create a hierarchy of legal 
norms, placing the Ordinance at the apex. 
(2) "A Muslim girl who has reached the age of twenty-one may marry a non-Muslim under 
the Marriage Ordinance, and so may a girl of under that age if her father or (if he be 
dead, insane or absent from the Protectorate) her mother, etc., gives consent in writing - 
although such a union is utterly precluded under Muhammadan law". 
Anderson admits that in Islamic law, the mother's consent is void, as only the father or the 
guardian may give such consent. It is an established rule in English law that for a marriage 
to be recognised, each party must have capacity to marry 147. That capacity is governed by 
the law of each party's domicil or personal law, where applicable. The capacity to marry, 
for an under-aged Moslem girl, is provided by her personal law, Islamic law, and if that- 
law says that only the father or guardian may give consent for the under-aged girl to 
marry, then the mother's consent must be void. Anderson himself states that in the 
Ordinance "provision is made for the marriage of minor boys and girls by their 
guardians" 148 
147  ,,, Ir., , -. .-- tti - -- - 
lA0 
"° Anderson, p. 148. Emphasis mine. 
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(3) "A non-Muslim man married under either the Marriage Ordinance or the Marriage of 
Africans Ordinance, 1903149, who subsequently embraced Islam would not thereby be in 
a position to divorce his wife or remarry (or, indeed to regard his marriage as 
automatically dissolved) except as provided in the Divorce Ordinance, 1904150 
regardless of the position in Islamic law". 
It is difficult to accept Anderson's position. Conversion to Islam, endows the husband with a 
new personal law which becomes immediately applicable. It is suggested that the husband is 
free to divorce his wife under Islamic law. Although Jatoi v Jatoil51 is a decision by the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is of persuasive. value. In that case, the court held that 
although a Moslem man married a non-Moslem woman according English law, he was free 
to divorce her according to Islamic law. There is no rule in law which suggests that the lex 
loci celebrationis must also be the law of the divorce. 
(4) "Similarly, a non-Muslim woman married under either of these two Ordinances who 
subsequently embraced Islam would still be bound by her marriage, although this is 
regarded as automatically dissolved, if the husband be a non-Muslim and refuses to 
accept Islam, under the Sharia". 
By converting to Islam, the wife acquires a new personal law by which her marriage to the 
-non-Moslem is automatically dissolved if the husband refuses to convert to Islam. It is 
difficult to see how the Ordinance could compel the woman to remain married although her 
personal law, which is the applicable law, has pronounced the marriage dissolved. 
During the British colonial administration, the Moslem communities in East Africa came to 
comprise of Indians, Baluchis, Persians and Arabs from various parts of the Middle East 152. 
As far as enforcement of Islamic law was concerned, there appeared to be little difficulty, 
especially in family matters. In Kenya, Baluchis, Arabs and Somalis were subject to the 
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jurisdiction of Qadis. In Tanganyika they would submit to the jurisdiction of the Liwalis'53 
while in Somalia, they would submit to the Qadis' jurisdiction 154 
(c) Application of Islamic Law 
Generally, in conflicts between Islamic and customary law, it is necessary to distinguish 
those countries where Islamic law was regarded as a variety of native law and custom from 
those where it was treated as a distinct legal system. In the former case, conflict situations 
are left to the native courts, "... such as the Native Tribunal of the Gambia" 155. According to 
Anderson, 
"... it is here that the particular genius of native courts makes itself felt, and they are 
able to make special concessions, at times to Muslim litigants in a way that British 
56 courts could scarcely attempt to emulate"' 
The aim of the native court is not to enforce rigid law but 
"... to reach an equitable solution to the individual case, a solution based on legal 
principles, but with a flexibility of adjustment designed to preserve the social 
157 equilibrium and satisfy both the parties and the public". 
In cases where Islamic law is treated as a separate system, the conflict is avoided by creating 
a separate court for Moslems158. In Northern Nigeria, for example, all matters, civil and 
criminal, except the area of land law where customary law still ruled, and where all parties 
were Moslems, came before the Alkali's court of the Emirs159 The British colonial policy of 
153 Swahili for Qadi. 
154 ibid, at p. 322. 
155 Anderson; "Colonial Law in Tropical Africa: the Conflict between English, Islamic 
and Customary Law"; 35 Indian Law Journal, 1959 - 60, p. 440. 156 ibid, at p. 440. 
157 ibid, at p. 440. 
158 ibid, at p. 440. 
159 Coulson, N. J; Islamic Surveys; A History of Islamic Law, 1964, p. 157. Cited 
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non-interference in religious matters and the recognition of native law and custom was 
preserved. However, the repugnancy clause, "repugnant to natural justice and humanity" 
was available to the Government to limit or prevent certain types of punishments such as 
amputation of the hand for theft and stoning for adultery 160 
Some Islamic punishments remained though, such as flogging for fornication, wine-drinking 
and slanderous allegations of unchastity. However, the manner in which the punishment was 
imposed indicated that it was meant to inflict public shame and religious penance and not 
pain; 
"for the one who administers the lashes must hold the whip between his fingers, 
must keep a stone or similar object under the arm he is using and mi; st not raise his 
wrist above the level of his elbow. " 161 
While Coulson believes that this is the traditional way of imposing the punishment162, it is 
highly probable that the Islamic courts were being careful to avoid flogging forbidden under 
the repugnancy rule. The manner in which flogging, and other Islamic punishments, are 
imposed in modem Northern Nigeria seems to confirm this view 163 
hereafter as, Coulson. 
161 ibid, at p. 157. 
161 ibid, at p. 158. 
162 ibid, at p. 157. 
163 This view is gathered largely from the news media. In September 2002, the Sharia 
court of Katsina State, condemned a woman, Aminal Lawal to death by stoning for 
having had a child outside marriage. See West Africa Magazine, 2-8 September 
2002, Issue No. 4341, p. 20. A Miss World contest scheduled to be held in Nigeria 
in November 2002 had to be cancelled due to rioting by Islamic radicals who 
considered such a contest unislamic. See Political Tensions and Religious Riots, in 
West Africa Magazine, 9- 12 December 2002, Issue No. 4355, pp. 10 - 11. 
Between 2001 and 2002, the Sharia courts of Northern Nigeria have handed down 
36 sentences according to Sharia Law, including the following; 2 convictions of 
126 lashes of the cane each for carrying women on motorcycles; one conviction of 
80 lashes for stealing 3 packets of cigarettes; 3 convictions of 180 lashes each for 
fornication; six convictions of amputation for theft and three convictions of death 
by stoning for adultery. See The Dialectics of the Sharia Imbroglio in Nigeria, pp 
48 - 49,. Monograph by Dr John A. Yakubu, Demyaxs Law Books, Nigeria, 
Monograph Series 4. Copy on file. 
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The jurisdiction of the Islamic courts, especially in criminal matters, was not total, for there 
were cases where the Nigerian Criminal Code prevailed and the matter would come before a 
British-type court. This was usually the case in homicide cases where it had to be 
determined whether the Islamic court had jurisdiction under the Native Courts Ordinance16a 
The decision as to which court had jurisdiction was crucial to the type of punishment 
imposed. In Islamic law, deliberate killing or murder as well all other cases of unintentional 
killing carried the death penalty if the relatives of the deceased demanded it16s Defences to 
homicide in Islamic law are not available and even provocation, which in the common law, 
would only amount to manslaughter, carries the death penalty166. To determine whether the 
Islamic court or the common law courts had jurisdiction, it had be established whether (a) 
the accused was subject to the jurisdiction of the native courts, (b) whether the offence was 
committed within the boundaries of the Emirate in which the Emir's court had jurisdiction 
in criminal cases, (c) whether the case had been investigated by the Nigeria Police or by the 
Native Authority Police, and (d) whether the Resident or other Officer saw it fit to transfer 
the case from the native court to the common law court 167 
This dual jurisdiction was to be found in Native Courts Law 1956 168 which provided as 
follows; 
"Subject to the provisions of this Law but notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Criminal Code Ordinance, where any person is charged with an offence against 
native law and custom, a native court may try the case in accordance with native law 
and custom even though the act or omission constituting the offence may also 
constitute an offence under the provisions of the Criminal Code or any other 
enactment. 
164 ibid, at p. 158. 
165 ibid, at p. 158. 
166 ibid, at p: 158. 
167 Anderson, J, N; "Conflict of Laws in Northern Nigeria", J. A. L., No. 2,1957, p. 87. 168 Cap. 78. 
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Provided that where an act or omission constituting an offence against native law 
and custom also constitutes an offence under the provisions of the Criminal Code or 
of any other enactment, a native court shall not impose a punishment in excess of the 
maximum punishment permitted by the Criminal Code or such other enactment. " 
This unsatisfactory situation led to a conflict in judicial opinion as to whether the Supreme 
Court could, on appeal, interfere with a death penalty properly imposed by an Islamic court 
for homicide which only carries manslaughter under the Criminal Code. This conflict in 
judicial opinion continued until 1957 when it was decided that native courts must not 
impose a sentence which was in excess of the maximum under the Criminal Code for the 
same act or omission169. The Supreme Court of Nigeria finally held that native courts were 
bound to conform to the Criminal Code in regard to sentences. The court also laid down that 
an appellate court may follow one of two options under the Criminal Code by either 
substituting the proper punishment, as provided under Section 67 (1) (b) (iii), or if for any 
reason it was unable to do so, order a retrial under Section 67 (1) (b) (ii) of the Code. 
V. The Partition and Colonisation of Africa 
On the eve of the partition of West Africa, in the 1870s, European influence in the area 
remained restricted to the forts and settlements built on the coast. Europeans had been 
trading with West Africa since the fifteenth century and yet, they had remarkably little 
influence on West African societies. This was not for the lack of trying, "... on the contrary it 
was the richness and diversity of the economies of West Africa which gave its societies the 
strength to withstand European influence"170. Indeed on the eve of partition, "... what was 
apparent and a matter of grave concern (to the. European powers), were West African 
strengths not weaknesses, assertiveness, not passivity "171. 
From 1885 onwards, East Africa began to experience partition on a grand scale. Italy's 
, 7n 
169 Malam Mammam Maizabo & Others v Sokoto Native Authority (F. S. C. 5/1957). 
"" Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 6; p. 40. 171 ibid, at p. 41. 
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claim to Somalia was internationally recognised in 1890172. Britain claimed the territory 
from the Juba river to Vanga173 and the Portuguese extended their sphere of control to cover 
what is now Mozambique174. At this stage, colonial influence was exercised through 
chartered companies but between 1888 and 1900 active conquest of East Africa took place 
'7s 
which established the colonies 
The second major change brought about by colonialism is that the legal systems of Europe, 
mainly those of Britain and France, came to be firmly implanted in Africa and have become 
the general law. The Supreme Court Act of 1876 passed for the Gold Coast, for example, 
stated that; 
The Common Law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general application 
which were in force in England at the date when the colony obtained a local 
legislature, that is to say, on the 24th day of July 1874, shall be in force within the 
176 jurisdiction of the court 
This general law inevitably came to conflict with local legal systems and the techniques 
evolved to resolve these conflicts are dealt with below. 
VI. Conflict between Customary Law and Legislation 
The method chosen by the British colonial governments to resolve conflict between 
customary law and legislation was to declare customary law inapplicable when it conflicted 
with any law in force. This approach first appeared in the Gold Coast Colony Supreme 
Court Ordinance 1876 Section 19177 which provided that customary law would not apply if 
it was; 
172 . rn_ ^r. r"-,........ . ,...,. --.. 
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"... incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any enactment of 
the Colonial Legislature existing at the commencement of this Ordinance, or which 
may afterwards come into operation. " 
What the provision did was to remove conflict resolution, in this area of law, from the 
courts. All that needed to be established was that the customary law rule relied upon by the 
party conflicted with an existing legislation in the colony. The Gold Coast provision was 
taken over in several British colonies 17ß, sometimes with slight modifications, such as 
"written laws" in place of "any enactment" in the Western Nigerian legislation. 
The provision was modified in the case of Eastern and Central Africa. Thus, the Uganda 
Order in Council 1902 provided in Article 20 that customary law was inapplicable if it 
conflicted with any law, 
"... or inconsistent with any Order in Council, Ordinance, or any regulation or rule 
made under any Order in Council or Ordinance.... " 
The Eastern. and Southern African exclusion clause was wider than the West African 
provision. 
When Ghana passed the Courts Act 1960179, which introduced new conflicts rules, the 
incompatibility clause was excluded. Most probably, this was due to the new status the 
Courts Act had conferred on customary law. Customary law now had the same status as the 
common law as received in Ghana Customary law was no longer a matter of fact to be 
proved in court Section 67 of the Courts Act 1960180 provided thus: 
177 No. 4. 
178 Nigeria: High Court of Lagos Act (Cap. 80), s. 27 (1); former Eastern Region High 
Court Law 1955, S. 34 (1); former Western Region High Court Law (Cap. 44) 
S. 121(1). 
179 C. A. 9. 
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"(1)... any question as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of 
law for the court and not a question of fact. " 
In the colonial period however, it was not altogether clear whether the incompatibility clause 
referred only to legislation passed for the colony or whether it also included United 
Kingdom legislation and the common law and equity. In other words, would a customary 
law rule be struck down if it conflicted with United Kingdom legislation, but not with local 
colonial written law, or with the common law and equity? It is submitted that the provisions 
containing the exclusion clause referred to the colonies concerned and did not apply to 
United Kingdom legislation. Allott strongly argues that United Kingdom law was excluded 
from the incompatibility rule: 
"It is submitted that this is to negate the whole purpose of recognising customary 
law, and to go behind the `written law' in a way which would appear quite opposed 
to the original intention of the legislator" 81. 
It would seem that this is the correct position to take on this subject. Allott further cites 
L. C. B. Gower, writing on Nigeria, who states that; 
"English common law or statutes of general application can never be incompatible 
with customary law for the simple reason that they have no application to the 
82 transaction governed by customary law" . 
This position however, was not held uniformly in the colonies. In the Northern Rhodesian 
case of R. v Mubanga and Sakeni183, the court was called upon to consider whether a 
particular Bemba custom was inconsistent with the Northern Rhodesian Order in Council 
1924, Article 36 of which provided that native law and custom would apply only if it was 
not 
l8oC. A. 9. 
181 Allott, p. 177. 
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"inconsistent with any Order in Council, Ordinance or Proclamation or any Order in 
Council, Ordinance or proclamation. " 
In the opinion of the learned judge, Somerhough, J., even if the alleged Bemba custom at 
issue in this case were proved to exist; 
"it would clearly be inconsistent with the Common Law and repugnant to justice if, 
by averring a breach of native law and custom, the effect could be achieved whereby 
an offence was created of counselling and procuring a person to do an act which, if 
that person did, he would not be committing an offence. The existence of such an 
offence is not only unknown to the Penal Code of this Territory but it is inconsistent 
with it, as it is with the Common Law; and on the face of it, and in the absence of 
any law to the contrary, that there should be such a law creating the offence of 
peacefully persuading a person or persons to withhold something or refrain from 
doing something which they are entitled to withhold or to refrain from doing, can be 
said to be inconsistent with other laws in force in the Territory and indeed, repugnant 
to justice. " 84 
While it is correct to say that the alleged custom, if proved to exist, could be incompatible 
with the existing Order in Council and any other Ordinances, or repugnant to morality and 
justice, the view. that the customary law rule could be incompatible with the common law is 
wrong. Further, it is difficult to accept that the customary law rule could be incompatible 
with the Penal Code, simply because the Penal Code knows no such parallel rule. The fact 
that the Order in Council uses the word "inconsistent" instead of "incompatible", as in the 
Gold Coast legislation, should make no difference. Both words should be given the same 
meaning. In Gower's view; 
"... a [Nigerian] statute should be construed as not affecting a transaction governed 
by customary law unless it expressly, or by necessary implication provides to the 
184 At p. 179. Allott, p. 178. 
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contrary. The main argument in favour of this conclusion is the manifest absurdity 
35 which would otherwise result"1. 
The only difficulty in Gower's analysis is the expression "necessary implication", as Allott 
observes. How is the court to arrive at the conclusion that by necessary implication a 
customary law rule is incompatible with a piece of legislation? It appears that ; 
"One must regretfully rely on the good sense of the judges, and echo Gower's hope 
that the whole matter be cleared up by the enactment of express rules to govern the 
point"'s6 
VI. Types of Choice of Law in Africa 
(i) Choice of Law in Geographically Separate Law Districts 
The Federal Republic ofNigeria 
Section 6 of the Nigerian Federal Constitution of 1979, vests judicial power in the Federal 
Courts and in the state courts. Nigeria consists of about thirty clearly demarcated federal 
states, each with its own judicial apparatus. For the federation, the Constitution has set up 
the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal High Court. For the federal 
states, the structure consists of the State High Court, the Sharia and/or Customary Court of 
Appeal187. Thus, the question of choice of law is settled once the matter is determined to be 
governed by the Sharia, Customary or general law. Nigeria is therefore one of the few West 
African countries left which has retained the colonial pattern of jurisdictional separation 
between the Common Law and local/Sharia law1ß%. Appeals from the state High Court and 
185 Gower, L. C. B; "Nigerian Statutes and Customary Law" (1964), 1 Nig. L. J. p. 73. 
, oc 
Allott, p. 179. 
`°° Allott, p. 180. 187 Section 5. 
188 Countries which have abolished the "native courts" are; Senegal, Mali Niger, Benin, 
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the state Sharia/Customary law Courts of Appeal are allowed at the Federal Court of Appeal 
and from there to the Supreme Court. At the federal level therefore, jurisdiction has been 
fused. 
Nigeria was constituted into a federation in 1954 by the Colonial Government when the 
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council came into force189. The Order in Council 
established a Legislative House for the federation and for each region and a Supreme 
Court19o In the exercise of establishing the federation, the Government relied heavily on the 
Australian experience. The Order provided for the "Procedure of Federal Supreme Court 
enforcement of Judgments", which was worded in similar terms as the provisions of the 
Federal Council of Australasia Act and the provisions of Section 51 of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act191. The Governor-General, upon the authority of the Order in 
Council, enacted the Adaptation of Laws (Judicial Provisions) Order of 1955192. In a 
schedule to the new law, a new Sheriffs and Civil Process Ordinance was included, Part VII 
of which was entitled "Service of process and Enforcement of the Judgments of the Courts 
of Lagos, the Southern Cameroons and the Regions throughout Nigeria". This was largely a 
copy of Parts II and IV of the Australia Act 193 
As far as recognition of intrafederal judgments is concerned, it would seem that 
"a regime of mutual recognition of judgments across the country is inherent in a 
194 federation". 
Nevertheless, in Nigeria, as, in Australia, reliance has been placed on legislation to regulate 
Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Gabon and Ivory Coast. 189 Section 3 L. N. 102 (1954). This section on Nigeria is based on the unpublished 
Ph. D thesis by Tunde Ajibade of King's College London, entitled Aspects of the 
Intrafederal Conflict ofLaws. Cited hereafter as Ajibade. 190 Section 138, cited in Ajibade. 
191 Ajibade, p. 204. 
192 L. N. 47 (1955), Ajibade p. 205. 193 ibid, at p. 205. 
194 The Canadian Supreme Court in Morguard Investment Ltd v De Savoye (1900) 
D. L. R. 4 `h 256. Ajibade, p. 293. 
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recognition, rather than to wait for individual cases to set the precedent. The service of writs 
and recognition of judgments is governed by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act195. The Act 
96 
enables a state to serve a writ on a person residing in another state' 
(ii) Choice of law in Geographically undivided Countries 
In geographically undivided states, it is possible to have various legal systems operating side 
by side. This happens when the population of these units have different rules on certain 
matters, such as status, marriage or succession. Their proximity to each other enables 
contacts to be made at various levels, such as inter-marriage, succession to property in a 
"foreign" law district and so on. Geographically undivided countries form the usual pattern 
in inter-local conflict of laws in Africa. 
(iii) Specially Constructed Choice of Law Rules for Inter-local Conflict of Laws 
In some African countries, rules have been specially constructed for resolving inter-local 
conflict of laws197. The rules are meant for the guidance of the courts in resolving inter-local 
conflict of laws in geographically undivided countries. The major difference between these 
types of rules and the federal type is that while the federal type rules are left to be formulated 
by the federal states to construct, the rules for the geographically undivided countries are 
always constructed by the central authority 198 
195 Chap. 407. Vol. 22, L. N. 1990. Ajibade, p. 211. 
196 Ajibade, p. 211. 
197 See for example, Ghana's Courts Act 1960, Section 66. 
198 See for example, the case of the former Soviet Union and former 
Czechoslovakia, Lasok, 15 Am. J. Comp. Law, 1966, p. 330. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES TO INTER-LOCAL 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
I. Introduction 
There is the temptation to assume that the rules of private international law cannot apply to 
inter-local conflict of laws, since the two types of conflict of laws operate in different 
spheres, private international law between sovereign states while inter-local conflict of laws 
operates between various regions within the same sovereign state. In this chapter, the 
attempt will be made to show that the rules of private international law apply equally to 
inter-local conflict of laws, or at least must be applied by analogy where they cannot be 
applied directly. 
The short historical account is to demonstrate that the basic concepts of private international 
law have originated from inter-local conflict of laws and that they have remained 
unchanged, in spite of the change in emphasis from the province or district to the sovereign 
state. 
Finally, it will be shown that West African legal systems are territorially based and are not 
personal legal systems as some writers have suggested 1 99. 
II. Historical Background of Inter-local Conflict of Laws 
Towards the close of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Empire, the Empire in 
Italy consisted of provinces and municipalities. Each province had its own magistrates and 
jurisdiction and in some cases even its own legislative powers. Inevitably, conflict of laws 
199 Lipstein and Szaszy; "Interpersonal Conflict of Laws", in International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. 11.11, Chapter 10; Lampue; "Les conflits 
des loin interregionaux et interpersonnel", Revue critique de droit international 
prive, 1954, Vol. 43, p. 249. 
s® 
resulted2oo 
Each individual was legally connected either with the City of Rome or with, at least, one of 
the provinces. The connecting factor was either citizenship or domicil. Citizenship was the 
result of origo (ie by birth, adoption, manumission or by election). Origo was transmitted 
through a person's father, if born legitimate, or through the mother, if born illegitimate. 
Domicil was the place of permanent abode, freely chosen by the individual to govern his or 
her business relationships. Permanency was not interpreted to mean unchanging but was 
meant to exclude transitory presence in a territory. A person could always change domicil 
but presence in the province must be accompanied by the intention to remain. 
Thus, a person could, theoretically, be a citizen by origo , that is be born 
into the 
community, freed into it or be elected into it, while at the same time maintaining a domicil 
in a different province201. A woman who married into a "foreign" province did not lose her 
citizenship but retained it in abeyance, so that she could be relieved of her duties (munera) 
of citizenship. The same applied to a person who was elected to the senate in Rome and his 
02 descendants and to a soldier serving abroad2. 
Since a person could be connected with more than one province at once, the inevitable 
choice of law problems arose where the plaintiff and the defendant were connected with 
different provinces. In principle the suit could be brought in any of the provinces with which 
the defendant was connected. In Savigny's view however, the domicil would be preferred by 
the plaintiff because the defendant could be more easily reached 203 If this was not possible, 
for example in the case of a manumitted slave, then any other origo was appropriate. but 
only if the defendant had an origo in Italy, otherwise, his domicil was the appropriate forum. 
The forum in which the case was brought was crucial for each province, except the city of 
Zoo This part of the historical account is based on Von Savigny: A Treatise on the Conflict 
ofLaws, 1849, (Guthrie's translation). Cited hereafter as Savigny. 201 Savigny, p. 48. 
202 ibid, at p. 48 
203 ibid, at p. 69. 
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Rome, which enforced only its own territorial law to the total exclusion of other territorial 
law. 
When it comes to personal law, Savigny held; 
"... that when a person had origo and domicil in two different cities, the local law to 
Zoa which that person was subject was determined by origo and not by domicil" 
This Savigny explains, is due to the fact that the origo was the closer tie, compared with 
domicil, "which depends on an arbitrary and capricious choice" 205 
The barbarian conquest of Rome effectively brought to an end the territorial legal system 
and introduced the personal legal system into the former Roman Empire. Between the sixth 
and ninth centuries, each of the conquering tribes, Visigoths, the Lombard, the Burgundians 
etc, professed the law of their nation and not the law of the territory in which they were 
domiciled206 
R 
By the end of the tenth century, the personal legal system gave way to the territorial legal 
system yet again. The reasons for this change were not the same everywhere. In the 
Germanic regions, north of the Alps, feudalism was the main cause. All who lived within a 
fief were subject to the manorial court and to. the laws of the feudal overlord. The 
application of the law was territorial and governed all persons and transactions within the 
fief. The feudal lord had complete disregard for all "foreign" legal systems and did not 
accord any rights to a stranger. A person who left the fief for another, stood in danger of 
losing his property and his liberty and could not dispose of his property upon death. Personal 
rights were seen only as part of the feudal system for "Feudalism is the negation of 
207 personality". Thus conflict of laws could not exist in feudal society, which was rigidly 
204 Savigny, p. 76. 
205 ibid, p. 76. 
206 Cheshire and North; Private International Law, 11th Ed. P. 16. 
207 Cheshire and North; Private International Law, 11th Ed. P. 16. This quotation has 
been retained, although it is no longer to be found in the 13`h Edition.. 
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organised and self-contained and had no use for neighbouring legal systems 208 
The situation in the southern parts of Europe, especially Italy, was different. Here, the 
rebirth of the territorial legal system was due to the rise of the Italian city states and not to 
feudalism. Apart from the general law, which continued to be Roman, each city state had its 
own municipal legal system which portrayed individual variations between the cities. The 
diversity of these laws, especially in commercial practice, prompted some recognition of the 
laws of the other city states. This ultimately gave rise to the science of private international 
law 209 
III. The Statutist Period 
With the increase in commerce between the city states, Italian jurists came to realise that for 
rights to be enforceable in another city, one rule must be allowed to govern the same type of 
relationship. The father of this approach was Bartolus (1314-1357), who proceeded to list 
groups of relationships under a given rule of law210. 
The statutist classified each law as `personal' or as concerning `impersonal things', or as 
`mixed personal and impersonal'. A `real' statute was one whose principal object was to 
regulate things, a personal statute was one which concerned persons, while a mixed statute 
covered acts such as contracts. Real statutes applied only within the territory in which they 
were enacted and had no extra-territorial application. Personal statutes applied, not only in 
. the territory 
in which the person was domiciled but also in other territories11 2 
By the sixteenth century, the statute theory had arrived in France, where the internal political 
organisation was such that a study of conflict of laws was imperative. France was divided 
into several provinces, each province with its own legal system, referred to as coutume or 
208 ibid, at p. 16. 209 
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custom. Commercial activity between the various provinces accounted for the inevitable 
conflict between the coutumes. The most notable among the French jurists were Dumoulin 
(1500-66), D'Argentre (1519-90) and Guy Coquille (1523-1603)212. Dumoulin was the first 
jurist to develop the theory that the law which governs a contract was the law intended by 
the parties. For D'Argentre however, freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law was 
to be discouraged. He was territorially-minded and supported the autonomy of the 
provinces213. Niboyet has accused him of overemphasising the territorial nature of law and 
of always proceeding from the viewpoint of Brittany, his home province214. 
The seventeenth century saw the ascendancy of the Dutch statutists, who based their 
fundamental principle on the exclusive sovereignty of states. Like France, the United 
Netherlands consisted of several provinces, each with its own legal system and with the 
same need to resolve legal conflicts. De Nova suggests that the extensive maritime and 
commercial interests of the Dutch may have prompted them to consider conflict of laws 
215 between sovereign states 
The most prominent jurist among the Dutch school was Huber. While admitting that the 
applicable law was territorial law, Huber also stressed that foreign law ought to apply for 
reasons of comity. Thus, the application of foreign law was a matter of free choice for the 
sovereign state to make but in the knowledge that this comity will be returned by the other 
state. Huber laid down three maxims which he considered sufficient for the resolution of 
conflict problems: - 
(a) The laws of a state have absolute force within, but only within the territorial limits of its 
sovereignty; 
(b) All persons who, whether permanently or temporarily, are found within the territory of a 
North. 
212 ibid, at p. 20. These historical observations have not been repeated in the 13th Ed. 
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sovereign are deemed to be his subjects and as such are bound by his laws; 
(c) By reason of comity however, every sovereign admits that a law which has already 
operated in the country of its origin shall retain its force everywhere, provided that this will 
not prejudice the subjects of the sovereign by whom its recognition is sought2'6. 
With the commercial activities of the Dutch in mind, Huber pointed out that nothing could 
be more destructive for commerce than to extinguish rights validly acquired elsewhere, 
merely because they were unknown to the lex fori or conflicted with its rule on the issue. 
Thus, all rights acquired and transactions effected according to the law of a place are to be 
recognised even if the lex fori would have regarded them as void if effected according to 
that law. Huber's theory, therefore, eliminated arbitrariness and established a certain 
customary international law, in spite of the free will of the sovereign state to apply foreign 
law. 
The importance of the statutists was the emphasis they placed on the intrinsic nature of the 
rules of conflict themselves. The rules had in them 
"... a peculiar power that made them effective everywhere in relation to certain sets of 
facts. "217. 
Thus, for the first time, it became irrelevant how widely different the local rules were, since 
the same rules of conflict resolution could be applied. It is important to note that the 
internationalisation of conflict rules did not prompt the suggestion that different rules ought 
to be adopted for inter-local conflict of laws. The same rules continued to apply to both 
types of conflicts as long as provinces remained autonomous. 
215 (1966) 11 Rec. des cours, pp. 441- 447. 
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IV. Savigny's Theory 
In Savigny's view, the statutist theory and all its forerunners were not scientifically 
constructed and were therefore of little use in resolving international conflict of laws. He 
objected to Huber's suggestion of territorial sovereignty, which obliged the court to apply 
the lex fori , except where the case involved rights already vested under some 
foreign law. 
The question whether a right has been acquired under a foreign law could only be 
determined by reference to that foreign law. Therefore, each time foreign law is pleaded, the 
court is obliged to refer to that foreign law, which alone could determine that a right has 
been acquired. Hence Huber's argument that the court must apply its own law exclusively, 
except where a right is already vested under foreign law, is circular218. 
Savingy sought to develop a more scientific approach to the problem. Instead of classifying 
laws according to their object, as the statutists had done, Savigny held that for every legal 
relationship, there was a local law which was its proper and natural seat and it is that law 
which must apply when it differs from the law of the lex fori 219. To determine that natural 
seat, the court must consider the following: - 
(a) the domicil of a person affected by the legal relationship, 
(b) the place where a thing, which is the object of a legal relationship, is situated, 
(c) the place where a juridical act is done, 
(d) the place where a tribunal sits220. 
Yntema criticises the theory, for Savigny seems to assume that legal relations are uniform in 
all legal systems and therefore a natural seat can be found in each case221. As Cheshire and 
North point out, a person who breaks a promise to marry, may commit breach of contract in 
218 Savigny, pp. 102-103. 
219 Savigny, p. 89. 220 
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one legal system but a tort in another and in a third, no legal wrong at all. Determining a 
legal seat may not be easy222. Nevertheless, Savigny's theory is still valid in a general sense, 
if only because the court still attempts to decide each case according to the legal system in 
which it appears to have its most natural domain. 
V. Modern Developments 
In spite of the internationalisation of conflict of law rules, theories based on the territoriality 
principle have persisted into the twentieth century. Huber's territoriality theory had a 
profound effect on Anglo-Saxon jurists, especially on Dicey 223 in England and on Beale 224 
in the United States of America. The theory of "vested" or "acquired rights", as it came to be 
called, is based directly on Huber's theory that a court must not recognise or enforce foreign 
laws or judgments, for only lexfori can govern all cases which come before it. The court 
must however, protect rights which have already been acquired by a party under foreign law 
or a foreign judgment, and in doing so, the judge is merely administering private 
international law, not enforcing foreign law: 
"English judges never in strictness enforce the laws of any country but their own, 
and when they are popularly said to enforce a foreign law, what they enforce is not a 
foreign law but a right acquired under the law of a foreign country. "225 
The theory has been severely attacked by leading jurists226 and "receives scant support at the 
present day"227. One of the primary functions of a court is to protect legally acquired rights, 
even if these have been acquired in a foreign forum. In any case "... to protect a right is to 
give effect to the legal system which gave birth to it, for a right is not a self-evident fact, but 
222 Cheshire and North, p. 24. Not repeated in the 13th Edition. 223 r. --. _- _r_ i-. n. .rr, st , -, .... 
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a conclusion of law"228. 
However, Savigny's complaint of the circular nature of the territoriality argument is still 
valid, for in order to enforce the lex foci, the court must first consult foreign law to ascertain 
whether the party has acquired a right under it. 
Another theory that has come out of the United States of America is the "Local Law 
Theory". Its main proponent is Cook229. The theory holds that the court of a forum 
recognises and enforces a right created by its own law only. The court applies its own rules 
to the, total exclusion of foreign rules. However, for reasons of, social expediency and 
practical convenience, the court takes account of the laws of a foreign country. The forum 
creates its own right but fashions it closely upon the law of the country in which the decisive 
facts have occurred. 
It is not clear what purpose this theory is to serve beyond stating the fact that a forum must 
apply its own laws. Yntema has described it as sterile truism230. Further, the local law theory 
does not explain why or when it is necessary to refer to foreign law in the first place. In a 
sense, it is an explanation of what has happened rather than a theory. 
To sum up, the position remains that the lex foci applies unless there is a foreign issue and 
the court realises that its own positive rules may not be best suited to the resolution of the 
issue. The position is the same whether the conflict is inter-local or international. 
VI. Application of Private International Law Rules to Inter-local Conflict of Laws. 
There is disagreement among legal commentators as to whether the legal nature of inter- 
local conflict of laws can be formulated in terms similar to those of private international 
law. Although most jurists admit that there are similarities between international and inter- 
228 ibid, at p. 25. 
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local conflict of laws, they are not agreed that the same rules should apply to both. Those 
who admit there are similarities between the two types of conflicts point either to similarity 
of problems, for example, choice of law, or to the techniques applied in resolving conflicts. 
Adherents of this group also hold that a single definition of the two types of conflicts is 
indeed. possible. This is a position usually held by jurists of the common law tradition231. 
Some leading German jurists also belong to this school and accept that the two types of 
conflicts are two sides of the same coin. Thus, Savigny declared that the rules are always the 
232 same. Von Bar even claimed that it is irrational to attempt to distinguish between the two 
types of conflicts 
233 
Opponents of equal treatment of the two types of conflicts argue that the two occur within 
quite different frameworks, the one within a state with composite legal systems and the 
other between sovereign states with which the issues are connected. More importantly, they 
argue that inter-local conflict rules are subject to unfettered regulation by the state and 
therefore are unlikely to conform to internationally accepted standards 234 
An intermediate view held by Kahn-Freund maintains that the two types of conflicts are 
essentially equal, subject to certain exceptions. Essentially, however, the difference between 
the two types of conflicts can be expressed "more in terms of attitudes or tendencies and not 
in terms of rules"235 He observes that courts have a greater inclination to apply other local 
laws than they have in relation to purely foreign ones. 
Prominent among legal writers who deny any similarities between the two types of conflicts 
231 Graveson; Conflict of Laws 2nd Ed. 1974; Kahn-Freund; "General Problems of 
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is Anthony Allott. He maintains that: 
"There is a temptation to think that the easy way of dealing with internal conflicts is 
to proceed on the analogy of Private International Law, except where one is 
expressly prevented from doing so by the contrary word of a particular statute. This 
approach, with respect, is a totally fallacious one. "236 
Allott's reasons for holding this radical view are that a court deciding a case involving inter- 
local conflict of laws must first look at any statute specifically regulating the issue. If the 
issue is not regulated by statute then the court must turn to the statute controlling the court 
which, in the case of Africa, always contains instructions to the court as to what law to apply 
to a specific issue. Only in the absence of statutory guidance is a court permitted to apply 
rules of private international law237. It is not clear why the situation as illustrated by Allott 
proves that private international law rules cannot apply to inter-local conflict situations. 
Courts are always expected to apply statutory law, whether in a case involving conflict of 
laws or in a purely domestic situation. It is only in the absence of statutory provisions that a 
court may resort to the common law or to any other law. A court, dealing with an issue 
involving inter-local conflicts of law will have to follow the same procedure. Secondly, 
Allott's conclusion that the court must therefore do what "the statutes tell it to do, and not 
what it might have done had the case involved external conflict problems", is not 
convincing. Allott appears to be suggesting that private international law rules have an 
existence of their own outside the legal system in which they operate and that the very 
existence of codified law must negate the application of private international law rules. In 
other words, what statute law instructs the court to do, cannot be described as private 
international law. This position is untenable. Private international law rules have been 
codified in many jurisdictions since the subject came to be identified to have its own 
existence, as demonstrated in the earlier parts of this chapter. The logical conclusion to be 
drawn from Allott's argument is that any time statute obliges the court to apply a rule of 
236 Allott, pp. 115-117. 
237 Allott, p. 112. 
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conflict of laws, that rule ceases to be a rule of conflict of laws. 
Allott further argues that the connecting factor in international conflicts does not resemble 
the connecting factor in inter-local conflicts. He adds: 
"Private International Law operates from the concept of a discrete and intact 
personal law for each individual (your personal law may be the law of your domicil 
or your nationality) but in any event, you will be referred to a national legal 
"238 system. 
It is not clear what "discrete and intact personal law" is supposed to mean but the 
assumption that one is always referred to a national legal system is incorrect. States which 
operate plural legal systems always refer to a particular law district within the state, unless a 
special national connecting factor has been created for a specific purpose, such as federal 
law on marriage and divorce in Canada and Australia239. Indeed unitary states with plural 
legal systems, applying nationality as a connecting factor, often devise their own methods to 
identify the correct law district, such as the vencidad civil in Spain240 
The choice of a connecting factor in private international law or inter-local conflict of laws 
is merely to decide in advance the law which will govern the individual in matters of status 
and personal acts, such as capacity. In some cases, it can be wholly technical, as in the case 
of nationality, habitual residence or domicil in the American sense, as these may be changed 
at will with little or no ceremony. It is difficult to understand what is supposed to be 
"discrete and intact" about a connecting factor. 
The main difference between private international law and inter-local conflict of laws is that 
inter-local conflict of laws develops within one sovereign state and therefore operates within 
the constraints set for it by the central government. Apart from these "rules of legislative 
238 *bid, at p. 116. 
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jurisdiction" 241, the inter-local conflict rules themselves have their counterparts in 
international conflict rules. 
Nevertheless, it is this control by central government that has prompted Bartin to argue that 
inter-local conflict of laws are not genuine conflicts of law. According to Bartin, 
commenting on conflict of laws in French colonies, in international conflicts, the judge 
chooses between the laws of the same origin promulgated by states of equal sovereignty. In 
the conflits coloniaux (as he refers to inter-local conflicts in the colonies), on the other 
hand, it was the sovereign act of France alone which permitted the application of local law. 
Therefore, equal respect between the laws, which is essential in private international law, is 
absent242. Kouassigan has refuted this argument by stating that in international conflict of 
laws, the conflict is not between sovereignties but between the laws of sovereign states243 In 
any case, the equal respect that Bartin speaks of is to be found between the various law 
districts within the state and it must be irrelevant that sovereignty resides in a colonial 
power. 
The similarities between the rules of private international law and inter-local conflict of laws 
are so striking that it is useful to examine some of them. 
a) Connecting factors 
Like international conflicts, inter-local conflicts connect the relevant facts with the various 
local legal systems by means of connecting factors. Even where a different terminology is 
used, such as "personal law", instead of law of "domicil", the private international law 
concept of a connecting factor is being contemplated by analogy. There could be problems 
in finding an alternative however, where the concept for determining the international 
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This has led Lampue244 to observe that where French law applies, it might be impossible to 
, apply a connecting 
factor in inter-local conflict of laws. Some countries which apply the 
nationality test, have evolved two possibilities of solving this problem. The first is to adopt 
for inter-local conflict of laws, a test other than nationality but one which closely resembles 
it and concentrates on the individual character of the person. This is the test adopted in 
Spain whereby the personal law of the individual is determined by the vencidad civil or 
"civil neighbourhood", by which a region or a district connection is acquired, in principle by 
descent but there are provisions for the individual to opt out by acquiring a habitual 
residence in another region or by marriage, in the case of women 245 
The second method of resolving the problem is to retain nationality as a connecting factor in 
determining issues involving international conflicts but to adopt a test of domicil for inter- 
local conflict of laws. This, was the method preferred by a number of countries which no 
longer possess composite legal systems, such as Poland, Greece and the former 
Czechoslovakia 246 
ii) Characterisation 
Characterisation is another concept which inter-local conflicts share with international 
conflict of laws. By characterisation of the cause of action is meant; 
"... the allocation of the question raised by the factual situation before the 
court to its correct legal category. Its objective is to reveal the relevant rule 
for the choice of law"2. 47 
Whenever a case containing a foreign element comes before a court, the court will have to 
determine, first, that it has jurisdiction. Where the court sits in a jurisdiction with inter-local 
droit international prie, 1978, p. 641. 
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conflict of laws, the court almost always has jurisdiction, except where there are religious 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction in religious matters. Second, the court must decide which 
area of law is covered by the case. Is it divorce, capacity to many, succession and so on. 
Third, the court must determine which legal system governs the issue. This is done by 
referring to the connecting factor of the parties, or in the case of African inter-local conflict 
of laws, the personal law or customary law of the parties. 
However, there could be problems where each legal system classifies the issue differently. 
Such may be the case for example, where one legal system classifies property as falling 
under the law of succession while the other sees it. as covered by matrimonial law248. A 
court in an inter-local conflicts case may be faced with the same difficulty. For example, a 
woman from a matrilineal system in Ghana marries a man from a patrilineal system. The 
woman dies intestate. According to matrilineal rules of succession, her property would pass 
to her maternal nieces and nephews. However, the law of her husband's patrilineal system 
may characterise the issue as governed by matrimonial law and award the property to the 
children and spouse of the deceased wife. 
iii) Public Policy 
In international conflict of laws, public policy plays an important role in limiting the 
application of foreign-law. In inter-local conflicts however, the doctrine appears to be of 
value mainly in intra-federal situations. Vitta maintains that in principle, a local court could 
evoke the doctrine to protect the way of life in the region249. Thus, he argues, the operation 
of public policy should be allowed, not only in federal states but also in unitary states with 
plural legal systems. 
Some legal writers are not so certain about the usefulness of the doctrine in unitary states 
with plural legal systems and hold that public policy can only apply in intra-federal conflict 
of laws. Some Belgian and French writers who favour this approach therefore classify intra- 
247 Cheshire and North; Private International Law, 13`h Ed. 1999, p. 36. 
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federal and international application of public policy together but exclude the use of the 
doctrine in unitary states with plural legal systems. They make only two exceptions, in the 
case of annexation and in the colonies250. In England the courts have held that public policy 
would be applied to preclude the recognition of the laws of Commonwealth countries251 but 
have never excluded the application of laws of another law district within the United 
Kingdom. Anton argues that the application of the doctrine in England would be contrary to 
the notion of supremacy of parliament252. 
In the African colonies however, both British and French colonial administrations applied 
the public policy doctrine to exclude the application of local law. Typical of the British 
approach was the provision in colonial legislation that "law or custom" existing in the 
colony would be observed and enforced unless the law or custom was "repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience"253. This provision was interpreted far more widely than 
in England itself 54. In most post-colonial legislation, the repugnancy clause has been 
retained as demonstrated by section 49 of the Ghana Courts Act 1971, on choice of law. 
In French colonies, the French doctrine of ordre public was applied but with the difference 
that French law was regarded as superior to local law and whenever there was conflict 
249 ibid, at p. 21. 
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between the two, French law prevailed255. Some former French colonies have abolished this 
hierarchical application of the doctrine, notably Senegal, Niger and Madagascar 256 
The doctrine of public policy has a role to play in inter-local conflict of laws in Africa. It 
should, be possible, for example, to apply the public policy doctrine to prohibit child 
marriage in an ethnic community which does not believe in it. 
Thus, the same problems and the techniques for their resolution arise in both international 
and inter-local conflict of laws. The similarities between the two types of conflicts are most 
striking where the local legal system is autonomous and complete. The more autonomous 
the legal system is, the closer. are its rules to those of international conflict of laws. For 
practical reasons, it is advantageous to apply the same rules to both types of conflict of laws, 
for it facilitates the solution of mixed international and inter-local conflicts. Secondly, the 
use of the same rules is likely to help to harmonise conflicts rules generally. 
VII. Inter-local and Inter-personal Conflict of Laws Contrasted 
Inter-local conflict of laws denotes the existence of various "law districts" within the one 
sovereign state but its main feature is that it is based on territory. Inter-personal conflict of 
laws, on the other hand, involves the operation, within a single state or territory or across 
territorial boundaries, of competing norms affecting particular groups, characterised by their 
personal traits or beliefs257. The usual circumstances in which inter-personal conflicts may 
arise are when religious groups profess religions which also contain a code of law for their 
members, such as Judaism, Islam or Buddhism. What becomes immediately clear is that a 
local legal system is based on territory while a personal legal system remains an attribute of 
the individual claiming to belong to a religious or racial group. Thus, while the connecting 
factor in the case of a territorially-based system is derived from the territory and remains 
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constant, the connecting factor in a personal legal system depends on the religious 
convictions of the individual or the race to which he or she claims to belong. The 
ascertainment of the connecting factor therefore depends on the state of mind of the 
individual. In Att. General of Ceylon v Reid258 the Privy Council held that in a country with 
plural personal legal systems, there is an inherent right in the inhabitants domiciled there, to 
change their religion and personal law. 
The facts in Att. General of Ceylon v Reid involved a married couple in Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka), who contracted their marriage before the Registrar in England. The husband later 
converted to Islam in Ceylon and married a second wife, as he was entitled to do under 
Islamic law. The question for the court to consider was whether the second "marriage" was 
valid. The Privy Council held that the second marriage was valid, for the personal law of the 
husband was now Islamic law, which determined the essential validity of the marriage, 
including its potentially polygamous nature. 
The instability in the connecting factor of a personal legal system can cause social 
uncertainty and increase tension instead of minimising it. 
David Pear1259 has sought to introduce some certainty into the connecting factor of a 
personal legal system by suggesting that where a Moslem male marries a Christian woman 
according to non-Moslem law (eg English law), the law governing the dissolution of the 
marriage should also be the law which is both the lex loci celebrationis and the law of 
domicil of the woman. As a parallel to this view Pearl suggests that; 
7[Q 
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Pearl, David; Interpersonal Conflict of Laws in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
1981, p. 71. French colonial administration in West Africa applied a regime similar 
to Pearl's concept. The decree of 1931, Decret reorganisant le justice indigene en 
Afrique occidentale francaise, 3 dec. 1931, provided that in matters of marriage, 
divorce and custody, the local customary law followed by the parties at the time 
of the marriage applied, failing which, the local customary law of the wife 
applied. The decree was meant to protect the rights of non- Moslem wives whose 
husbands had converted to Islam at the time of the divorce but were non-Moslem at 
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"... the law which governs the dissolution of a marriage between a Moslem male and 
a Christian female celebrated in a Moslem form, is the law of the celebration and of 
the personal law of the husband both at the time of the dissolution and at the time of 
the marriage. "260 
However, there is no principle in law which suggests that the lex loci celebrationis should 
also be the law which governs the divorce. The point was raised in Jatoi v Jatoi261 but was 
unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The court accepted a divorce by 
Talaq by the Moslem husband as effective, even though the wife was of the Christian faith 
and non-Pakistani and the marriage took place in England, according to English law. 
Secondly, Pearl's solution would fail where the law of the Christian wife's domicil is 
different from the lex loci celebrationis. Lastly, there is no reason why a Christian wife 
should be given a privilege which wives of other religious denominations cannot have. The 
parallel that the Moslem husband married to a Christian woman according to Islamic law, 
should be able to divorce according to the law of the husband at the time of the marriage and 
of the divorce, is not likely to impose any legal burden on the husband and is of no benefit to 
the Christian wife. 
The other major difference between inter-local and interpersonal conflicts is that, while a 
judge faced with inter-local conflict of laws actually has to decide which of the competing 
laws will govern the issue, a true conflict situation rarely arises in interpersonal conflicts. 
All that the judge can do is to determine whether the individual is or is not a member of the 
group. After the determination that he or she belongs, the law of the group is applied, to the 
exclusion of any other competing law involved in the matter. The judge is not called upon to 
choose between conflicting legal rules of two or more systems262. 
Even where the court is secular, the opportunity to apply conflict rules is limited. Egyptian 
the time of the marriage. 
260 ibid, at p. 71. 
261 (1967) P. L. D, SC, p. 580. 
262 Lipstein & Szaszy, p. 30. 
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courts have had the power to apply religious law since 1955 but the courts are faced with a 
choice of law only in two situations: 
(i) in what circumstances can religious law apply in the case, as opposed. to statute law? 
Where. the parties are foreigners, foreign law will apply according to the rules of private 
international law, except where one of the parties is Egyptian and pleads religious law. The 
court must apply the relevant religious law 
263 
(ii) Where the court must apply religious law to the exclusion of statute law. This is usually 
the case in matters of personal status264. 
There cannot be a conflict between the rules of two religious groups, except in the rare case 
where two religions lay claim to the same individual. This is possible where, for example, a 
Jewish male, who had married a Jewish woman according to Hebrew law, later converts to 
Islam and a child is born thereafter. Islamic law traces membership of the religion through 
the father, while Hebrew law traces it through the mother. But even here, the conflict 
situation may be eliminated, for Egyptian law provides that the law of the father prevails26s 
The other possibility of conflict is where two people of different religions with personal 
codes of law marry, for example, where a Jewish male marries a Moslem woman, or vice 
versa. 
The closest a secular court can come to applying choice of law rules to religious law is 
where the parties belong to the same region but are of different sects, such as the Maliki and 
Hanafi of North Africa. But even here, it is more likely that Hanafi law will apply 
automatically in Egypt, while Maliki law will apply in, say, Algeria. In practice though, 
where society is fairly homogenous in religion, such as in the Middle East and North Africa, 
inter-personal conflicts are rare. It is therefore impracticable to apply private international 
law rules to inter-personal conflict of laws. 
263 Civil Code Articles 11 - 28. 264 The definition of'personal status' is contained in Law No. 147 of 1949, Art. 13. 
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Inter-local conflict of laws, on the other hand, involves a genuine conflict of laws and as 
shown above, employs similar rules and techniques as private international law. African 
legal systems are largely inter-local, as opposed to inter-personal, and therefore conflict 
rules will be applied to them. 
VIII. African Legal Systems - Inter-local or Inter-personal? 
Some legal writers on internal conflict of laws in Africa, tend to assume that the conflict of 
laws found there is of a personal nature and not inter-local. According to Professor Szaszy, 
African and Asian legal systems are purely personal266, for they lack territorial basis, 
although they relate to the territory within which they are found. Territory is therefore "not a 
constitutive element of the idea of a personal legal system, it is merely a framework of it"267. 
While the statement may be valid for personal legal systems, it does not apply to Africa, as 
will be shown in this part of the study. 
Territorial application of law has been known to Africa as far back as can be recorded. In the 
ancient Ghana Empire268, the 'personal law' of the individual was the law of the district 
from which, he or she came. When Moslem traders arrived in the Empire to settle and to 
trade, the Askiya (the Emperor), obliged them to settle in one place so that Islamic law 
would apply to the settlement. The most famous of these settlements was Timbuktu, which 
came to be larger and . 
more prosperous than the imperial capital, Gao, upon which it was 
dependent269. By 1352, during In Battuta's second visit to Timbuktu the pattern had been 
well established. The merchants of the city were exclusively Moslem and had their own 
courts, presided over by the Qadi and applied the Sharia law of the Maliki sect. The 
Governor of Timbuktu, the Timbuktu-koi and his officials were the only non-settler officials 
265 Civil Code Articles 124 & 129. 
266 Szaszy; Conflict of Laws in Western, Socialist and Developing Countries, 
1974, p. 293. 
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in the city and had no judicial function270, an indication that only Moslem law applied in 
Timbuktu. 
On the coast of what is now modern Ghana, settlements of merchants from the neighbouring 
interior were reported by Dutch travellers to be treated in much the same way271. Modem 
Ghana itself has retained the territorial nature of its legal system. A senior judicial adviser 
during British colonial administration wrote in 1953: 
"In the Gold Coast there are five or six major distinct regions wherein the customary 
law differs from that of the neighbouring areas, and there is a good deal of migration 
from one to another, particularly into the forest country which will support cocoa 
from areas with drier climate. There are obviously great opportunities for conflict of 
laws, not only between English law and customary law, but between different 
systems of the latter type"272. 
To maintain the territorial application of law in the face of this constant movement of 
people, the local chief would allocate land to the 'strangers', as th ey are often called, to build 
their own community (sometimes called Zongo), under their own chief, enforcing their own 
laws273. Whenever necessary, the community chief would represent the settler community at 
the local court, explaining matters concerning the law of his community. When the strangers 
were too few to form a community, the local chief appointed one of his officials to deal with 
them as an intermediary. It was the function of this official to collect the relevant law on any 
subject to be presented in a case involving a stranger and a local. The map of Kintampo on 
the next page illustrates the point accurately. Kintampo, now in modem Ghana, was a 
famous trading town on the route to the Sahel region, where gold and salt were sold to 
270 ibid, at p. 668. 
271 Pieter de Marees; "A Description and Historical Declaration of the Golden Kingdom 
of Guinea, Otherwise called the Golden Coast of Myna", 1602, cited in Pageant of 
Ghana, Ed. Wolfson, Freda, 1958, p. 86. 
272 Matson, J. N; "Internal Conflict of Laws in the Gold Coast", 16 M. L. R. (1953), p. 
471. 
273 Skinne, Elliot P; "Strangers in West African Societies", Africa, Vol. XXXiii, No. 4,. 
October 1963, p. 568. . 
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merchants who transported these commodities to the Mediterranean. The town was divided 
into as many sectors as there were people of different origins who applied their own laws 
and religions in their sectors. 
Even in Islamic areas of Africa, the Sharia has not replaced the territorial nature of the legal 
systems. In Northern Nigeria, Islamic law is the general law and yet the Islamic law 
practised at the Alkali's 274 court has received heavy doses of the local legal systems, 
especially in matters of land and succession to immovable property, thus explaining 
"the territorial basis on which the law is intended to be applied in Nigeria - thus 
avoiding the confusion consequent on every individual being subject to the personal 
law of his own religion. "275 
In Ghana, the hold of Islam on the communities is much weaker than in Northern Nigeria. 
Ghanaians from the north of the country, where Islam is generally practised, profess the 
religion only when they come to the south, to non-Islamic areas; 
"whereas in their native setting the overwhelming majority are frankly pagan and the 
Islam of the minority is skin-deep. "276 
In Ghana therefore, it is the local legal system which provides the connecting factor, not 
religion. 
The reasons for this weakness of the Islamic hold on Ghana are twofold. First,, there had 
never been a Jihad or holy war in Ghana and therefore, there is nothing resembling the 
powerful Hausa/Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria in Ghana277. Second, Islamic law 
never became part of the local legal systems, as is the case in Northern Nigeria. Islam 
274 The Hausa for al-Qadi. n7f 
"' Anderson, J. N; Islamic Law in Africa, 1970, p. 172. 
276 ibid, p. 249. 
277 ibid, at p. 249. 
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arrived in Ghana through missionary activity and was never imposed on the people. 
Ghanaian Moslems have therefore come to accept Islam only as a religion (much as 
Ghanaian Christians accept Christianity) and not as a legal system. 
In this study therefore, African legal systems will be treated as territorially based and the 
legal conflicts will be treated as inter-local conflict of laws. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHOICE OF LAW IN AFRICA 
I. A note on Approaches to Choice of Law in Plural-legal Systems 
Inter-local conflict of laws has been known to Africa since ancient times and the choice of 
law problems have been approached in the same way as in other parts of the world. Ibn 
Battuta on his travels in East Africa in 1331 reports that; 
"... the qadi, the wazirs, the private secretary, and four of the leading amirs sit for 
hearing litigation between the members of the public and hearing the cases of people 
with complaints. In a matter connected with the rules of the sharia (religious law) 
the qadi passes judgement; in a matter other than that, the members of the council 
pass judgement, that is the ministers and the amirs278. 
In all plural-legal systems, the courts take cognisance of the close political, socio-economic, 
cultural and even sentimental ties which bind one state unit to the other. Thus, the courts are 
more disposed to take account of the law of a sister-state unit and "to seek the harmonisation 
279 and mutual accommodation of conflicting state policies". 
There is the need for legal units to be receptive to each other's laws. Hence the guiding 
principles for the court are far more flexible than those that operate between legally unified 
states. 
278 Said Hamdun & Noel King; Ibn Battuta in Black Africa, 1975 at p. 18. Commenting 
on this practice the authors observe that 
"The difference between the cases decided by the qadi and those decided by the 
group may have been the difference between the law of the sharia which was 
known to the qadi as an expert who had to set out what the law said, and traditional 
law where a group of old men who knew many cases and precedents would give a 
verdict on behalf of customary law". At p. 65. 279 Shapira, Amos; The Interest Approach to Choice of Law, 1970, Also see Lavers; The 
Choice of Law Process, 1965, Preface at p. Viii - "A spirit of mutual accommodation 
leading to agreement on certain principles may spread more quickly through the 
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Furthermore, while the choice of law process on the international level often involves a 
choice between radically divergent legal systems or rules, the inherent closeness and relative 
homogeneity among the state units of a plural-legal state provide a common ground for 
comity within an atmosphere and framework which are commonly accepted as notions of 
reason and justice. Thus, the conflict situations between the various legal systems are much 
less pronounced than those which exist between legally unified states on the international 
level. 
This cultural homogeneity and common notion of justice has certain consequences for 
choice of law in plural-legal systems. For, the fonim of one state unit is usually not reluctant 
to adjudicate a case governed by the law of a sister-state unit. However, there is a slight 
difference between choice of law in plural-legal states and some federal states such as the 
United States of America. Several views on inter-federal choice of law rules have enjoyed 
their popularity in America. Although the common law is largely a unifying legal factor, 
there have been arguments in America as to the status of the law of another state. 
Currie, one of the most prominent lawyers in this area of law thought that the court should 
examine the policies and interests expressed in the substantive rules to determine whether 
there is a `true' or `false' conflict. There is a true conflict where the rules, policies and 
interests are found to be in conflict, in which case the law of the forum should be applied, 
even though the other state also has an interest to see the application of its own policy 280 
The interest approach appears to ignore the international nature of the conflict of laws but 
even in a federal, inter-state situation, it is difficult for a court to determine what the policy 
behind a piece of legislation is. Not surprisingly, the interest approach has been applied in 
America only to inter-state cases281, and is unsuitable. for international cases, and one would 
add, to plural-legal states as well. 
American courts now rely on two fairly similar principles, the first, found in the American 
states of a federal union than among independent nations". 280 Currie, B; Selected Essays on Conflict of Laws, 1963, Chapters 4 and 12. 281 Kegel, G; "Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the 
American Reforms", (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. Law, p. 618. 
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Law Institute's Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Second (1971), which adopts, as a 
basic rule, the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the issue at 
hand. In paragraph 6 the Restatement requires the court to follow the statutory requirements 
of its own state but in the absence of such requirements, the factors relevant to the choice of 
the applicable law include; 
(a) the needs of the interstate and the international system, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
The most significant relationship test, as it is sometimes called, has been widely applied in 
America but it is not suitable for plural-legal states in Africa. "They read like an exhortation 
to a law reformer, as criteria to be weighed in formulating new rules"282 and not concrete 
rules the court might rely on. 
The second approach is provided by Leflar who advocates that the court rely on five choice- 
influencing considerations 2ß3, which he arranges in no order of priority; 
(A) Predictability of results; 
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order; 
(C) Simplification of the judicial task; 
(D) Advancement of the forum's government interests; 
(E) Application of the better rule of law. 
282. ---'-'---_,, . .,, ,.. -- ----... ---- %-nesmre ana iNonn-s rrivate International Law, 13th hdition,. 1: 999, p. 30. 283 Leflar, R. A; American Conflicts Law, 4th Edition, 1986, pp. 277 -278. 
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However, four of his principles are to be found in the Restatement Second, leaving only the 
last as relevant; (E) Application of the better rule of law to be considered. The "better rule of 
law" approach is unsuitable for plural-legal situations as it might lead to the court 
concluding that its own rule of law is the better rule of law284. 
The cultural homogeneity in plural-legal systems leads to the situation where the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens is hardly ever applied except in rare cases. One of those rare 
occasions occurred in Rockware Glass Ltd v MacShannon285. In that case the House of 
Lords was satisfied that the other forum, Scotland, would be clearly or distinctly more 
appropriate than the English forum. Both parties were resident in Scotland and all elements 
of the dispute took place in Scotland but the plaintiffs, upon legal advice, honestly believed 
that they would obtain certain advantages if the case was tried in England. To determine a 
clearly more appropriate forum abroad, the forum must be one with which the action has the 
most real and substantial connection286, which will include, not only factors affecting 
convenience or expense, such as availability of witnesses, but also the law governing the 
relevant transaction and the place where the parties respectively reside or carry on business. 
All these elements were considered in the Rockware Glass case and were found to be 
present; 
Four appeals were consolidated. They all involved Scotsmen living and working in 
Scotland who suffered industrial injuries in Scotland. All the defendants were 
English companies with registered offices in England. All the witnesses, medical 
and otherwise, lived in Scotland. The plaintiffs served writs on defendants at their 
English registered offices, the English courts thus having jurisdiction. The 
defendants sought to have the English proceedings stayed, leaving the plaintiffs to 
bring the claims in Scotland287. 
The House of Lords held that the appropriate or natural forum for the trial was in Scotland, 
284 See for example, Clark v Clark, 222, A 2"`1.205 (1966). 285 [1978] AC 795.. 
286 Spiliada Maritime Corpn. v Cansulex Ltd. [1987] AC 460, at pp. 477 - 478. 287 Rockware Glass v MacShannon [1978] AC 795. 
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as all significant factors pointed to that part of the United Kingdom and that there was no 
justification for the plaintiffs coming to England. Apart from clear cases, such as the 
Rockware Glass case, forum non conveniens is not normally applied to cases in plural-legal 
states except in intra-federal states, as in the United States. 
Secondly, the socio-economic and cultural homogeneity within countries with several legal 
systems often has the psychological effect of minimising the "foreign" aspect of choice of 
law288. The court therefore easily presumes the reasonable expectations of the parties at the 
relevant time of the transaction or occurrence289. The reasonable expectation is not the same 
as the American interest theory but the expectation that justice will be done. 
Thirdly, choice of law problems facing the court in a plural-legal system appear to be often 
less complicated than in international conflicts. Perhaps this is because of the proximity of 
the legal districts thus making the "foreign law" more easily ascertainable and the possibility 
of error in stating the applicable "foreign" law is greatly reduced. 
Despite the relatively congenial atmosphere in which inter-local conflict of laws operates, 
the choice of law problems are far more recurrent than on the international level. The main 
reason for this is the ease of mobility within the state units. Further, the nature of the 
conflicts also tends to differ. 
Due to the greater frequency of inter-local choice of law issues, inter-local choice of law 
processes appear to be less sophisticated and relatively simple to apply, except in the United 
States of America where they are more elaborate. Possibly the reason is that a quick solution 
is needed in these cases as they have immediate impact on the community. 
Lastly, because the decisions of a court in an inter-local conflicts case are bound to have a 
288 Cheatham & Rees; "Choice of the Applicable Law", 52 Columb. L. Rev. (1962), pp. 
95-962. In the United States, "... business and social activities almost ignore state 
lines. " 
289 Anderson, J. N; "Colonial Law in Tropical Africa: the Conflict between English,. 
Islamic and Customary Law". 35 Indian Law Journal, 1959 - 60, p. 440. 
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substantial impact on the community, the local court is more likely to be guided by a sense 
of justice and fair play than a court sitting in an international conflict case. Choice of law in 
Africa follows this pattern 290 
II.. A Note on Choice of Law in Pre-colonial Africa 
There is very little literature on choice of law in pre-colonial Africa. However, there are 
glimpses into the past through the observations of European and Arab travellers and present- 
day remnants of the old legal systems. 
Choice of law situations arose mainly because of the constant movement of people from one 
African state unit to the other. Most of the "strangers", as they are still referred to in Africa 
today, lived in permanent communities291, some of which became even larger than the host 
town. Permanent stranger communities have been known to exist since very early times and 
have been reported in ancient Ghana292. In the coastal regions, Dutch travellers have 
reported the presence of settlements of merchant communities from the neighbouring 
interior 293 The usual pattern was that the "foreign" Africans lived in a special ward within 
the town under their own chief. These settlements were sometimes called "Zongo" and 
continue to exist in Africa to this day 94. 
Where the stranger community was fairly large, they were allocated land outside the host 
town, where they built their own village or town. Territory allocated to strangers sometimes 
became transformed into large towns,, the most famous example being Timbuktu. Timbuktu 
290 See Anderson, J. N; "Colonial Law in Tropical Africa: Conflict between English, 
qni 
Islamic and Customary Law", 35 Indian Law Journal 1959 -60, p. 440. 
See a valuable article on the subject by Elliot P. Skinne; "Strangers in West African 
Societies", in Africa, Vol. XXX111, No. 4, October 1963, p. 565, on which the above 
paragraphs are based. 
292 Stranger communities were found in Melle, Gao (the capital), Djene and Timbuktu. 
See Ibn Battuta; Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354 AD, pp. 124 - 125. 293 Pieter de Marees; A description and Historical Declaration of the Golden Kingdom of 
Guinea, Otherwise called the Golden Coast ofMyna, 1602 (modem Ghana), p. 108. 294 Anderson describes "Zongo" as "Suburbs or quarters occupied by immigrants". 
Anderson, J. N; Islamic Law in Africa, 1970, p. 270. 
79 
was the commercial stranger town where Islamic commercial law applied but which was 
dependent on Gao, the imperial capital. The twin-city system has survived in modern 
Ghana, as in the examples of Salaga - Kpembe or Gambaga - Narelingu295. Whether the 
stranger community lived within the host town or built their own, they lived under their own 
chief or headman and enforced their own laws. However, since strangers were usually 
engaged in local and foreign trade, it was most likely, that Islamic commercial law applied 
to transactions, after that legal system arrived in Africa. The practice of separate jurisdiction 
for strangers was observed by the Arab historian Sa'di in Timbuktu in 1352: - 
"Timbuktu at that time was inhabited by people of Minah and Tawarek, especially 
Musafa, who had a headman of their own, while the Melle Governor was Farba 
296 Musa" 
Whenever the need arose, the headman or chief represented the settler community at the 
local court explaining matters of law of his community. Where the stranger community was 
very small, the local chief appointed one of his own officials to deal with the settlers as 
intermediary. It was the function of this official to collect the relevant law on any subject to 
be presented in a case involving a stranger and a local297. 
It is not clear how the question of choice of law was approached but there are indications of 
a form of depegage298 as the guiding principle. Thus, Elias observes that an Alkali in 
Northern Nigeria or a Liwali in Tanganyika, who sits in judgment over disputes between a 
believer and a non-believer, sometimes applies, Islamic law of one school or another, 
sometimes a mixture of it with elements of purely indigenous customary law299. This care to 
achieve the fairest possible result is a hallmark of inter-local conflict of laws, as discussed 
earlier. It is this subtleness of the choice of law process which leads commentators to the 
295 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 2. c. 55BC - AD 1050, p. 668. 296 Sa'di Abderrahman Ben Abdallah Ben Imram Ben Amires - Tarikh es Soudan. 
Translated by Houdas, 0; 1900, p. 36. 
297 Skinne; "Strangers in West African Societies", Africa, Vol xxxiii, No. 4,1963, p. 565. 298 Depecageis a choice of law technique which judges apply sometimes apply to pick 
and choose from legal rules from different system. 299 Elias, T. 0; British Colonial Law, 1962, p. 222. 
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wrong conclusion that African courts are unaware of choice of law. Elias himself concludes 
that where there is a conflict between two local legal systems, the judges are "... blissfully 
unaware of the problems of choice of law"300 The court is guided solely by the wish to 
resolve the problem and "... resorts to an appeal to natural justice and sweet reasonableness - 
a mixture of jus gentium and jus naturale ". This "sweet reasonableness" in picking and 
choosing between the laws of different legal systems, or depecage, is a recognised choice of 
law process and not proof of its absence. The close proximity of the various state units 
demands that a choice of law process be applied which would not create animosity. Thus, 
Gluckman observes that the "reasonable man" standard is applied301. The "reasonable man" 
is not the abstract personification by the English judge of the man on the Clapham omnibus 
or a conceptual device modelled by the judge to measure judicial standards but rather the 
reasonable expectations of the parties and proper behaviour, or as Anderson puts it "... a 
solution based on legal principles, but with a flexibility of adjustment designed to preserve 
302 . the social equilibrium and satisfy both the parties and the public" 
III. The Law Applicable to European Settlers in Pre-colonial Africa 
With the arrival of Europeans in the fifteenth century, a new element entered the choice of 
law process in Africa. The cosy method of picking and choosing between the various legal 
systems could not apply to Europeans, if only because African judges had no way of 
ascertaining the laws of European countries. What appears to be the case is that how far 
European laws were allowed to apply depended on the level of friendship or hostility 
between the European community and its African hosts. 
The main areas of contact between Africans and Europeans were on the coasts of Upper 
Guinea (from Senegal to Cape Mount in Liberia), the Gold Coast and the Western Slave 
Coast (roughly between the Volta River in Eastern Ghana and Lagos in Nigeria). 
300 .,. ý.,. 
lni 
iaia, at p. LLL. 
"" Gluckman, M; Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law, 1969, p. 74 302 Anderson, J. N; "Colonial Law in Tropical Africa: the Conflict between English, 
Islamic and Customary Law"; 35 Indian Law Journal, 1959 - 60, p. 440. 
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Information so far available covers only the Upper Guinea Coast303 
IV. The Upper Guinea Coast, c. 1441- c. 1800 
The earliest records on the law applicable to Europeans were provided mainly by the 
Portuguese, who arrived in the area in 1441 and set about establishing trading settlements. 
These settlements were not manned permanently but were meeting places, where the 
Portuguese exchanged their goods with their middlemen3oa These middlemen were mainly 
Europeans who acted for both Africans and Europeans and were usually Portuguese. There 
were two types of middlemen, the lancado and the tangomao305 The lancado (from the 
Portuguese "to throw"), were Europeans who had "thrown themselves" among Africans, 
living and trading among them but who retained their identity as Europeans. The tangomao, 
on the other hand, was the European trader who severed all his links with Europe, adopting 
the local religion and custom and sometimes covered himself in ritual tattoos3ob It is the 
reports of these two groups of settlers, which give some insight into the law applicable to 
Europeans in pre-colonial West Africa. 
The general pattern which emerges is that societies of the Upper Guinea Coast applied a 
strict territoriality rule to Europeans. While the tangomao regarded himself as a local and 
therefore subject to local law, the lancado saw himself as a foreigner and expected the law 
of his nationality to apply to. him in his personal matters. Nevertheless "the lancado was 
asked to fit into the African way of life"307 and all local laws and customs applied to him 
equally. Rodney cites one example which illustrates the point. The law of succession in 
some parts of the region stipulated that movables passed to the king and not to the next of 
kin308. This law applied equally to the lancado, although as a trader, he was likely to be in 
303 Walter Rodney; History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545 - 1800,1970, pp. 20 - 21. Hereafter referred to as Rodney. 
304 Rodney, p. 19. 
305 ibid, at p. 74. 
306 ibid, at p. 74 
307 ibid, at p. 86. 
308 ibid, at p. 87. 
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possession of goods belonging to a third party 309 Even salvage laws appeared to follow the 
same pattern. Thus, if a ship ran aground in the king's territory, both the ship and its contents 
passed to the king310. This is an extreme example of the territoriality theory but with an 
important difference. The lancado (indeed any foreigner), could also start litigation against 
an African and expect to be treated equally311. 
The territoriality rule applied to contracts as well. A contract between a lancado and an 
African was unwritten, in the usual African manner, and depended heavily on oaths which 
were binding in the form in which the contract was entered into. Thus, only the lex loci 
contractus was applicable312. There is some evidence that experienced lancado began to 
lure African parties to the contract into kingdoms with more advanced court systems or 
whose oaths were more widely applicable, in order to have the benefit of a more favourable 
law 313 This is an early example of forum shopping which is today a feature of international 
conflict of laws. 
There must have been a few towns which came to specialise in commercial law. Rodney 
reports that by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the town of Cacheu (in modern 
Gambia), had a population of about 1,500, of which 500 were permanent European 
residents314. It is reasonable to assume that a town with such a large permanent foreign 
population, would apply more sophistication and sensitivity to the territoriality principle 
than would a provincial village court. 
These early encounters between West Africans and Europeans may have laid the foundation 
for the ready recognition by the colonial powers of African legal systems in colonial West 
Africa. 
309 ibid, at p. 87. 
310 Brasio; Voyages from Santiago to Guinea, [Second Series (ii)] 1558, p. 467. I /I 
"' Rodney, p. 87. 
312 ibid, at p. 88. 
313 ibid, at p. 92. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHOICE OF LAW IN FRENCH-SPEAKING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
A. Historical Background 
Permanent French settlement in Sub-Saharan Africa began in 1638 when French traders 
erected a settlement near the mouth of the Senegal river but the site proved to be unhealthy 
and they moved upstream to the island of Guet NDar and built what was to be called Saint- 
Louis315 The French Government later purchased the offshore island of Goree from the 
Dutch in 1678 
and Goree became the French base for trade with the Petit-cote (Rufisque, Potudal and 
Joal) 316 
The background of French involvement, as far as law is concerned, began in 1814. The fall 
of Napoleon and the Treaty of Paris reduced French possessions in Africa to Saint-Louis 
and Goree, both in present-day Senegal317. Between 1839 and 1844, further settlements 
were established in Ivory Coast and Gabon. From these settlements the French expanded 
into the interior. By the second half of the nineteenth century, France had become the 
dominant power in West Africa, with the British holding on to only four colonies, Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (Ghana), and Nigeria. Between 1895 and 1904, a series of decrees 
were issued grouping all French possessions in West Africa into a large federation, Afrique 
Occidentale Francaise (OAF). In similar fashion the French expanded from Gabon into 
Central Africa and by 1910, created a second federation, Afrique Equitoriale Francaise 
(AEF)318 
314 ibid, at p. 92. 
315 Hargreaves, J. D; France and West Africa, 1969, p. 34. 
316 ibid, at p. 34. 
317 Salacuse, J; An Introduction to Law in French-speaking Africa, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 9. 
Hereafter cited as Salacuse. 
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When France declared its colonies in Africa, the assimilation of the African colonies was its 
principal aim. The theory expected the administration and legal model of the French 
executive to be followed in all cases319. , As far as law is concerned it meant that native 
custom had to give way to the Code Napoleone"320. Officially, assimilation was in the Isaac 
Report to the Congress of 1889 as; 
"that system which tends to efface all difference between the colonies and the 
motherland, and which views the colonies simply as a prolongation of the mother 
321 country" 
Another feature of the civil law which was transported to Africa is its centralised nature. 
Civil law systems were evolved by strong centralised governments, while the common law 
in England is the result of judicial procedure which never came under the direct control of 
the monarch. Civil law courts, on the other hand, lacking the doctrine of stare decisis could 
only turn to Roman Law for guidance322. And yet Roman Law had fallen under the absolute 
control of the Roman Catholic Church, which interpreted the law for its own protection, 
rather than for the protection of the individual. Roman Law became "... a prop for absolutism 
323 and feudalism" 
The French revolution of 1789 changed all that. "Unlike the -common law, whose 
development has been gradual and (at least up to the present) continuous, the Civil Code is 
"324 the product of the age of rationalism and enlightenment 
The Civil Code is a systematic and authoritative piece of legislation aimed at unifying the 
state under one and the same law. There is a strong emphasis on logical. integration, which 
318 Salacuse, p. 10 . 319 Hooker, M. B; Legal Pluralism, An introduction to Colonial and neo-colonial laws, 
1975, p. 196. Hereafter cited as Hooker. 320 ibid, at p. 196. 
321 ibid, at p. 196 
322 ibid, at p. 193. 
323 ibid, at p. 193. 
324 Hooker, p. 193. 
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was to have serious implications in French colonies of Africa. This rationalism has led to the 
inevitable division of the civil law systems into "private" and "public" law325. Private law - 
which deals with status and transactions between persons - is administered by the ordinary 
courts, while public law - which relates to the validity of administrative and state acts - is 
adjudicated by special administrative courts326. The effect of this division on the colonies 
was profound. It meant that the wholesale application of civil law to a colony was not a 
judicial matter but an administrative one, and therefore subject to bureaucratic decision- 
making 27. Since bureaucratic decisions are usually the result of political policy, French 
colonial law changed with each successive government. 
II. French Colonial Policy 
Due to the fact that French colonial policy was a matter for the executive, there had never 
been a coherent colonial policy. Officially, the French recognised four theories of 
colonisation - subjection, autonomy, assimilation and association328. Variations of each of 
these theories went in and out of official favour as often as the turbulent political history of 
France dictated. 
Subjection was the theory which stipulated that the colony was to be ruled by France for 
French interests exclusively. The colonial administration was to be tightly controlled and the 
view that the interests of the colonial subjects could be taken into account was denied. Such 
harsh colonial policy was never truly implemented but it does demonstrate the civil law 
concept of the supremacy of state power. 
Autonomy was the theory whereby the colonial subjects would be allowed to govern 
themselves according to French law. Though recognised by the French as a theory, it was 
325 Hooker, p. 193. 
326 ibid, at p. 194. 
327 Hooker, p. 193. 
328Roberts, S. H; The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870 - 1925,1963 (New 
impression) p. 73. Hereafter referred to as Roberts. 
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not practised until after the Second World War 329 
Assimilation was by far the most popular theory and was officially defined as "... that system 
which tends to efface all difference between the colonies and the motherland, and which 
views the colonies simply as, a prolongation of the mother country beyond the seas"330 
According to this theory, the legal model of France was to be strictly followed in all the 
colonies. As far as law was concerned, it meant that local law had to give way to the French 
Code. On the whole, assimilation as a policy was a failure and was never fully implemented 
in any colony 331 
Association became a fashionable theory by the end of the nineteenth century. This theory 
held that although the colony was to be administered for the benefit of France, the latter had 
a duty to the colonial people, to develop their institutions and protect their well-being 332 
Thus, the theory recognised two parallel approaches to development, colonial and 
metropolitan, a major improvement on assimilation. Slowly colonial officials began to 
accept that local legal rules were enforceable333 This development led to great advances in 
local government and in the development of local legal systems in French colonial Africa 
but it was still nowhere near the levels achieved in British colonies through indirect rule 334 
In spite of these developments, however, French colonial policy, on the whole, continued to 
depend on French national interests. Thus, the centralised authority of Paris remained 
dominant despite association 335 Secondly, any policy adopted for a particular colony, 
formed part of French state policy and was subordinate to the requirements of that state 
policy. Association was not implemented in disregard of the national interest of France. The 
view was that: 
329 Salacuse, p. 16. 
330 ibid, at p. 67. 
331 ibid, at p. 67. 
332 Sarraut, A; La mise en valeur des colonies francaises, 1923, p. 87. 
333 Nevertheless, the recognition of local legal systems took place only in West Africa and 
Tonkin. The French Code remained supreme in Central Africa, Algeria and Cochin- 
China. 
334 Roberts, pp. 73- 74,76 - 77 
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"The administration of native customary law is a branch of native policy and 
territorial administration. The tribunal is an observation post from which the 
administrative officer who presides over it may study the effects of his own 
administration and the reaction of the people he governs.... And in pronouncing 
judgment he effects political action; he maintains civil peace as well as public order; 
he recognises and observes native rights and by pursuing justice he stimulates their 
evolution. "336 
Thus, French colonial law was based on three essential features; law is a branch of native 
policy; its administration is a political matter; and the local legal system must be stimulated 
to evolve towards higher. standards of (French) civilisation. In truth therefore, association 
was assimilation at a slower pace: 
"The colonial peoples were to absorb French culture so that they might become 
Frenchmen and French citizens; the colonies were to become overseas parts of 
France" 337 
As Laverue observes, the policy of assimilation, tempered with varying degrees of 
concession, was not practicable due to the diverse nature of the races of which the French 
colonial empire was composed. Thus, French colonial policy had to be adapted to suit 
practically every colony: - 
"La pratique coloniale suivie par nous depuis 1871 represente une infinite de 
dosages differentes des deux principes d'autonomie et d'assimilation; ces dosages ont 
vane non seulement dune colonie ä 1'autre, mais au cours du temps en ce qui 
concerne la meme territoire. "338 
335 ibid, at p. 77. 
336 Delavignette; Freedom and Authority in French West Africa, 1968, p. 85. 337 -, - ----- v r- curl r, rr rr. .. ý, r 11 
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Association therefore, was in reality, assimilation with doses of other policies which were 
regarded as suitable for each colony. 
III. Historical Developments in France and their Impact on Law in the Colonies. 
(a) The Restoration (1815 - 1830) 
Throughout the colonial period, France adhered to the principle of centralised authority but 
the institutions which exercised legislative power over the colonies changed with each 
constitution and era. The Charter of 4 June 1814, which restored the monarchy, provided 
that "the colonies are to be governed by particular laws and regulations". 339 However, it did 
not specify the areas to be covered by each type of legislation. It is possible that 
"regulations" (reglements), referred to royal ordinances, for during the entire Restoration 
period, the only source of colonial legislation was the ordinance. Parliament never enacted a 
law for the colonies 340 
(b) The July Monarchy (1830 -1848) 
The Charter of 14 August 1830, under the July Monarchy, simply stated that "the colonies 
will be governed by particular laws" 341 - 
The omission of "regulation" would seem to imply that the king could no longer legislate by 
royal ordinances. The situation was soon reversed however, by the law of 24 April 1833, 
which provided that "... the French establishments ... 
in Africa... will continue to be governed 
"3a2 by ordinances of the King 
(c) The Constitution of 4 November 1848 (1848 -1852) 
The Constitution of 1848 appeared to have abandoned special legislation for the colonies,. 
339 Art. 73. Bulletin des lois (5th. Ser. ) Vol. I, p. 197 340 1 Dareste; Traite de Droit colonial 1931, p. 230. 341 Art. 64 [1830], Bulletin des Lois (9th Ser. ), Part I, p. 51. 342 Art. 25,1833 Bulletin des Lois (9th Ser. ), Part 1, p. 117. 
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for it provided that: - 
"The territory of Algeria and of the colonies is declared French territory and will be 
governed by particular laws until a special law places them under the regime of the 
343 present constitution  
However no such special law was ever enacted and during the lifetime of this constitution, 
Colonial legislation consisted entirely of decrees of the head of state, who had acquired the 
powers granted the king by the law of 24 April 1833344 . 
(d) The Second Empire 
The constitution of 1852 which ushered in the Second Empire, directed the Senate to 
345 establish a constitution for the colonies Two years later, the Senate passed the Senatus - 
Consulte of 3 May 1854 which was to form the basis of legislation for the African colonies. 
As originally enacted, the Senatus - Consulte gave the Emperor exclusive power to rule the 
African colonies by decree until a new Senatus - Consulte was enacted3a6 No new Senatus - 
Consulte was ever enacted and so throughout the Second Empire, legislation affecting 
Africa consisted entirely of imperial decrees 347 
(e) The Third Republic (1870 -1946) 
With the Third Republic, Parliament regained its full legislative powers over the colonies 
but did not repeal the 1854 Senatus - Consulte34ß. The result was that while Parliament 
could pass laws on any matter concerning the colonies, the head of state was only able to 
legislate by decree on matters which Parliament failed to address. The boundaries of the 
legislative competence of the two organs of government were not always clear and in the 
343 Art 109 [1848] Bulletin des Lois (10th Ser. ) Part II. p. 575. 344 Salacuse, pp. 14 - 15. 345 Art. 27 [1852] Bulletin des Lois (10th Ser. ) Vol. 1X, p. 59. 
346 Art. 18 [1854] Bulletin des Lois (11th. Ser. ) Vol. X, p. 1159. 
347 Salacuse, p. 15. 
348 Senatus-Consulte of 21 May 1870, Art. 43 [1870] Bulletin des Lois, (1 lth. Ser. ) Part 1, 
p. 519. 
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end, the head of state became the principal source of legislation for the colonies 349 
(f) The French Union (1946 -1958) 
The French Constitution of 27 October 1946 created the French Union and transformed the 
French colonies into "territoies d'outre-mer"350 There was very little legal significance to 
this change except that it provided that only Parliament could legislate for overseas 
territories in the areas of criminal law, civil liberties and in administrative matters351. The 
President still had the power to legislate by decree on matters not reserved for Parliament or 
upon which Parliament omitted to legislate. 
(g) The French Community and Independence 
When De Gaulle came to power in 1958, he proposed to transform French overseas 
territories into autonomous republics within the French Community. The matter was put to a 
referendum in all the colonies and all, except Guinea, endorsed it. Because of her refusal, 
Guinea was granted her independence on 1 October 1958 and ceased to be subject to French 
352 law 
Under the French Constitution of 1958, the Overseas Territories of France were given the 
opportunity . of 
becoming members of the French Community 353 The Constitution also 
provided that the French Community, and not the member states, possessed jurisdiction over 
foreign policy, defence, economic and financial policy, currency, policy on strategic raw 
3sa materials and unless excluded by agreement, higher education, internal and external 
349 Salacuse, p. 15. 
350 Overseas Territories. 
351 Article 72, French Constitution of 27 October 1946. 352 Salacuse, p. 16. 
353 Articles 76 and 86, Constitution Francaise, adopted by referendum on 28 
September 1958 and promulgated on 4 October, 1958. 354 Article 78 provided, inter alia, "The Community's jurisdiction shall extend over 
foreign policy, defence,. currency, common economic and financial policy, as well 
as over policy on strategic raw materials... " 
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communication and supervision of the courts3ss All French African territories, except 
356 Algeria obtained their independence in 1960 
IV. Reception of French Law 
Except in the case of Senegal, French Law was introduced into African colonies in two 
ways; 
(i) the enactment of a reception statute which introduced a whole range of laws into one or 
both federations, AOF and AEF. 
(ii) the enactment of specific legislation for the colony. 
The reception statute was enacted in general terms without actually citing the specific laws 
being introduced but providing that the laws of one of the colonies of the federation, applied 
to another. The only exception was Senegal, which, as the first African colony, already had 
legislation in place357. This Senegalese legislation was now incorporated into reception 
statutes and introduced into the other colonies. An example is the decree of 11 May 1892 
establishing the courts of French Guinea: - 
"In any matter, the courts of French Guinea shall conform to the civil, commercial 
and criminal legislation of Senegal, insofar as it is not contrary to the present 
decree"ass 
Similar decrees introduced the civil, commercial and criminal law of Senegal into Dahomey 
and Ivory Coas t359 
The practice remained the same for Equatorial Africa, where the civil, commercial and 
355 Art. 78, French Constitution of 1958. 356 
Zc7 zaiacuse, p. 1-/. 
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For Dahomey, Art.. 23,3 Penant (1894) p. 454; for Ivory Coast Art. 23,6 Penant III 
(1897), p. 17. 
92 
criminal law of Senegal was introduced by the decree of March 1903360 
V. The Position of Local Legal Systems 
In West Africa, French colonial policy did not suppress local legal systems in spite of the 
policy of assimilation. Thus, the greater part of the received metropolitan law did not apply 
to the bulk of the population. This is in contrast to earlier attempts in Senegal to subject the 
entire population to French Law. An order of 5 November 1830, which introduced the Civil 
Code, stated that: 
"Any individual born free and inhabiting Senegal or its dependencies will enjoy in 
361 the colony, the rights accorded by the Civil Code to French Citizens" 
What brought about the change appears to be the court decision in Diallo c. Dia11o362 In 
that case the Court of Appeal for West Africa held that although French Law applied to all 
Senegalese, it did not apply to persons whose local law was preserved by legislation. If the 
court had not intervened in this way, the result could have been the granting of French civil 
liberties and probably citizenship to all Senegalese. 
Regarding the application of local legal systems, France had no option but to recognise and 
enforce existing local laws, especially in matters of land, family and succession. The African 
principles upon which these areas of law were based, were so fundamentally different from 
those of the French, that any forced imposition of French civil law, would have had 
disastrous consequences. In the words of Solus: - 
"The truth is that the merit of any legislation is essentially relative. The best law is 
the one which corresponds best to the political and social state, to the economic 
needs, to the religion and to the mores of the people whose legal relations it must 
360 ,-.,.. ,.,.,,... 
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govern"363 
Nevertheless, French judges were at first reluctant to recognise that local legal systems 
could develop and grow and tended to insist that local legal rules were "... immemorial rules 
born of practice followed uninterruptedly in a given group" 3. 
As regards Islamic Law, French experiences in Algeria, which they had annexed and settled, 
were such that they expected only hostility from West African Moslems. And yet, the 
hostility shown by the Algerians was due mainly to the fact that the French had annexed 
their country36s Islam, being the dominant religion, merely served as a rallying point to 
resist the French 366 The situation in West Africa was different. Nevertheless, the French 
saw themselves as "... waging a crusade to liberate indigenous Africa from the grasp of 
militant Islam"367. Attempts were made to organise non-Islamic indigenous institutions to 
combat Islam, to strengthen the power base of the chiefs, to codify the principal local legal 
systems, to educate the sons of the chiefs in their own "customary law" on the same basis as 
the Moslems did 368 
With time the French came to realise that much of the Islamic Law practised in their 
colonies was part of the Maliki school and largely in name only. At the time Islamic Law 
was brought to Africa, the indigenous legal systems were well established and in many 
cases, directly contradictory to Islamic principles. "In accepting Islam, the people did not, 
indeed could not give up immediately and completely, law and custom which affected their 
way of life"369. The interaction between Islamic Law and indigenous law led rather to the 
modification of Islamic Law. In the words of Dicottignies: - 
362 Cour d'Appel d'AOF. 13 mai 1927. 363 Solus; Traite de la condition des indigenes en Droit prive, 1927, p. 233. 364 Femme Koromaka c. Le mori Kamara, Cour d'Appel d'AOF, 13 novembre, 1924, 
34 Penant I (1925) p. 101. 365 ..., .... _.,.,,. , 
2LL i ne t; ambnage History ot Amca, vol. s, c. 1 iyu - c. 17s iu, p. i uu. ývý rtn iv I. "ýý. . ..... .-.. -. ý.... . ... -... . ,... .... 
147 me tramenage historyot Atnca, volume-'), c. 1'/9u-c. Iu /U, pp. 1 U9- 11 U. 
"' Anderson, J. N; Islamic Law in Africa, 1970, Lord Hailey's introduction at p. ix. 368 i bid, at p. ix. 
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"... the customary law of the Senegalese people has resisted more than one invasion 
in the course of its history. If the country has been Islamised, at least in partial 
370 fashion, this Islamisation has been more religious than juridical" 
The French finally accepted that in West Africa, there was a distinction between Islam in 
theory and in practice. In 1857, a decree was published recognising the right of Senegalese 
Moslems to be governed by Islamic Law. The decree established a Moslem court to hear 
"... matters between Moslems, involving civil status, marriage, succession, gifts and 
wills... according to the law in force among the Moslems"371. 
In 1932, the French authorities followed with a decree which provided that where Islamic 
Law had been modified by indigenous law, the modified law was to be enforced by the 
courts372. However, although the French did not interfere with the process of local law 
modifying Islamic Law, they sometimes modified the local rules which they found 
repugnant. Thus, for example, the Decree of 15 June 1939 established the minimum age of 
marriage for females at fourteen and for males at sixteen373. The Decree also provided that a 
marriage was not valid unless both parties consented to it 
374 
VI. Persons to Whom Local Law Applied 
Prior to 1946, a distinction was drawn between those who were subject to "customary 
status" (statut coutoumier) and those subject to "French status" (statut civil francais). Only 
French citizens were entitled to French civil status except for Africans resident in the four 
"communes" of Senegal (Dakar, Goree, Rufisque and Saint-Louis)375. However, the 
369 Salacuse, p. 47. 
370 Dicottignies; LApport europeen dans l'elaboration du Droit Prive senegalais, 1964, 
p. 79, at p. 83. 371 Decree of 20 May 1857, Art. 2 [1857] Bulletin des Lois (11th Ser. ) Part 2, p. 878. 372 Decree of 20 November 1932, Art. 6.42 Penant III (1933), p. 161. 
373 49 Penant M (1940), p. 110. 375 Salacuse, pp. 48 - 49. 375 Article 82 of the French Constitution of 1946 stated that; "Citizens who do not have 
French civil status retain their personal status, insofar as they have not renounced 
it". Translation in Salacuse, p. 53. 
95 
Africans of the four communes were also subject to the local legal system at the same time 
in their personal matters such as marriage and succession 376 
The French Constitution of 1946 extended French citizenship to all French subjects in 
overseas territories377 but at the same time, Article 82 of the Constitution provided that 
personal status was still subject to the local legal system and not to French civil law378. In 
1955, the Conseil d'Etat ruled that a French subject could irrevocably and permanently 
renounce the application of local law to himself after reaching the age of 21 and if he was 
not a party to a polygamous marriage by a simple procedure of a declaration before a 
competent court of law379. However, the declaration was binding only on the individual and 
did not affect his family, although a father could include his minor children in his 
380 declaration 
VII. Matters Governed by Local Legal Systems 
Except for the "Quartre Communes" of Senegal, all general matters of private law were 
governed by local law31. In one area however, problems arose. The Decree of 20 July 1900 
(concerning Senegal and Ivory Coast), provided that "... property belonging to natives is 
governed by local customs and usages in all that concerns its acquisition, retention and 
transfer"382. But at the same time, French concepts of land ownership were introduced and 
the civil law distinction of public and private ownership came to apply to land. Publicly 
owned land referred to public roads, waterways etc, while "private land" covered grants 
made to individuals. Private land also included land purchased by persons subject to statut 
383 francais from holders subject to the local law 
376 ibid. 
377 Article 80, French Constitution of 1946. 
378 ibid. 
379 Article 82, French Constitution of 1946. 380 Article 82. 
381 ibid, See also Salacuse, p. 54. 382 Senegal and Ivory Coast, Decrees of 20 July 1900. 383 Article 122, Decree of 26 July 1932. 
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A system of land registration was also introduced which enabled a person subject to local 
law to legally transfer land to another subject to French status. Once the registration took 
place, title became indefeasible and irrevocable384. Another controversial procedure 
introduced was the so-called constatation de droits fonciere des indigenes335, whereby a 
person claiming rights to land could have title registered after investigation386. Land so 
registered was still governed by local law but the holder could only be dispossessed by 
means of a judicial process, 387 presumably before a local customary law tribunal. 
French authorities continued to introduce even more complicated legal concepts of land 
tenure by increasing the legal categories according to which land could be owned. Public 
land was now referred to as domaine, subject to special legislation concerning its acquisition 
and alienation 3ß8. The domaine was further divided into two classes, domaine public (public 
state owned) and domaine prive which was subject to grant or concessions to private 
individuals. Although French law never provided that all land was state-owned as a result of 
colonialism, it did provide however, that "vacant land" and "land without master" belonged 
to the domaine prive389. The decree did not lay down a procedure for determining what was 
"vacant land". 
The situation regarding privately held land was even more perplexing. Four legal categories 
existed side by side. The first category involved land purchased in the nineteenth century by 
Europeans and Africans of French civil status from holders who were subject to local legal 
systems. These holdings were now regarded as governed by French civil law39o Secondly, 
persons subject to local law sometimes "sold" land to each other, stipulating that the sale 
384 ibid. 
385 "Establishment of the land rights of natives". 
386 A. O. F, Decree of 8 October 1925,35 Penant III (1926), p. 51; A. E. F, Decree of 10 
February 1938,47 Penant III, (1938), p. 192; Togo, Decree of 13 August 1934,45 
Penant III (1936), p. 317; Cameroons, Decree of 21 July 1932,42 Penant III (1933), 
p. 33. 
387 Provision contained in all Decrees. 388 AEF Decree 28 March 1899,8 Penant (1899) p. 48; AOF Decree of 15 November 
1935,45 Penant (1936), p. 124. 389 Decree of 15 November 1935,45 Penant (1936), p. 124. 390 Doublier; La propriete fonciere en AOF, 1957, p. 60. Hereafter cited as as Doublier. 
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and the land itself was henceforth governed by the French civil code. The validity of these 
transactions was questionable as West African legal systems often do not permit permanent 
alienation of land. In most cases, West African land is held collectively by family, village or 
kinship groups. The individual in possession only holds rights of use and has no transferable 
title. The courts however, recognised these transactions, often under the pretext that the 
competing right under local law had not been proved or that it had been extinguished 
391 through prescription 
In this way, the French set out to undermine the collective ownership of land in order to 
stimulate western-type economic development. Their aim was to transform collective 
ownership into individual ownership and to secure a title which could not be attacked. To 
achieve this, they introduced the concept of land registration, le regime de Pimmatriculation, 
based on the Torrens system of Australia 392. Thus, the French succeeded in introducing a 
system which did not exist in France itself. 
The laws governing registration were complex. Generally, all land, whether held under local 
law or civil law, could be registered but registration was obligatory only when land 
previously subject to local law, was alienated to a person subject to the civil French status; 
and in AOF and the Cameroons, where land governed by local law was, for the first time 
alienated in a contract made in the French form. Once registered, a title became definitive 
and "constitutes before the French courts, the sole point of departure for rights and charges 
existing in the real property at the moment of registration, to the exclusion of all other rights 
not registered... "393 Furthermore, the land became permanently subject to French civil law 
and could not revert to its-former status, except where a person succeeded to land governed 
394 by local law and the deceased owner was also subject to local law 
However, registered land constituted a very small percentage of each colony and was limited 
391' Doublier, pp. 60 - 64. 392 AOF Decree of 26 July 1932,42 Penant III (1933), p. 83; AEF Decree of 28 March 
1899,8 Penant III (1899), p. 53; Togo Decree of 23 December 1922,32 Penant III 
(1923), p. 84; Cameroon Decree of 21 July 1932,42 Penant (1933), p. 40. 393 Art. 122, Decree of 26 July 1932,42 Penant III (1933), p. 83. 
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to urban areas, mainly for housing purposes. Throughout the colonial era, the greater 
percentage of land remained subject to local law. French attempts to bring most land under 
French law failed. In 1926 the officials attempted to regulate even land subject to local law 
and introduced a procedure known as constatation des droits foncieres des indigines 395. The 
new law was aimed principally at groups alleging collective property rights. If a member of 
the group decided to lay claim to a part or whole of the communal land, he must make a 
request to the local administrator who would conduct an inquiry. If the claim was disputed 
by third parties, the matter is referred to the local "customary" court. Otherwise the 
administrator would deliver to the claimant an official record (livretfoncier), describing the 
nature of his rights in the land. The land remained subject to local law and while the 
396 claimant had no title absolute, third parties could dispute his title only through the courts. 
Thus, constatation was an intermediate stop between traditional tenure and land registration. 
As things would have it, only a handful of Africans (mainly in urban areas), made use of the 
procedure. 
VIII. Limitations Placed on Application of Local Law 
A provision akin to the British "contrary to natural justice, equity and good conscience"397 
was introduced into French colonies. A local legal rule was not to be recognised or enforced 
if it was considered "contrary to the principles French civilisation"398. Customs which were 
alien to French culture were not, for that matter alone, considered contrary to public policy. 
Thus, polygamy, for example, was not considered contrary to public policy 399 
Both the English and the French provisions were similar, in that they were never defined 
394 ibid. 
395 "Establishment of the land rights of natives". AOF Decree of 8 October 1925,35 
Penant III (1926) p. 51; AEF Decree of 10 February 1938,47 Penant III (1938) p. 192; 
Togo - Decree of 13 August, 1934,45 Penant III (1936), p. 317; Cameroon - Decree 
of 21 July 1932,42 Penant III (1933), p. 33. 396 ibid. See Decrees at footnote 384 above. 
397 See later, Chapter Six. 
398 AOF Decree of 16 August 1912, Art. 36.21 Penant 111 (1912), p. 282. 
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and the courts interpreted them on individual case basis4oo However, the French 
constitution of 1946 retained the "statut coutoumier", which was viewed in certain quarters 
as a guarantee of the application of local law401. This must have made judges reluctant to 
interfere with local legal rules. 
A second limitation was developed by the courts which felt they had a duty to fill any 
lacuna which the local system might have402. However, except in the case of Togo, none of 
the various decrees expressly provided that where customary law was silent on an issue or 
where a remedy was unknown to the customary law, French law was to apply 
03 An 
example where this arose was in a case regarding liability of the master for the acts of the 
servant. In a Cameroonian case, the defendant's employee negligently injured the plaintiff 
with the defendant's truck. However the local law, the law of Douala, did not know 
vicarious liability. The court therefore applied the French civil code and held the defendant 
liable 404 
A third method used to limit the application of local law was the option granted to a person 
subject to "statut coutoumier" to opt for the application of French Law to individual 
transactions and matters4os In this way, two Africans, subject to local law, could provide 
that their contract was to be governed by the principles of the civil code 406 The provision 
applied to Moslems as well and they could freely make a will according to French law407. At 
times, the choice of French Law was said to be implied in the mode of transaction. In the 
Cameroonian case mentioned above, the court ruled inter alia, that the defendant had 
impliedly opted for French Law since he had taken out an insurance policy completed in the 
French form. Under French Law, motor insurance automatically covered a servant. The 
major exception to this rule was that Africans subject to "statut coutoumier" could not 
399 Salacuse, p. 60. 
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contract a marriage according to civil law. But even this was removed in 1947408. 
IX. Conflict of Laws 
Unlike the British colonial governments409, the French rarely enacted legislation on choice 
of law. Thus, only a few decided cases exist as a guide. In contract cases, the courts usually 
applied the law intended by the parties410. The law applicable to succession was the personal 
law of the deceased411. 
As in British colonies, the major conflicts involved marriage and family law, especially the 
legal status of a Christian marriage. The difficulty was that a marriage celebrated by a 
Christian minister alone was not recognised as a "Christian customary marriage"412. This 
remained the position until the decree of 1951413 " . relatif ä certaines modalites du marriage 
entre personnes de statut personnel en AOF, en AEF, au Togo et au Cameroon" somewhat 
clarified the matter. The decree was not totally helpful as it dealt only with monogamous 
marriages, the assumption being probably that a monogamous marriage necessarily equalled 
a Christian marriage. The decree declared that a marriage according to local law was the 
appropriate form of marriage for Africans who had not renounced their local personal law, 
thus abolishing the so-called "Christian customary marriage". Marriage under the civil code 
was possible for Africans only if they had renounced their statut coutoumier. The decree 
abolished any claim for a dowry or other customary payment in respect of marriage under 
14 local law where the woman was -over the age of 21 or had previously been marrieda 
In the case of unmarried women under 21, maximum rates were fixed and provision was 
407 Judgment of 6 September 1929,32 Recueil Dareste III (1929), p. 182. 
408 Decree of 19 November 1947, [1947] Journal Officiel (Fr. ), p. 11480. 
409 See for example, Supreme Court Ordinance, Section 14 of 1876; Salacuse, p. 63. 
410 Salacuse, p. 64. 411 Rolland & Lampue; Droit d'outre-mer, 3rd ed. 1959, pp. 220-221. 412 Herschenroder, M. F. P; "Study of the Law Applicable to Native Christians in the 
French Depencies and in India", Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law, 1935-, 3rd Sess. 18: pp. 186 - 194. 413 No. 51-1100 of 14- September 1951 414 ibid. 
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made for disputes to be heard by the Tribunaux de premier degre, composed of an 
Administrative Officer and African assessors. Where the tribunal considered the dowry 
demanded excessively high, it had power to grant a certificate for the marriage to proceed 
without the consent of the woman's relatives4' 
The decree also gave legal effect to contracts of marriage under local law based on a 
promise of monogamy by providing for the legal enforcement of the promise416. The theory 
appears to be that a marriage regulated by the decree could still remain governed by local 
law. There could be difficulties here as the decree is able to deprive the marriage of essential 
validity under local law as it had prohibited the payment of dowry and also disregarded 
parental consent417. Thus, a marriage under the decree could find itself in a legal limbo, not 
governed by the civil code, as it was essentially a customary marriage, nor by local law, 
which, as the lex loci celebrationis, had not been followed. Where the conflict was between 
two or more local legal systems, the French exceptionally enacted choice of law rules on 
certain issues 419. The rules provided the following: - 
(i) Marriage 
In all questions relating to marriage, divorce, custody of children or rights of a wife, when 
the marriage is dissolved by divorce, repudiation or death, the applicable law is the law 
governing the marriage. If there was no marriage contract, the customary law of the 
woman's locality applied. 
(ii) Wills and Succession 
Questions relating to wills and succession were governed by the customary law of the 
deceased. 
415 ibid. 
416 Philips; 4(2) Journal of African Administration, pp. 79 - 80. 417 See Dobkin, Marlene; "Colonialism and the Legal Status of Women in Francophone 
Africa", 1968,8 Cahiers d'etudes africaines, pp. 390-405. 418 AOF Decree of 3 December 1931, Art. 6.41 Penant (1932), p. 149; Togo-Decree of 
21 April 1933, Art. 6.47 Penant (1938), p. 258; Cameroons-Decree of 31 July 
1927, Art. 51.36 Penant (1927), p. 354; AEF; Decree of 29 May 1936, Art. 51,14 
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(iii) Contracts 
Contracts, other than of marriage contracts, are to be decided according to the law generally 
followed at the place where the contract was made ie, lex loci contractus. 
(iv) In all other matters, the customary law of the defendant applied. 
How French colonial authorities interpreted these rules will be dealt with below. 
B. Application of the Choice of Law Rules, 1814 -1946 
I. 'Natives' who were French Citizens 
With assimilation occupying such a prominent position in French colonial policy, one would 
have thought that natives who managed to become assimilated and became French citizens 
would be granted all the rights due to a French citizen in France. However, this was not the 
case because, as the French argued, the political organisation in the colonies was different 
from that in France itself419. There was no representation of colonial peoples in the French 
Parliament until after the Second World War, nor were there elected local councils until 
after the War 420 . 
Secondly, the civil law of the colonial French citizen was not derived from French law itself 
but was the result of legislation specially enacted for each colony. Even the metropolitan 
French citizen residing in the colony was not subject to the law of France, as another French 
citizen residing in France was, nor indeed as he would be if he were residing in a "foreign" 
state, in which case conflicts rules would have called for the application of the law of 
France 421. Only upon arrival on French soil, was it possible for these colonial citizens to 
419 Solus,. Henry; Traite de la condition des indigenes en droit prive, 1927, p. 13. 
Hereafter cited as Solus. 420 ibid, at p. 13. 
421 ibid, at p. 13. 
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enjoy the full rights of a French citizen422. Thus, there was a basic weakness in the concept 
of assimilation. 
One of the reasons for this discrepancy in citizens' rights appears to be the patronising 
attitude the French adopted towards the colonial peoples. Thus, French civil law could not 
apply to the "assimile", as it was "... dangereux de leur accorder tous les droits politiques et 
423 les libertes individuelles ä la jouissance desquels ils ne sont pas prepares" 
II. The Origins of the Extension of Citizenship to the Colonies 
The French Revolution and its principle of "liberte, egalite et fraternite", were the grand 
vision behind the concept that colonised peoples could obtain French citizenship. It was 
passed into legislation on 15 May 1791 and gave "people of colour" and enfranchised slaves 
the same civil and political rights as Europeans. This state of affairs remained until slavery 
was re-introduced in the Napoleonic era but was revived after 1830 when several ordinances 
were enacted creating complete equality between blacks and whites, especially in the 
colonies of Martinique, Guadaloupe, Bourbon (Reunion) and French Guyana424. The Law of 
24 April 1833 further extended the principle to all colonies. Article 1 provided that: 
"Toute personne nee libre ou ayant acquis legalement la liberte jouit, dans les 
colonies francaises: 1. des droits civils, 2. des droits politiques, sous les 
conditions prescrites par les Lois. 
Article 2. Sont abrogees toutes dispositions de lois, edits, declarations du roi, 
ordonnances royales... et notament toutes restrictions et exclusions qui avaient ete 
prononcees, quand ä l'excercise des droits civils et des droits politiques ä 1'egard des 
hommes de Couleur libreset des affranchis. " 
422 ibid, at p. 14. 
423 Solus, p. 15. 
424 ibid, p. 15. The ordinances of 7 September 1830 and 24 February 1831. 
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There were substantial differences between the law of 1833 and original law of 1791 which 
created equal rights. The egalitarian motives behind the Law of 1791 were somewhat 
modified in the new law. Thus, the new policy was "assimilation" and the propagation of "le 
benifice des lois francais"425. Furthermore, these rights could only be enjoyed "sous les 
conditions prescrites par la loi". In any case, it was over-optimistic of the French to suppose 
that one single piece legislation could, overnight, transform Africans, living under very 
different conditions, into Frenchmen. 
III. The Law of 29 September 1916 
As regards the inhabitants of the four communes of Senegal, the Law of 29 September 1916 
stated that: 
"Les natifs des quartre communes de plein exercise du Senegal et leurs descendants sont et 
"a26 demeurent des citoyens francais 
Therefore being a French citizen depended upon the chance of being born within any of the 
four "communes" and not one kilometre outside it. This arrangement could have problems 
though. Suppose a non-resident Senegalese woman gave birth to a child in one of the 
communes. Her child would be a French citizen while she remained Senegalese. It would be 
irrelevant that place of birth was the only connection the child had with the commune and 
that he had no intention of ever residing there. Indeed his descendants would be French 
citizens! It is not clear why the French found it necessary to give the communes a special 
status, as Article 109 of the 1848 Constitution had declared Senegal an extension of France 
overseas. 
The imposition may have been found necessary to deprive the communes of their local legal 
systems, while the rest of Senegal retained their customary legal systems in full. The idea 
425 ibid, at p. 16. 426 Recueil Dareste I(1916), p. 716; 3 Penant (1916), p. 316. 
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that the inhabitants of the communes were now subject to the family law, religious laws and 
laws of succession of France must have been unbearable. The imposition of French Law 
must have brought uncertainty and conflict into communities which had no wish to abandon 
their own legal systems. 
Even more perplexing was the provision that the inhabitants of the communes "sont et 
demeurent francais", thus they were not only regarded as French from the enactment of the 
legislation but also retroactively before the Act came into force. They had always been 
French. The consequences must have been far-reaching. All legal relations and acts entered 
into according to local laws before the enactment of the law and which conflicted with the 
French civil code, stood the danger of being declared a nullity. Marriages celebrated 
according to local law would be invalid and children of such marriages would be 
illegitimate; divorces not conforming to the French code would be invalid, with the possible 
instances of bigamy; polygamous marriages which took place before the Act came into force 
would entail criminal offences; gifts, testamentary dispositions etc would all be affected427. 
It is difficult to appreciate the wisdom behind the retroactivity inherent in the legislation, in 
view of the uncertainty and disruption of social life it was likely to bring about. 
The courts recognised the difficulties posed by the Law of 1916 and proceeded to interpret it 
strictly. In a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Afrique Ocidental Francais (AOF), the 
court refused to confer French citizenship on a Moslem born outside the four communes but 
of a mother who was born in one of them428. The court found a loophole which enabled it to 
hold that in Islamic Law as well as in French Law, a child assumed the citizenship of the 
father, not of its mother. It seems however that the real reason for the decision was the 
anxiety to limit the number of Senegalese who could validly claim French citizenship. It is 
unlikely that the judgment would have gone the other way if the plaintiff had been a non- 
Moslem from a matriarchal community. Nevertheless it is also possible that the court was 
attempting to avoid the inextricable conflicts which were likely to arise in cases such as the 
427 The Appeal Court (Cour d'Appel de l'AOF) recognised this danger in its judgment of 
8 December 1920. Recueil Dareste III (1922), p. 169. 428 Judgment of 5 September 1924, Recueil Dareste III (1925), p. 106; Pennant I (1925), 
p. ll. 
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one before it but the suspicion remains that the first interpretation is correct. 
In a series of decisions the courts confirmed this suspicion. In its judgment of 4 December 
1924 the court held that the fact that a native of one of the communes had French 
citizenship, did not preclude him from retaining his "statut coutumier"429. In another 
judgment of 2 April 1926, the court was quite explicit and held that the law of 1916 was 
meant to entice Senegalese men to enlist in the French army during the First World War and 
that the intention was never to deprive them of their "statut coutumier"43° The court 
doubted that a complete loss of status was what the legislator had in mind. 
Despite the explanations of the Court of Appeal, it is difficult to accept that the French 
legislator was only interested in the limited use of French citizenship for military purposes 
and had no intentions whatsoever of allowing the "natives" to enforce their rights as French 
citizens. The retroactive nature of the legislation appears to indicate that there were wider 
policy reasons for enacting the law. A French citizen resident in one of the communes ought 
to be in the position to enjoy the civil and political rights available to French citizens from 
France, at least the rights in force in the colony. However, as matters stood, a "native" was 
capable of enjoying those same rights only upon naturalisation while he could not do so 
were he born in one of the four communes in spite of having French citizenship. 
Furthermore, the law of 1916 placed no restriction whatsoever on citizenship obtained 
through' birth of a resident of the four communes.. In any case, since there were no local (or 
native) courts in the four communes, it is difficult to see how the inhabitants were supposed 
to organise their affairs according to non-French law. 
IV. French Subjects 
The general notion was that, any colonial person who possessed French citizenship was a 
French subject. However, French policy on the subject was inconsistent and at times, the 
429 Recueil Dareste III (1925), p. 176. 430 Pennant 1 (1926), p. 197. 
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subject could be either: 
1. a French citizen, or 
2. an African who was regarded as a French citizen resident in a French colony but who 
could not enjoy the rights of a French citizen. 
However, the concept "French subject" was more readily understood to mean that all 
colonial persons who were not born in a commune were French subjects. 
V. Administered Territories 
After the First World War, the Peace of Versailles placed half of the former African German 
colonies of Cameroon and Togo under French administration and the other half of 
Cameroon and Togo and Tanganyika under British rule and South West Africa under South 
African administration to be governed as trusteeships under the supervision of the League of 
Nations. The Council of the League of Nations in its session of 22 April 1923, passed a 
resolution which elaborated the mandate granted to the Allied Powers 431. Resolution I 
stated that the status of the citizens of the mandated territories is distinct from that of the 
mandatory power and was never to be assimilated by any means. 
Resolution II further stated that under no circumstance were the inhabitants of a mandated 
territory to assume the nationality of the mandatory power, simply because benefits were 
being conferred upon them. However, Resolution III permitted individuals of a mandated 
territory to obtain by way of naturalisation, the nationality of the mandatory power. 
VI. Strangers Assimilated into Local Colonial Population 
Metropolitan French citizens who found themselves living in a French colony were subject 
largely to French civil law and such French law as was enacted for the colony. However, 
there were times when a French citizen would abandon the French way of life altogether and 
431 The Council, 24th Session, April 1923. Official Journal, League of Nations, 1923. 
N. 6, p. 567. 
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develop a greater affinity with a local African community, adopt their ways and laws, join 
their institutions and religion. In such cases it was irrational to pretend that he was still 
subject to the "statut civil": - 
"... Il a semble logique de les considerer comme des indigenes, de les 
"a3z assimiler aux indigenes 
These "strangers assimiles aux indigenes", as they came to be known, were therefore subject 
to the particular "statut coutumier" under which they came. However, the following rules 
were formulated to govern the choice of law process involving them. 
1. All legal acts between the ' assimile' and the locals are governed by local law 33 
2. Criminal and tortious liability by the 'assimile' is governed by local law 434 
3. The 'assimile' is amenable, in all other matters, to the same local courts as the locals 435 
4. The capacity of the 'assimile' to acquire or own immoveable property is governed by the 
local law. However, the locals were not to place any undue restrictions on the ' assimile'436. 
In West Africa, there was no general agreement regarding the law applicable to the 'etranger 
assimile' but there were provisions in the various decrees indicating a choice of law in the 
matter. For French West Africa (AEF), Article 2 of the Decree of 22 March 1924437; for 
Cameroon, Article 1, Decree of 13 April 1921 438 and for Togo, Article 3, Decree of 22, 
November 1922439. However, the general approach shown above was kept. 
432 n_t___ -- n 
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434 Cass. Crim. 16 janvier 1913 et 30janvier 1913, Receuil Dareste III (1913), p. 175. 435 ibid, at p. 313. 
436 Several agreements were signed in Asia with the locals to protect the ' assimiles, eg Art 
4, Treaty of 9 June 1885 (Tonkin), the Royal Ordinance of 13 May 1909 (Cambodia). 
437 Recueil Dareste I (1924), p. 206. 438 Recueil Dareste I (1922), p. 383. 
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VII. Persons of Mixed Race and Persons of Unknown Parentage 
Persons of mixed race (of black and white parentage) were a common phenomenon in the 
colonies but the French policy of ascribing a status to everyone mainly according to race, 
made it difficult to decide what to do with people of mixed race. Were they to be regarded 
as French citizens simply because of the "sang francais qui coule dans leurs veins" 
40? 
Were they 'assimiles aux indigenes'? Or should an intermediate category between the 
French and the indigenous population be created for them? The French authorities rejected 
the third solution because of the dangers of creating a class of mixed races apart, who would 
have less rights than the French (and therefore be jealous of the French) and would have 
more rights than the Africans (for whom they could develop contempt). Most probably, the 
authorities felt they ought to learn from the example of Saint-Dominque (Haiti), where 
whites had unwisely provoked the anger and hatred of people of mixed races441. 
The only solutions left to be considered were the first two: assimilation into European 
society or assimilation into indigenous society. Legally the solution was not simple. How 
were mixed children to be assimilated? Which parent was to be decisive in the choice of a 
status? Which nationality were they to adopt? For many years the French authorities avoided 
these issues and left them to the courts to solve on an individual basis. By the end of the 
Eighteenth Century, philanthropic societies were established to deal with this acute problem. 
In 1894, the "Association de protection des enfants metis du Tonkin" was formed. In 1925, 
it was transformed by decree into the "Societe d'assistance aux enfants abandonnees franco- 
indo-chinois"442. A similar society was formed in 1900 in Madagascar. The activities of 
these societies led to the issue of the Decree of 1925, regulating the status of persons of 
mixed race. The Decree classified mixed races into two large groups, (a) mixed persons of 
known parentage and (b) mixed persons of unknown parentage. 
439" 
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The courts had no opportunity to consider such cases as the African father usually had the 
mixed child brought up as an African. Such mixed children did not turn to the French courts 
seeking French citizenship. It is difficult to guess how the courts would have dealt with such 
443 a case 
IX. Mixed Child Born in Wedlock to a French Father and an African Mother. 
A mixed child born in wedlock to a French father and an African mother is a French citizen, 
according to the French Civil Code, which lays down as follows: - 
"French citizens are individuals born of a Frenchman in France, in the 
colonies or in a foreign country' 
Further, an African woman who married a Frenchman had a right to French citizenship and 
therefore there may have been no doubt about the status of the child. 
X. Mixed Child born to Unmarried Couple 
The legal complications arose in cases where the parents of a mixed child were unmarried 
but wished their child to be recognised as a French citizen. If the French father recognised 
the child as his own, Article 8 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code applied and the child "... suivra 
la nationalite du pere". This was still the case even if the French father and the African 
mother recognised the child simultaneously 5. As long as the French father recognised the 
child, it became French, even if the recognition was the result of a court order of the colonial 
cour t446 This legal position was originally adopted by the Decree of 7 February 1897 which 
first applied only to Martinique, Guadaloupe and Reunion but came to apply to all French 
colonies. The general rule was that a child whose filiation was established during minority 
aas See Solus, p. 75. 
aaa French Civil Code, Article 8, para 1. aas Solus, p. 76. 
446 Loi du 16 Novembre 1912. 
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by recognition, acquires the nationality of the recognising parent447. If the recognition was 
by the French father, the child was French, and African of the relevant country, if 
. recognition was by the African mother48 
There were however, difficulties in applying the rule, for, unmarried French fathers often 
did not recognise their children and left them to their mothers to bring up alone. 
Consequently, many of the children grew up in poverty. Soon, French philanthropists found 
a loophole in the Decree of 1897 and began to exploit it. It began in Indo-China, where a 
certain Mr. Honore Bodin decided to recognise as his natural children, every single 
illegitimate child of mixed race in Indo-China, who wished to acquire French citizenship449 
Soon his example was being followed in other French colonies45o The French Government 
acted quickly to stop this traffic in mixed children451. However the colonial French courts 
did not see things the Government's way and held that the Minister for Public Order could 
not challenge the recognition of a child as he was not on the list of eligible people who 
could mount such challenge452. The court also felt that the minister could not, in the name of 
53 public order, interfere with the honour and the peace of family life4 
Not surprisingly, the Government changed the law. The Decree of 7 November 1916 came 
into effect in Madagascar and reformed the law of that country. In traditional Madagascan 
law, a child was born with its own status and needed no recognition. A child born out of 
wedlock acquired the mother's personal lawasa The Decree of 7 November now created the 
possibility for a father of French citizenship, or 'etranger assimile', to recognise his mixed 
child born out of wedlock. The recognition had to be effected before the Procurator 
447 Decree of 7 February 1897. 
448 Cour d'Appel de 1'Indo-Chine, 10 Septembre 1903. Recueil Dareste III (1904), p. 44. 
449 Girault, Arthur, Principes de colonisation et de legislation nationale, p. 347. 450 ibid, at p. 347. 
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(Procureur de la Republic), who must be satisfied that the recognition was sincereass If the 
Procurator was satisfied, a tribunal was convened and the Minister of Public Order had the 
right to challenge the recognition and appeal against the decision if it went against him 456 
The decree also gave the Minister wide discretionary powers to stop any recognition hearing 
he disagreed with. Article 15 provided that: - 
"... le Ministere public, s'agissant d'office, dans un interet d'ordre public pourra, en ce 
qui concerne certaines reconnaissance anterieures ä la promulgation du present 
decret et posterieus au l er juillet 1916, qui lui paraitraient avoir ete faites sans 
aucune. garantie de sincerite et dans un but frauduleux, se pourvoir directement en 
annulation des dites reconnaissance devant les tribunaux competents.... Un delai 
d'une annee ä compter de la promulgation du present decret sera accorde au ministre 
public ä ces fins. " 
The French Government further extended the legislation to apply to all its colonies in a 
series of decrees457. Thus, the new decrees amended Article 339 of the Civil Code by adding 
the Minister of Public Order to the list of interested parties who could challenge a 
recognition proceeding concerning a mixed child458 
XI. Mixed Child Recognised by each Parent in a Succession 
Generally where the French father recognised the mixed child, the child is French459. 
Suppose however, that the mixed child were recognised by the African mother first and then 
by the French father next. What status did the child have? This is a hypothetical situation 
and there are no decided cases on it but Solus thinks that where the African mother was a 
French subject, the child was also a French subject, ie the child had statut coutoumier and 
ass Article 3. 
456 Articles 5 and 6. 
457 For example, Article 2 of Decree of 15 December 1922. 458 Article 339 of the Civil Code did not previously include the Minister of Public 
Order as an interested person to the- proceedings. 
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the subsequent recognition by the French father could not change the child's status46o Solus 
however leans heavily towards French citizenship where the mother was a French citizen 
and the father was not. As stated before, African fathers had their children brought up as 
Africans and did not care for French citizenship for their mixed children. Solus however 
argues. that the child ought to have been allowed to benefit from both cultures so that he may 
choose which of both cultures was "most advantageous"461. Solus does not reveal how the 
test of "most advantageous" is to be applied and by whom. If the choice was made by the 
African father, the child would almost likely be made to regard the African culture as the 
"most advantageous", while the French mother would almost invariably choose French 
status. The fact that the French colonial government omitted to legislate on the matter 
indicates that the problem did not exist or if it did, was not serious. 
XII. Mixed Children of Unknown Parentage 
Children of unknown parentage must not be understood literally to mean that the parents 
were actually unknown but that neither the paternal nor maternal parentage was legally 
established voluntarily through recognition or by court order. The position is governed by 
Article 8(2) of the Civil Code, as amended by the Decree of 7 February1897. It provides: 
"(2) Est francais... tout individu ne aux colonies de parents inconnus ou dont 
la nationalite est inconnu... " 
This provision would have afforded all illegitimate children the opportunity of becoming 
French citizens, regardless of race. To prevent that from happening, the Decree of 7 
February 1897 provided in Article 17 that, 
"Il West rien change ä la condition des indigenes dans les colonies francaises". 
Thus, the provision did not apply to Africans residing in French colonies. 
459 ., ý,., -, r. I... --- -- 
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A combination of Article 8(2) of the Civil Code and Article 17 of the Decree of 1897 
produced the following result. Article 8(2) applied only to mixed children of whom one 
parent was French or etranger assimile. Children whose parents were both African could 
not claim this-right. However, there were inherent contradictions in the rule. Article 8(1) of 
the Civil Code provided that a mixed child acquired French citizenship only when its French 
father legally established his paternity462. And yet Article 8(2) appears to grant such mixed 
children French citizenship anyway, even if the father failed (or refused), to recognise him. 
Why then did the law refer to these children as children of unknown parentage? 
It would have been easier to declare all mixed children whose parentage was unknown 
African but the French disapproved of this approach as it was French policy to encourage 
mixed children to become French. However, the policy undermined the stated French 
doctrine of assimilation by which there should have been no distinction between 
unrecognised children of African parentage and unrecognised mixed children. As far as 
status was concerned such children should all have been classified either African or French. 
Secondly, an unrecognised child of pure African parentage was automatically indigene, 
since status was acquired through the father. If the parents did not exist in law, how was the 
child identified as having statut coutumier? 
Case law on the subject is not very helpful. The courts tended to interpret the provisions 
strictly and were willing to refuse civil status. The Court of Appeal of Indo-China held that 
Article 8(2) of the Civil Code could not apply to a mixed child who claimed that although 
his father was French, he was unable to trace his mother. Such a child could not claim 
French citizenshipa63 It is difficult to discover the wisdom behind this judgment. The onus 
of establishing paternity ought to lie on the parents and not on the child and it was precisely 
in cases such as this, where the parents failed to do this, that the child was entitled to the 
rights provided in Article 8(2). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, that the courts were 
unwilling to confer French citizenship on children of mixed race whose parents were legally 
unknown. The logical conclusion to be drawn from the judgment is that a mixed child 
461 .,., ý., 
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whose parents failed to establish paternity, had no status at all and therefore no personal law, 
with all the consequences that such a conclusion would entail. 
After 1920 however, the courts began to redress this short-coming, as evidenced in two 
important judgments, namely the judgment of 20 October 19214, in Pnom-Penh, 
Cambodia and of 28 March 1923, in Noumea, French Caledonia465 Both decisions now 
stated that a mixed child born in the colonies and whose parents had not established their 
paternity but who had been brought up and educated as a French person may not be refused 
French civil status. He was to be classified as a person born of an unidentified French father 
and of an unknown mother 466 
There is little doubt that Article 8(2) was meant to provide a personal law (or status) for 
illegitimate mixed children whose French fathers had left the colony without establishing 
their paternity, or the French father had abandoned the child right from birth; or the child's 
father had died before completing the legal formalities. In all these situations, it would be 
reasonable for the child to acquire the French civil status as his personal law. The decisions 
cited above however, fail to implement the rationale behind the legislation. The idea that the 
child had to be brought up and educated as a French citizen before benefiting from Article 
8(2) appears to defeat the purpose of the legislation. Clearly illegitimate mixed children 
whose French fathers had left the colony or had died, would be unable to benefit from the 
provision, for it would now be left to them to establish, not only the French citizenship of 
their fathers but also that they had been brought up and educated as French citizens. Not an 
easy task for children who had spent all their lives outside France and possibly in non- 
French communities. 
Solus suggests that where the mixed child is unable to establish the French nationality of his 
father, the court should examine the race of the child, to determine whether he should pass 
463 Cour d'Appel de 1'Indo-Chine 28 mai. Pennant I (1903), p_ 312. 
464 Recueil Dareste III (1922), p. 118. 
465 Tri. civ. de Noumea, 28 mars 1923. Recueil Dareste III (1924), p. 109. 466 Fran ais ne de ere ran ais non desi ýpýfý gne et de mere inconnue'. 
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for white (in which case he acquires French civil status), or be considered indigenous467. 
Herein lay the major weakness of the French policy of relying on race to establish the 
personal law or status of the individual. The personal law of a person ought to be the law 
with which he has the closest connection and not the law which is held to be appropriate for 
his race. If Solus' view should prevail, then it is quite possible that the indigenous mother of 
an illegitimate mixed child and who also has a pure indigenous child, could face the 
situation where her two children had two different personal laws, although they had been 
brought up together in the same community and cultural environment. 
XIII. The Law of 16 November 1912 
In an attempt to ameliorate this situation, the French Government passed the law of 16 
November 1912. Article 4 of the new law entitled the mixed child to seek his father in 
France and if he could identify him, he was entitled to French citizenship. However, the 
authorities were unwilling to allow anyone who claimed this right to take advantage of it. 
Article 4 also provided that the local colonial authorities could determine that Article 4 
applied only in cases where the child's mother and the purported father were both French 
citizens or belonged to the category of strangers assimiles. This restriction saw to it that in 
some colonies, only few unrecognised children acquired French citizenship. In some 
colonies, children of mixed race were excluded altogether from benefiting under the new 
Article 4468. In West Africa, the courts interpreted the provision in such manner that it 
excluded children of mixed race altogether 469 Even in colonies where children of mixed 
race could start litigation in France to establish the identity of their fathers, the sheer cost 
and duration of such litigation rendered the new law academic to most who qualified. 
467 Solus, p. 88. 
468 eg in Indo-China. See Arrete de Promulgation du 19 juin 1913. Journal Offciel Indo- 
Chine, 23 juin 1913. 
469 Cour d'Appel de 1'AOF, 12 mars 1920, Recueil Dareste III (1923), p. 135. 
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French territories in Africa south of the Sahara were colonies. Therefore the indigenous 
population retained their African status. However, the French policy of assimilation sought 
to encourage Africans to opt for French citizenship. Several methods of acquiring French 
nationality were open to Africans. . 
(a) Naturalisation 
Naturalisation had several legal effects, depending on whether the applicant was a French 
subject. French subjects were considered Frenchmen but without the rights of a French 
citizen. Technically therefore, naturalisation for them simply meant accession to the rights 
of a French citizen. However, French subjects and colonial subjects were subjected to the 
same procedure when applying for citizenship and therefore the so-called rights of the 
subject were dubious. To qualify to apply for naturalisation, the African had to demonstrate 
that he was sufficiently educated in the French manner, that he had acquired French culture 
and civilisation and that he possessed sufficient aptitude to assimilate 470 
A decree was issued for each colony regulating naturalisation and the requirements were 
consequently varied to suit the needs of each colony. The conditions imposed on colonial 
subjects were less rigorous than those imposed on non-subjects. This is because the French 
actually thought of their colonial subjects as Frenchmen without French rights. 
In West Africa, naturalisation as a policy was introduced quite late, in 1912, by the Decree 
of 25 May 1912471. This decree was augmented in 1918 by the Decree of 14 January 
1918472, making it possible for Africans who had distinguished themselves in the French 
Army during the First World War, to naturalise. 
An applicant had to satisfy several conditions before being considered for naturalisation. 
The conditions for West Africa were far more rigorous and complicated than those for 
Madagascar. Solus thinks this was because the French considered Madagascans better 
470 ni -- ni 
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The conditions for West Africa were far more rigorous and complicated than those for 
Madagascar. Solus thinks this was because the French considered Madagascans better 
prepared for assimilation than West Africans473. The conditions were laid down in Articles 
1 and 2 of the Decree of 25 May 1912: - 
1. The applicant must be born and domiciled in any territory comprising the AOF; 
2. Must have attained the age of 21; 
3 Must possess the ability to read and write the French language, unless he has been 
decorated with the Legion of Honour (Legion d'honneur), or other similar military 
order, or has seen active service in France or in the colonies; 
4. Must show proof of source of income and must be of decent life-style and manners; 
5. Must show proof of devotion to French interests or must have occupied, with merit, 
for ten years at least, a public or private position of importance. 
The Governor - General's Order of 29 October 1912474, laid down details about the 
procedure to be adopted in submitting applications and of how proof of qualification was to 
be established. 
Procedure: The applicant had to present himself before the mayor of the community in 
which he lived or before the District Commissioner of the district in which he resided and 
declare that he was willing to be governed by the civil law which applies to French citizens. 
If the applicant succeeded and naturalised, his personal law ceased to be his local legal 
system, which he would have renounced. Although the acquired French status was personal 
to the individual, any woman he married under civil law, automatically assumed his 
personal law, ie French law. All children who were minors at the time of naturalisation, also 
acquired the new status475. Subsisting polygamous marriages became immediately invalid 
and only the wife married under French law (if any) was recognised and assumed her 
husband's new status. 
472 Recueil Dareste 1 (1918), p. 195; Pennant III (1918), p. 87. -1 
"" Solus, p. 105. 
474 L'Arrete du Gouverneur-General,. Recueil Dareste I' (1914), p. 271. 475 Article 6, Decree of May 1912.. 
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In order to compensate individuals who responded to the French call to take up arms in the 
defence of France during the First World War, a special regime of acquiring French 
citizenship was created in 1918 - the Decree of 14 January 1918. The procedure established 
by the regime was much simpler and quicker than under the Decree of 25 May 1912. The 
applicant needed only to show that: - 
1 he had served during the war and that he had been awarded a military order and La 
croix de guerre476, 
2 he was of good character 477 
3 he had never participated in any activity detrimental to French rule in the colony 7s; 
4 he had never been convicted or imprisoned under French law or suffered any 
479 punishment under any local legal system 
The decree went further and allowed all children and all wives of the applicant, to 
automatically assume French status480. A wife was required to give her consent to the 
inclusion of her children who were above 16 but below 21 but she herself could not ask to 
be exempted from the new status of her husband481. The decree thus permitted the 
individual to retain the polygamous state of his marriage but it remained unclear whether he 
could. marry a further wife after changing his status. Solus believes that the polygamous 
marriage of a naturalised French African was invalid under French law482. This was most 
probably not the position adopted by the authorities. A polygamous marriage after 
naturalisation would be invalid but not one concluded before naturalisation. 
To confer citizenship on a person to show appreciation for loyalty was an unsatisfactory 
manner of creating a personal law. The community in which a person chooses to live is far 
more important than loyalty to a foreign country. Further, if a naturalised ex-serviceman 
may legally indulge in polygamy, why was it denied other naturalised Africans? 
476 Article 3. 
477 Article 5. 
478 Article 5. 
479 Article 5. 
480 Sesfemmes et ses enfants, Articles 3 and 4. 
481 Article 3. 
482 Solus, p. 72. 
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To confer citizenship on a person to show appreciation for loyalty was an unsatisfactory 
manner of creating a personal law. The community in which a person chooses to live is far 
more important than loyalty to a foreign country. Further, if a naturalised ex-serviceman 
may legally indulge in polygamy, why was it denied other naturalised Africans? 
In spite of the favourable conditions created specially to encourage Africans to become 
French citizens, only a handful took up the opportunity. A report published in the Journal 
Officiel of 9 May 1926 showed that out of a total of 11,107 naturalisations in 1925, only 36 
were non-European and only 7 West Africans bothered to apply for and obtain 
naturalisation 483. The report did not say how many applications in all were rejected but it 
stated that 327 applications from non-colonial subjects were rejected and 8,925 accepted, 
indicating that rejections from the colonies must have been few. Whichever way the report 
is interpreted, West Africans had demonstrated decisively that they were unwilling to 
abandon their own legal systems for a foreign one they were not familiar with. 
(c) The Renunciation of Statut coutumier 
Change ofPersonal Law as a Result of Change of Religion 
In most French colonies in Africa, the predominant religion was Islam, which also provided 
the personal law. Where a religion also automatically provides the personal law, a change of 
religion also means change of personal law. Where however, the change of religion is to, 
say, Christianity, which does not provide a personal law, there should be no change in 
personal law. Further, the French did not create a Catholic or Protestant status as such and 
conversion to Christianity should not have required change of status. When a Moslem 
converts to Christianity, it is arguable that his personal law remains Islamic, as Christianity 
has no legal system which accompanies it. If there is merit in this argument then, then the 
483 The 7 came from the following countries: - Senegal 2, one under the Decree of 25 May 
1912 and the other under the Law of 25 March 1915; Ivory Coast 3,2 applied under 
the Decree of 25 May 1912 and 1 under the Law of 1915; Dahomey, 2 and their 3 
minors, both applied under the Decree of 25 May 1912. None under the Decree of 
1918. 
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The French hatred for and fear of Islam, however, led the courts to hold that the principles 
of Islam and the Catholic religion were incompatible and therefore a conversion to 
Catholicism should also entail change or abandonment of Islamic law as the personal law4 4 
It is difficult to support this position as the rules embodied in Christianity (such as 
monogamy), are merely appeals to conscience, unless they are incorporated into the legal 
system of the country. If conversion to Catholicism also meant acquisition of the civil status, 
then this would be an additional method of obtaining that status which should have been 
provided for in colonial legislation. Conversion to Christianity should have been seen only 
as a religious act and no more. If there should be any change of status at all, then the change 
should be to the local customary law, which might end up being Islamic law. 
In cases where the two religions have conflicting rules on an issue, the later religion ought to 
prevail. Such was the position adopted by the Court of Appeal for West Africa485. The Court 
held that a converted African, who married according to Christian rites, did not thereby 
abandon the statut coutumier, as there was no such thing as a Catholic status which could 
provide a personal law. Solus disagrees with the court's decision arguing that the absence of 
a Catholic status was a lacuna which the court ought to have filled486. According to Solus, 
the Canon Law is sufficiently clear on certain areas of the law, such as that of the family. 
That may be the case but in a plural-legal system, what may be seen as a lacuna, calling for 
"legislation" by the court, may in fact be a denial of a rule in another legal system. Polygamy 
was valid under the personal law of the plaintiff and the conversion to Catholicism could not 
have suddenly created a lacuna in either French law or the applicable local legal system. 
Secondly, it seems inaccurate to claim that the unenforceability of monogamy in French 
Africa was due to a lacuna in the legislation. The fact was that monogamy remained a rule 
of the Canon Law but it was unenforceable in a civil court of law. An unenforceable rule 
does not necessarily create a lacuna which the judge ought to fill by making the rule 
enforceable 
484 Trib. l er Inst. Saint-Louis, 8 mars 1902; Cour d'Appel du Senegal, 29 juin 1903, 
Recueil Dareste III (1905), p. 180; Trib.. 1er inst. Saint-Louis, 5 aoüt 1913, Recueil 
Dareste I (1914), p. 43. 
485 Cour d'Appel de 1'AOF, Pennant I (1925), p. 101.. 486 Solus, p. 157. 
122 
CHAPTER SIX 
CHOICE OF LAW IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING AFRICA 
Historical Introduction 
I. The Gold Coast 
In 1471, the Portuguese landed in the Gold Coast, now Ghana, and found so much gold to 
purchase that they named the spot where they landed, El Mina (the Mine)487. By 1472, the 
Portuguese King, John II decided to build a fort and a church at El Mina. He dispatched a 
squadron, consisting of ten caravels and two transporters, with five hundred soldiers and one 
hundred men under Don Diego d'Azambuja, to El Mina. At El Mina, a Portuguese lancado, 
De Barros, acted as interpreter 488 between d'Azambuja and King Ansa, ruler of the area. 
D'Azambuja addressed King Ansa and said that the King of Portugal, in appreciation of the 
hospitality shown to his subjects by King Ansa, sought permission to build a fort and a 
church. King Ansa refused to grant permission, saying that the two cultures were too far 
apart to live in peaceful proximity with each other, for "The sea and land, being always 
neighbours, are continually at variance, and contending who shall give way.... "489 
D'Azambuja then threatened to commit suicide rather than return to Portugal without having 
built the fort. Suicide being seen as utterly repugnant, even in present day Ghana, King Ansa 
reluctantly granted permission for the fort to be built. And thus began a permanent European 
presence in the Gold Coast. 
The Portuguese had a monopoly of the lucrative gold trade from the Gold Coast until Henry 
VIII quarrelled with the Pope and began to disobey the papal bull granting the Guinea Coast 
to the Portuguese. However, Portuguese jurisdiction did not extend beyond the coast-line 
487 Mensah Sarbah; Fanti National Constitution, 1906, p. 55. Hereafter cited as 
Mensah Sarbah. 
488 ibid, at p. 56. 
489 ibid, at p. 61. 
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where their forts and settlements were49o 
In 1637, El Mina fell to the Dutch, who formed an alliance with the local ruler to drive out 
the Portuguese491. Soon more Europeans joined in the gold rush. The British concluded a 
series of secret treaties with local rulers, who agreed to transfer trade from the Dutch to the 
Britisha9z 
The Swedes, emerging from the Thirty Years' War with a new sense of pride, sent an 
expedition to the Gold Coast in 1652. They built lodges at Takoradi, Osu (near Accra) and a 
castle at Cape Coast493 In 1657, the Swedes were driven out by the Danes, thus putting a 
permanent end to Swedish presence on the Gold Coast. The Danes proceeded to build 
several settlements and a luxurious castle (Christiansborg) at Osu, which came to be 
inherited by successive governors of the Gold Coast and is still the residence of the Head of 
State of Ghana. 
In 1662, the English trade with the Gold Coast was made a priority and a company called 
the Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading to Africa, was formed for the 
purpose. Among its subscribers was James, Duke of York, later, King James II. Thus, the 
new company came to be close to the Government of the day 94. The company lost no time 
in building a castle at Cape Coast and lodges all over the coast-line. 
A bitter struggle ensured among the European powers on the Gold Coast for control over the 
gold trade. In 1672, after a severe setback for the British, a new company, the Royal Africa 
Company was formed, with very little capital. In the end it was the slave trade which saved 
the company from bankruptcy 95 
As regards jurisdiction of the European settlements, the practice had been that the law of the 
490 ibid, at p. 71. 
491 Mensah Sarbah, p. 72. 
492 ibid, at p. 73- 493 Ward, W. E. F; History of the Gold Coast, 1948, p. 75. Hereafter cited as Ward. 494 ibid, at p. 77. 
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European countries did not extend beyond the fort or castle. In 1821, a new British 
Governor, Sir Charles Macarthy, was sent to the Gold Coast to keep law and order in the 
settlements. Macarthy promptly set about establishing petty debts courts at the Cape Coast 
Castle and other trading settlementsa96 He selected the best qualified local merchants as 
magistrates and although the courts had jurisdiction only within the settlements, these 
magistrates did not hesitate to try any case, civil or criminal, which was brought before them 
and whether or not the matter arose within or without the settlement497. The courts were 
frequently used by the local people who brought cases against merchants. Thus, for the first 
time, English law began to apply in limited circumstances, to both Europeans and locals but 
only within the settlements. 
Unlike the Upper Guinea Coast, the Europeans did not live among the Africans. There were 
no settled Lancados or Tangomaos. African traders brought their goods to the coast 
themselves, without the need of middlemen. It appears that even in the settlements, 
"... exclusive jurisdiction to any civil or criminal case was never vested in the white man, nor 
did the people grant such powers "498. Thus, the only way English law could exclusively 
govern an issue was for the party or parties to go to England, or be sent there in criminal 
cases. "In the castle near the great gate was a dungeon for the confinement of murderers, 
traitors and other such-like criminals until they could be conveniently sent to England for 
their trial"499 
Clearly matters were unsatisfactory for the British traders and in 1874 the Gold Coast 
colony was declared. However, the declaration of colonialism did not bring with it the full 
establishment of the English legal system. There were several reasons for this. Unlike 
French colonialism, British rule in West Africa was established largely through treaties and 
agreements with local chiefs and kings. These agreements usually stipulated that the laws 
and customs of the African parties should be fully recognised. This recognition was 
495 ibid, at p. 81. 
496 Mensah Sarbah, p. 77. 
497 Ward, p. 77. 
498 Mensah Sarbah, p. 83. 
499 ibid, at p. 84. 
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incorporated into the Orders in Council which laid down the ground rules for the 
administration of the colonies. The Orders specifically instructed the British legislator and 
the judiciary to accept the operation of "native law and custom" where they were not 
repugnant to "natural justice, equity and good conscience". 
500 An Order in Council issued in 
1844 provided that the judges were to "... observe until further Order such of the local 
customs of the said countries and places as may be compatible with the principles of the law 
of England and in default of such customs shall proceed in all things as nearly as may be 
soi 
according to the said law of England" 
II. Application of Local (Customary) Law 
The British colonial administration endeavoured, since the declaration of the colony, "... to 
exercise British rule through, rather than in spite of, the Chiefs and the Chiefs were to be 
made to enforce central decisions"502. D. Chalmers, the Chief Magistrate in the Gold Coast, 
was asked to devise a comprehensive scheme for "utilizing, regulating and controlling the 
power of the Chiefs". 503 He advised that the system of Chiefs was the "best foundation on 
which to build and advocated that the most reliable Chiefs should be directly recognised, 
paid a stipend and to have their own courts of first instance504 Thus began what was later to 
be called, "Indirect Rule". 
Allott gives two reasons for the continued application of local customary legal systems in 
Africa. The British, according to him, had the desire to preserve tranquillity by leaving the 
inhabitants under "... the existing and familiar customary law"sos Secondly, the British felt 
that "British law was too sophisticated to be administrable to primitive populations living by 
the hoe and not knowing the use of writing" 506 
Soo Allott, at p. 13. 
501 Jurisdiction Order in Council 1844. 
502 Kimble, David; A Political History of Ghana 1850 - 1928,1963, p. 457. 
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Some of Allott's views; expressed above, do not seem to conform to the history of British 
colonial policy in West Africa. Before the Gold Coast Colony was declared in 1874, the 
British Government had agreed with the coastal Chiefs in the Bond of 1844, to treat "... the 
States as independent authorities over whom control could only be secured by their 
individual agreement"507. Thus, the various kingdoms over which the Chiefs ruled were 
recognised as States, with their own judicial systems. In 1877, the Governor, S. Freeling 
directed that it was not only a matter of policy but also of justice "... to effect reforms by as 
slight disruption of long-cherished powers and customs as possible"508. The introduction of 
the Supreme Court Ordinance in 1876 however, created difficulties, for here were Chiefs 
being called upon to understand the common law, an alien system, in addition to applying 
their own legal systems. Chalmers suggested a way out by asking the Government to 
appoint a clerk to each Chief and if the Chief was young, to be taught to read and write in 
his own language 509 This policy greatly enhanced the literacy levels of the Gold Coast 
aristocracy and to this day, a person would not, as a policy, be elected Chief by the 
community unless he were well-educated. 
To implement these recommendations, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was enacted in 
1878. It provided that the Kings were now to be called Head-Chiefs. The Head-Chiefs were 
to make by-laws on a range of subjects. More controversial still, the Government now had 
the power to dismiss a Chief 10. The Chiefs and their subjects objected to the Ordinance 
which seemed to suggest that not only were the Chiefs the agents of the British Government 
but also that the Government was the source of the Chiefs' authority. The Colonial Office 
made it plain to the Gold Coast administration that it had no intention of 
"... entering upon a crusade to reform customs, or to abolish the power of Chiefs 
simply because they might not always administer justice in accordance with English 
ideas. In some respects, they should even be strengthened, since the Government 
507 Hailey, Lord; Native Administration in the British African Territories, 1951, p. 201. 508 
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was not in a position to substitute its authority in the inaccessible wilds and 
impenetrable forests of the interior" 511 
Thus, the Chiefs were seen as better placed to administer the colony as agents of the 
Government. Not only was it cheaper that way but also because the Government lacked the 
personnel to take up these positions. Nevertheless, since "indirect rule" had never been 
implemented before, the Colonial Office was not certain whether the Gold Coast was to be 
governed through the Chiefs with only general supervision and control, or whether there 
should be some Government representation throughout the country. The Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance 1878 was never implemented. 
The Governor, Sir Samuel Rowe, was categorical. "I think the proper way to administer the 
Gold Coast Colony is by acting through the Chiefs"512. In the Governor's view, the Chiefs 
were the most respectable persons in the community and the "... expression of the native 
mind in favour of social order and the rights of property"513. By now, Chalmers' policy of 
educating the Chiefs on the European model had begun to bear fruit and a good number of 
Chiefs had achieved appreciable levels of education514 
III. Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 18835'5 
On the Governor's insistence, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 1878 was repealed and 
replaced with a new Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 1883. It provided for native courts to be 
established, administered by the Chiefs but with appeal to the High Court. Thus, the Chiefs 
were not only called upon to deliver judgments they could legally support, they also had to 
understand the common law system to which appeals from their courts were to go. The 
Ordinance was criticised from all quarters, from some educated Africans who were 
511 Minute of 9 March 1880 by A. W. L. Hemming; Cited in Kimble, p. 461. 512 Letter of 31 Aug. 1882, from Rowe to Colonial Office; CO/96/147. 513 ibid. 
514 Kimble, p. 462. 
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expecting to be appointed magistrates if the native courts were not manned by Chiefs516, 
from some of the Chiefs themselves and from the press at Cape Coast, from which the 
Governor received much abuse51. 
One of the positive developments from the controversy was that many educated Africans, 
especially the lawyers, began to take serious interest in their institutions, the nature and 
position of Chiefs in the community. Books and articles began to appear on indigenous 
constitutional law and legal institutions. One example was Mensah Sarbah, who not only 
wrote books on Fanti constitution and law but also compiled case law518. These educated 
Africans now rallied to the support of the Chiefs and began to resist interference from the 
Colonial Government. They argued that the Governor should not have the power to dismiss 
Chiefs without referring the matter to the Oman Council (the peoples' council). 
The mixed support given the Ordinance continued throughout its existence. The subjects of 
the Chiefs also mounted opposition, especially to some of the punishments which Chiefs 
were permitted to impose, such as imprisonment. In Oppon v Ackinnie519 it was argued that 
the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876 had curtailed the judicial powers of the Chiefs in the 
Protected Territories and that the Chiefs had no power to imprison their subjects. The Full 
Court of the Gold Coast rejected these arguments and held that the Supreme Court 
Ordinance did not impair the judicial powers of the Chiefs and that they had power to 
imprison their subjects. 
516 One interesting letter of protest came from J. Renner Maxwell, the first African from 
the Gold Coast to be called to Bar. He wrote to the Secretary of State, saying that he 
considered himself emancipated from the jurisdiction of uneducated Chiefs and was 
sad to see that the Ordinance preferred "Ignorance and Barbarism to Education and 
Civilisation". He was particularly worried that "... my own cook is a son-in-law and 
captain to the Chief of the district in which I live, and if the Ordinance is ever made 
to apply to Cape Coast, which I pray God and your Lordship will forbid, I may 
become the victim of a great deal of annoyance from my own cook". Letter of 23 
Aug. 1883, from Renner Maxwell to Secretary of State enclosed in Dispatch No. 
420 of 4 Dec. 1883, from Rowe to Derby; CO/96/153. 
517 Kimble, p. 463. 
518 See Bibliography. 
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Opposition to the Chiefs' jurisdiction over customary law did not end there. The Acting 
Queen's Advocate W. Brandford Griffith jun. had a singular hatred for native courts and 
called for their replacement by the District Commissioner's Court 520. However, London 
took the practical view that the colony could not afford either the District Commissioners or 
the police necessary to keep "... the people of the interior in hand, clear the roads, and to 
prevent slavery"521. There was no hope of performing all these functions if the Chiefs were 
not respected by their subjects, therefore they must retain the power to fine and imprison522. 
The controversy now saw the educated Africans solidly behind the Chiefs. Mensah Sarbah, 
in his book Fanti National Constitution523, repeated the argument made by the Chiefs that 
the Gold Coast had not been conquered and that British jurisdiction and influence had only 
been acquired by treaties with the existing State Governments which had their own rights of 
sovereignty. 
The controversy continued throughout the colonial period but the Ordinance remained in 
force until 1927 and by it "... the administration of justice by the Chiefs gradually became 
interwoven with the English system"524. 
IV. Choice of Law in the Gold Coast 
In 1874, the Imperial Charter of July 24 1874 established the Gold Coast Legislation 
Council. This Council was to become the Government of the future colony. Two years later, 
the Council declared the Gold Coast Colony and proceeded to enact a new Ordinance, the 
525 Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876. The purpose of the new Supreme Court Ordinance 
was 
"... to fuse the jurisdictions of the different territories under British administration or 
520 Kimble, p. 464. 
521 Memorandum of 22 Jan. 1888 by Acting Colonial Secretary. Cited in Kimble, p. 
464. 
522 ibid. 
523 1906, Chapter iii. 
524 Kimble, p. 463. 
525 No. 4 of 1876. 
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protection; these were the Chief Magistrate's Court at Accra, the Chief Magistrate's 
Court at Lagos, and the Judicial Assessor's Court exercising in the Gold Coast 
szb 'Protectorate' 
The direction to the court as to the application of the common law and customary law was 
contained in Section 19 of the Ordinance. It provided as follows: 
"Application of Native Laws and Customs 
19. Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court of the right to 
observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the 
benefit, of any law or custom existing in the Colony, such law or custom not 
being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor 
incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any enactment 
of the Colonial Legislature existing at the commencement of this Ordinance, 
or which may afterwards come into operation. Such laws and customs shall 
be deemed applicable in causes and matters where the parties thereto are 
natives of the Colony, and particularly, but without derogating from their 
application in other cases, in causes and matters relating to marriage and to 
the tenure and transfer of real and personal property, and to inheritance and 
testamentary disposition, and also in causes and matters between natives and 
Europeans where it. may appear to the Court that substantial injustice would 
be done to either party by strict adherence to the rules of English law. No 
party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any local law or custom, if it 
shall appear either from express contract or from the nature of the 
transactions out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that such 
party agreed that his obligations in connection with such transactions should 
be regulated exclusively by English law: and in cases where no express rule 
is applicable to the matter in controversy, the Court shall be governed by the 
527 principles of justice, equity, and good conscience". 
526 Allott, p. 123. 
527 Full text in Alloff, p. 123. 
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Section 19 was widely popular in the British colonies and as Allot observes, it was "taken 
over in the Colony of Lagos, and later in the colony and protectorate of Nigeria"528. It was 
again re-enacted in the Courts Ordinance of 1935 as Section 74 (1). 
The section was also adopted by the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance of Sierra 
Leone529 and reproduced in the Courts Act of 1965530 Section 19's popularity did not end in 
West Africa. It was introduced into North-Eastern Rhodesia by the High Court Procedure 
Regulations of 1904531, with the alteration that 'customary law' was to apply only if it was 
not "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good government532. The provision was 
extended, with its alteration, to the Colony of Northern Rhodesia. Section 19 thus became 
the basis of choice of law in the British colonies of the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, and parts of Eastern and Central Africa533 
It is at once noticeable that the Gold Coast provision applied only to the Supreme Court, 
excluding the 'native courts'. In the Gold Coast, this was rectified by Section 74 (1) of the 
Courts Ordinance of 1935534, which now provided in its opening words that "Nothing in this 
Ordinance shall deprive the Courts.... " Prior to 1935, a local court was not obliged to 
examine the possibility that a law other than the lex foci could apply. But on appeal, it is just 
possible that the parties might be faced with the possibility that a hitherto unknown legal 
system governed the issue(s). "Native Law" may have applied in the first instance, while on 
appeal, Section 19 could have provided for the application of either the "customary law" of 
53s another ethnic unit or the common law 
The popularity of Section 19 may lie in the opening sentence of the provision. "Nothing in 
529 Allott, p. 124. 
529 No. 6 of 1903. 
530 As Section 76, No. 31 of 1965. See Allott, p. 124. 
531 No. 4 of 1904. 
G17 
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532 Regulation 8. Allott, p. 124. (Emphasis added). 
i nere is no maicauon mai ine section was extenaea to tme uambla but it is unlikely 
that the Gambia was exempt from the application of Section 19. 
"" Allott, p. 126. 
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this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court-or shall deprive any person of the benefit, 
of any law or custom existing in the Colony. " The opening sentence is important for three 
major reasons. 
First, Section 19 would seem to override any provision in the Ordinance or elsewhere, 
which purported to prohibit the application of local law. 
Second, the application of local law is seen as a 'right' of the court which may not be taken 
away. 
Third, there is no reason to suggest that the term 'any person' does not mean what it says 
and therefore the racial factor, which was crucial in French colonial legislation, is removed. 
This view is strengthened by the provision that local law is to apply in cases between an 
African and a European, where it may appear to the court that substantial injustice may 
otherwise be done to either party 536 
The only express exclusion of local law is the provision that local law is to be excluded 
where there is a prior agreement between the parties to do so or where the nature of the 
transaction is such as to call for its exclusion537. This does not appear to depart from the 
normal procedure of the court, to examine the nature of a transaction in order to arrive at the 
proper law which should govern the transaction. This provision seems to emphasise further 
the view that the court is bound to consider applying local law and to reject it only on well- 
established grounds. 
The significance of the provision is that the choice of law process was permitted to cover a 
whole range of African legal systems and the Common Law. Section 19 may have 
contributed to the rapid growth of jurisprudence in West Africa and must have been useful 
during the period of "indirect rule" which was to follow. 
535 .,.. ,., ý 
-7 
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536 A11ott's emphasis; New Essays in African Law, at p. 128. 
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V. Choice of Law under Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 
Section 19 did not provide specific choice of law rules for the application of customary law. 
It merely guided the court to investigate the nature of the transaction or claim to decide 
whether customary law applied. However, certain general presumptions were made by the 
court: 
a) that an African was prima facie presumed to be governed in his personal relations by 
customary law. This presumption could be rebutted if the person was able to show that some 
other law was applicable. If the transaction was between an African and a non-African, the 
general common law was to apply unless substantial injustice would be done by the strict 
53s 
adherence to the common law 
b) If both parties belonged to the same ethnic group, it would be far more difficult to show 
that some law other than that which applied to both of them prevailed, for example, where 
two Europeans purport to conclude a contract governed by customary law. Where 
commercial transactions are concerned, however, it was common for two Africans of the 
same ethnic group to enter into a contract governed by the common law, as long as existing 
customary rights of third parties were not infringed upon. For example, where the parties 
enter into a contract governed by the common law, to sell land in which customary law 
539 rights of third parties were involved 
(a) Bilateral Relations, 
Allott has identified a number of issues arising from "Marriage" mentioned in Section 19540, 
which he discusses into some detail. One may point out that "Marriage" was excluded in the 
538 Koney v UTC (1934) 2 W. A. C. A 188. 
539 ibid. 
134 
Courts Ordinance 1935. Nevertheless, marriage operated as an essential issue before 1935. 
The rest of the areas discussed by Allott are, Land541 and unilateral transactions54z 
The choice of law difficulty which the courts faced under Section 19 of the Ordinance when 
determining cases on bilateral relations was whether the mode of transaction determined the 
law which governed the relationship. If an African married according to the Marriage 
Ordinance, did all his matrimonial rights come to be governed by the common law or by his 
personal customary law? Or was it only certain aspects of the marriage which were 
governed by the common law, such as capacity or validity of the marriage5439 
The courts at first adopted the view that where an African chose to marry under the 
Ordinance, he must be taken to have opted out of his customary law completely. Even 
intestate succession would be governed _by 
the common law. In Cole v Cole, Griffith J, 
boldly declared that "... a Christian marriage clothes the parties to such a marriage and their 
offspring with a station unknown to native law"544. 
This was a harsh position to take in view of the fact that Christianity is not equipped with a 
legal system which could be said to have replaced customary law. The lex loci celebrationis 
can only regulate the formalities and validity of the marriage but to apply it to all aspects of 
the personal lives of the parties, and their children, is untenable. Slowly the courts began to 
soften their stand and by 1924, Van der Meulen, J, was able to state in the Nigerian case of 
Smith v Smith that: 
"It would be quite incorrect to say that the persons who embrace the Christian faith 
or who are married in accordance with its tenets, have in other respects attained that 
stage of culture and development as to make it just or reasonable to suppose that 
their whole lives should be regulated in accordance with English laws and 
540 ,.. .,,.., , 
CAI 
Al1oT[, pp /-10 -L1I. 
"' Allott, pp - 237 - 240. 542 ibid, pp - 240 - 241. 543 Allot. P. 217. 
544 (1898) 1 N. L. R, 15, at p. 22. Cited in Allott, p. 217. 
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procedures"sas 
Apart from the colourful and patronising language used in the judgment, the decision was 
correct in classifying the lex loci celebrationis as regulating only certain aspects of the 
marriage, such as formality, and nothing else. 
In the Gold Coast, the courts never expressed themselves that clearly until the Ghana case of 
sab Coleman v Shang, where the Ghana Court of Appeal held that: 
"We are of the opinion that a person subject to customary law who marries under the 
Marriage Ordinance does not cease to be a native subject to customary law by reason 
only of his contracting that marriage. The customary law will be applied to him in all 
matters, save and except those generally- excluded by the statute, and any other 
matters which are necessary consequences of the marriage under the 
Ordinance.... 547 
It would seem, therefore, that the legal consequences of a person subject to customary law 
but who marries under the Marriage Ordinance are these548: 
i) he is still subject to his customary law except in cases where legislation prescribes a 
different law; 
ii) he is debarred from taking another wife if the criminal code says so, as in R. v 
Batholomew Princewe11549, where the accused married under the Ordinance but 
subsequently converted to Islam. The court held that a person who marries under the 
Ordinance cannot later claim the prerogative of Islam to take other wives, simply by 
545 /1A1 ý\ r 1T T T\ " A/ý .r. 1f 11 .. ýý A 
GAL ý1 yý4ý D ly. L. it, 1 UL. CatOQ in AliOtt, p. 11 ö. 
"° (1959) G. L. R 390; [1961] A. C. 481, at 501. Confirmed on appeal to Privy Council 
[1961] AC 481. Cited in Allott, p. 218. 
say (1959) G. L. R. 390, at p. 401. Full text in Allott, pp 218 - 219. 548 .,, ... . --- ------ ----- 1". 1 ."... . 
fAn 
i iott raises seven issues wnicn ne aiscusses at some lengtn, However, only points 
(1) to (5) are of relevant to this study. 
'"' (1963) N. N. L. R, 54. 
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converting to Islam. One must remark however, that in R. vBatholomew Princewell the 
accused was charged with bigamy under the criminal law of Nigeria at the time. It is not 
certain how far the case establishes a general rule in conflict of laws. 
iii) the right of the spouses to divorce each other must be based on the Marriage Ordinance 
and not on customary law: Akwapim v Budu550; 
iv) the husband abandons the customary law right to sue a third party for compensation for 
committing adultery with his wife. The remedy for adultery must be based solely on the 
Ordinancess 
v) it would seem that property rights of the spouses are not affected by the Marriage 
Ordinance and continue to be governed by customary law, unless there is an agreement 
between the parties to the contrary. The Sierra Leone Christian Marriage Act552 stated that; 
"A marriage celebrated under this Act to which one of the parties is a native should 
not have any effect on the property of such native.... The properties of parties to a 
marriage celebrated under this Act shall, if both be natives, be subject in all respects 
to the laws and customs of the tribe or tribes to which the parties respectively 
belong. " 
It appears that the English Married Women's Property Acts were not received into domestic 
general law and therefore each married party continued to enjoy rights already accruing 
under the respective customary law. In post-independent Ghana and Nigeria, local versions 
of the Married Women's Property Acts were passed but did not have the effect the English 
version had553 According to Ollenu, "... except in so far as limitations or restrictions 
imposed by a statute are concerned, a Ghanaian woman's rights are in no way affected by 
her marriage under the Marriage Ordinance.... " The Married Women's Property Ordinance 
550 (1935) D. Ct. `31- `37, p. 89. Cited in Allot footnote 15. 
551 Obiter in Coleman v Shang, (1959) G. L. R. 390. Allott, footnote 14. 
552 Cap. 95, S. 26. Cited in Allott, p. 220. 
553 Allott, p. 221. 
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1890 was enacted " out of extra caution and... more especially for the benefit of non- 
Ghanaian women" 554 
There are no decided cases on the issue to indicate whether Ollenu is correct in his 
interpretation but it is not clear why married non-Ghanaian women needed this protection in 
Ghana. Possibly Ollenu is addressing the case where, for example, an Englishwoman 
married a Ghanaian subject to the matrilineal legal system of succession and thereby 
acquired his domicil of dependence, which would have deprived her of a share in his 
property in case of divorce or his death. 
(b) Breach of Promise 
In customary law, a breach of promise occurs where a man promises to marry a woman and 
thereafter refuses to marry the woman or places himself in such a situation that it would be 
illegal for him to proceed with the marriage. What cause of action, if any, is open to the 
woman? To start with, it would seem that the action may be brought either under the general 
English law of contract or under customary lawsss The post-independence Ghana law is 
clear on the subject. Rule 2 of the Courts Act 1960556 provides that the agreement of the 
parties determines an issue arising out of the transaction and transaction includes a marriage 
agreement or arrangement to marry. 
The usual cases of breach of promise are instances where a man performs a customary law 
marriage with a promise to convert it into a statutory marriage but before then, marries a 
second wife, thus making it impossible for him to marry under the Ordinance. In such a 
case, the court usually held that there was no breach of promise, since a marriage did take 
554 The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, 1966, p. 288. Married 
Women's Property Ordinance 1890, Cap. 131,1951 Revision. Cited in Allott, p. 
121. 
555 Allott, p. 227. 
556 C. A. 9, Section 66. 
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place557. Where however, the promise to convert the customary law marriage into an 
Ordinance marriage was made after the customary law marriage, it was held that there was a 
breach of promise. In Appiah and Acheampong v Acheampong558, the High Court said that 
the wife was entitled to sue the husband because the incidents of the two marriages were 
different. 
(C) Capacity of Non-Africans to enter into Customary Marriage 
The standard position taken by the courts was that a non-native could not enter into a 
customary law marriage. In the leading case of Savage v Macfoy559, it was held that because 
the late Macfoy was born in Freetown, Sierra Leone and was classed there as a non-native, 
he lacked the capacity to marry according to Yoruba law. It is correct to say that the law of 
domicil governs capacity of the parties to the marriage. However, the court had accepted 
that Macfoy had made Lagos his domicil of choice. Nevertheless; 
"The mere fact of Macfoy having made Lagos his domicil of choice would not 
necessarily make him subject to or given the benefit of native law and custom, and 
his ordinary relations would be governed by English law and not by native law.... " 
One would have thought that when a domicil of choice was acquired, then the person also 
became subject to the law of the new place of domicil as his or her connecting factor in 
personal matters but it appears the English domicil of origin was not to be easily overturned. 
In the earlier case of Re Bethell560 the validity of Bethell's marriage to a Tswana woman 
according to Tswana law and custom was raised in the. Chancery Division as regards 
succession under English law. Stirling J held that Bethell's marriage under the local law was 
valid. The learned judge took several circumstances into consideration. For example that; 
a) the parties lived together as man and wife in Tswana country; 
557 
558 
Jones v Mends, (1872) Sar. F. C. L. 128. See Allott, p. 230. 
558 (1967) C. C. 59. Allott, p. 230. 
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b) Bethell refused to marry in church although one was available to him at Kimberley; 
c) Bethell declared that he was a Tswana and wished to marry according to Tswana custom 
and law. 
The judge ruled that on those facts, there was a valid Tswana marriage even though Bethell 
had retained his English domicil of origin. In England though, the judge continued, such a 
marriage would not be recognised as it was essentially different from a Christian marriage. 
The ruling is unsatisfactory, for if Bethell retained his domicil of origin then he clearly 
lacked capacity to enter into a potentially polygamous marriage. If however he had capacity 
to many under Tswana law, then he must have acquired a domicil of choice in Tswana 
country. The marriage is clearly valid under the lex loci celebrationis, Tswana law, as the 
local legal system appears to have accepted Bethell as one of the community and therefore 
not lacking capacity to marry under the local law. The view that a foreign marriage 
conducted under a system that differed from the Christian could not be recognised in 
England is untenable. While the Anglican Church may be the established church, 
Christianity itself is not a state religion in England and there is no legal requirement that a 
marriage must conform to Christian rituals in order to be recognised as valid. 
From the two cases above, it would seem that; 
a) possibly a domiciled African from other parts of Africa could marry validly under the 
local customary law; 
b) a resident non-African, though having acquired a domicile of choice, lacked the capacity 
to marry under customary law. 
The decisions in the two cases are difficult to sustain in law. There is no rule of law which 
restricts the rights of a non-African making his home in an African country, and where his 
intentions of acquiring a domicil of choice are clear, legal effect should be given to that 
choice. Section 19 did not introduce a racial element which could justify the decisions. 
Indeed Section 19 had been quite progressive for its time. It referred to "any person" who 
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could not be deprived of the benefit of customary law and that customary law should apply 
to the parties, if it would cause "substantial injustice" to the parties to apply a law other than 
customary law. 
In the case of the Gold Coast (Ghana), not until 1956 did the courts rule that anyone residing 
in the country could be subject to customary law. In Adjei and Dua v Ripley561, the court 
ruled that a non-African could be liable under the customary law for the customary tort of 
seduction. In that case, Smith, Ag. J, (himself an Englishman), said concerning a European 
standing trial for the customary tort of seduction: 
"There is a customary law in this country that a father maintains his child. That is in 
effect the common law of this country .... I should be particularly reluctant to 
subscribe to the view that in one country one law should exist for one man and a 
different law for another, merely on a question of race. To hold so would be a 
retrogressive step for the law and the principles of natural justice. " 
It is submitted that this is the correct approach to the interpretation of Section 19. It is 
unfortunate that it took so long to be applied. 
VI. Choice of Law in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(a) Historical Introduction 
The history of Eastern and Southern Africa differs in many ways from that of West Africa. 
While the British, the French and even the Germans had no intention of settling permanently 
in West Africa, European settlement in Eastern and Southern Africa was a policy from the 
start. This portion of the study will exclude what is now the Republic of South Africa, as 
political and historical activity in that part of Africa is too vast and much too complex for 
the purpose of this 
research. 
561 (1956) 1 W. A. L. R. 62. See Allott, p. 235. 
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By the 1880s, South Africa had already witnessed an organised white settlement. In 1893 
Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSA) moved north from South Africa to 
provoke a war with Lobengula, King of the Matabele562. White participants in the war were 
granted land by BSA on a lavish scale and were additionally rewarded with mineral 
claims 563 The indigenous population was moved to settlements set aside for them56a 
In 1891, the Colonial Office in London accepted the protests of missionaries against BSA 
taking over control of Nyasaland (Malawi) and the British Central African Protectorate was 
declared by the Colonial Office over the area565 but Northern Rhodesia remained BSA 
territory. 
(b) German Colonies 
After the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Germans laid formal claim to four territories where 
they already had trading links: Togo and Cameroon in West Africa, Tanganyika (Tanzania) 
and German South-West Africa (Namibia). German colonies were thus scattered all over 
Africa and except for Togo, German colonial policy was similar in all the other colonies. 
There is no need therefore to analyse them on a regional basis as has been done with British 
colonies. 
In Togo, the Germans simply copied the British policy of indirect rule which was in 
operation across the border in neighbouring Gold Coasts66 It was the only German colony 
which did not have schutztruppe (protection troops) and the Germans relied heavily on 
existing local administrative structures. The ratio of Europeans to Africans in Togo was 
1: 11,000 compared to 1: 4,000 in the French mandated part of Togo after the First World 
562 Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 6, c. 1870 - c. 1905, p. 445. 563 ibid, at p. 446. 
564 ibid, at p. 446. 
565 ibid, at p. 448. 
566 Gann and Duignan; The Rulers of German Africa, 1884 - 1914,1977, pp. 77 - 81.. 
Hereafter cited as Gann and Duignan. 
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War567 The reasons for this may be due to the fact'that the Togolese and the people of the 
Gold Coast share the same cultures, social structures and similar language and the Togolese 
would have objected if the Germans had introduced a system different from that in the Gold 
Coast. Second, the Togolese had been trading with the British and the Germans prior to the 
declaration of colony and both parties knew each other well. Third, the Germans must have 
realised how much cheaper it was to apply the British type of indirect rule to a colony they 
had no intention to settle. 
The development of indirect rule in Togo owed much to Count Julius von Zech auf 
Neuhofen, who was Governor of Togo from 1903. to about 1910. The whole of Togo was 
divided into five administrative districts (Bezirksämter), each with a few sub-districts568. A 
great deal therefore depended on the district commissioner and the support he received from 
the local chiefs. According to Gann and Duignan, 
"... Togolese chiefs were more than tolerated; their judicial powers were recognised. 
Zech pioneered the study of African legal institutions in Togo and instructed his 
district commissioners to study them in a systematic fashion , 569 
The local court, consisting of a chief, assisted by several co-adjudicators, were permitted to 
settle civil, and minor criminal cases and could impose fines of up to one hundred marks. All 
those cases were tried according to. the local law but, as in the Gold Coast, appeals were 
allowed to the European type of higher court 570. There appears to have been an equivalent of 
the repugnancy rule, though not properly articulated, but it forbade the infliction of inhuman 
punishment and evidence obtained through poison, torture or similar means was 
inadmissible571. Von Zech however had difficulties implementing indirect rule. Unlike 
British colonies, German colonies were not permitted to raise their own revenue and were 
567 Gann and Duignan, p. 80. 
568 ibid, at p. 80. 
569 ibid, at p. 82. 
570 ibid, at p. 82. 
571 ibid, at p. 82. 
143 
thus at the mercy of central government in Berlin572. 
In the rest of the three colonies, German rule was very direct and there was no recognition of 
local legal systems573. German governors had a small staff to get by and one would have 
thought that the expansion of indirect rule would have been useful. By 1900, the entire 
colonial administration in the four colonies comprised of nine senior judges (Oberrichter) 
and senior secretaries (Erste Refernten) and nineteen district commissioners 
(Bezirksamtmänner)574. With such acute shortage of personnel, the Germans "... imposed 
direct rule of the most autocratic kind... "575, not only in South-West Africa but also in East 
Africa and Cameroon. A district commissioner had enormous powers. He controlled the 
troops and police, he was judge and head of the executive. Appeals of his decisions were 
allowed only to the Governor himself and few such appeals were ever made 576 
With such a heavy workload, it is not surprising that a large amount of work devolved on 
junior officers, including police sergeants in charge of sub-stations577. Thus, a police 
sergeant could, on his own authority, sentence a criminal to two months in prison or to 
twenty-five lashes578. District officers had extensive judicial powers which were open to 
abuse. When the British took over German East Africa at the end of the First World War, 
they found, to their amazement, that at one police station (Moshi police station), the sergeant 
had tried 348 Africans within nine months. Of these, 283 were flogged579. They also found, 
for example, that in 1909, the judge in charge of "native cases" at Dar es Salaam, tried on 
average, seventeen cases a day, giving each case about 12 minutes 580 
An attempt to examine the choice of law process in the German colonies has been found to 
be a futile exercise. Even in Togo, where indirect rule was practised, there are no records on 
572 ibid, at p. 83. 
573 This narrative is based on Gann and Guignan, pp. 70 - 79. 574 ibid, at p. 70. 
575 ibid, at p. 74. 
576 ibid, at p. 79. 
577 ibid, at p. 102. 
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579 ibid, at p. 102. 
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case law. 
(c) British Eastern and Southern Africa 
The British colonial administration did not introduce comprehensive legislation on choice of 
law as it had done in West Africa with the Courts Ordinance of 1876581. The rules on choice 
of law were often found in the Order in Council for the territory and not in an ordinance 
establishing a High Court or Supreme Court for the territory, as was the case in West Africa. 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), had both systems, the provision for the application of 
customary law in its Order in Counci1582 and the West African type in its High Court 
583 Ordinance 
The major difference between the East African and the West African provisions is that the 
West African type of legislation went into some detail to give guidance to the court dealing 
with areas of law, such as contract, marriage, succession and so on. The East African type of 
ssa legislation was brief and applied only if all parties were natives 
As was the case in West Africa, it was a trading company which was granted a charter to run 
the territories. The British East Africa Company was granted a charter dated 3 September 
1888, Article 12 of which provided as follows: 
"In the administration of justice by the Company to the peoples of its territories or to 
any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and 
laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, 
especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands 
and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce, and 
580 ibid, at p. 103. 
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legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights" 585 
This provision did not survive when the British East Africa Company withdrew from East 
Africa in 1895. It is uncertain how the company's courts interpreted the provisions as there 
are no reported cases during the brief period of the company's tenure. 
Administration of the East Africa Protectorate, as the area came to be called, was assumed 
by the British Government. In 1897, Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul General for 
the East Africa Protectorate, established native courts of two different types586. Native 
courts presided over by a European officer587 and native courts presided over by a native 
authority588. Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulations proceeded to specify the law which the two 
courts were to apply: 
"3. The Native Courts mentioned in Article 2(a) shall, as far as practicable, be 
guided by the Indian Civil Procedure Code, and the Indian Penal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes, but both in civil and criminal cases they shall, within the 
Mohammedans, also be guided by, and have regard to the general principles of the 
law of Islam, and throughout the Protectorate be guided by, and have regard to any 
native laws and customs not opposed to natural morality and humanity. 
"4. The native Courts mentioned in Article 2(b) shall be guided, subject to the 
provisions of these Regulations, by the native laws or customs existing in their 
respective jurisdictions". 
In 1884, the Bechuanaland (Botswana) protectorate was declared by the British 
Government. On 10 June 1891, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa issued 
a proclamation regarding the administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 589. Where the 
courts of resident commissioners, assistant commissioners and magistrates exercise 
585 . ,, _-_ 
586 The Native Courts Regulations 1897. Hertslet; Map of Africa by Treaties, 1896, 
Vol. 20, p. 74. 
588 Article 2 (a). 
588 Article 2 (b). 
A110IIl P. 13U. 
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jurisdiction in cases between natives, Section 9 of the Proclamation was to apply. It 
provided that: 
"In every matter wherein by consent jurisdiction is exercised by any such Court 
under the last preceding section of this Proclamation, the decision shall follow the 
laws and customs of the natives concerned, in so far as they are applicable: provided 
that if such laws or customs should be found to be incompatible with peace, order 
and good government, the Court may decide in accordance with the law which 
would regulate the decision if the matter in dispute concerned persons of European 
birth or descent". 
In the meantime, a new Order in Council was passed for Uganda in 1902590, Article 20 (a), 
which dealt with choice of law, provided the following; 
"In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives are parties, every Court shall be 
guided by native law so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and 
morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council, Ordinance, or any regulation or 
rule made under any Order in Council or Ordinance". 
The Eastern and Southern African provisions were far too brief and simplistic to cater for 
any complicated case involving choice of law. They purported to apply to all cases, civil and 
criminal, in contrast to the West African provisions which applied only to civil cases. 
Further, the provisions applied only to cases to which natives were parties, meaning that the 
provisions applied only when all parties were natives. There was no room for racially mixed 
parties, as in the West African provisions. There seems to have been 'a certain lack of 
interest in providing genuine choice of law rules for the region. 
589 Hertslet; Map ofAfrica by Treaties, 1896, Vol. 20, p. 91. 
'y" Uganda Order in Council, 1902. 
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VII. The Choice of Law Process in the Colonial Period 
(a) Ethnicity 
In determining which legal system might apply to the individual in the colonial period, 
various approaches were used. In Eastern and Southern Africa, race or ethnicity was 
determinant in selecting the legal system which applied to the individual. Thus, once the 
individual was found to be 'African', 'Asian' or 'White', a legal regime was automatically 
chosen for him or her and the choice of law process was determined by that legal regime. In 
the East African legislation, customary law could apply only if all parties were "natives". A 
native was generally a black African, to the exclusion of Asians and whites. The Tanganyika 
Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance591, for example provided in Section 2 as follows: 
"In this Ordinance, the expression `native' means any member of any African race, 
and includes a Swahili, but does not include a Somali or an Abyssinian". 
The meaning of this provision became crucial in Purshottam Narandas Kotak v A. Ali 
Abdullah592. In that case the respondent refused payment on three promisory notes which he 
had executed in favour of the appellant, arguing that the notes were in respect of a debt 
which was irrecoverable under the Ordinance as he was a `native' within the definition of 
Section 2 of the Ordinance. The appellant replied that the respondent was an Arab and not a 
`native'. The trial magistrate ruled that the respondent was a Swahili, and thus a `native'. On 
appeal the court agreed with the lower court. Although there was no statutory definition of 
the term `Swahili' in the Tanganyikan Ordinance, the term had been used to refer to 
members of a community inhabiting the coastal regions and who are of mixed Arab and 
African descent. The difficulty, as pointed out by Allott is that a person could be regarded as 
a Swahili by his community while being taken for an Arab by Arabs, since according to 
Arab culture, any direct descendant of the male side is Arab, no matter how racially mixed 
591 Cap. 75,1947 Revision. See Allott, p. 185. m, "t "` (1957) E. A. 321. This case is discussed in Allott, p. 185. 
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he may have become 593 
The East African cases on race were not consistent and the definitions of a `native' were 
blurred throughout the colonial period. In the Kenya case of Public Trustee v Jiwa Bin 
Bwana Hindi Ganeji 94, the court had to determine the combined effects of Section 2 of the 
Courts Ordinance 1931, which defined a `native' as a native of Africa not of European or 
Asiatic extraction but including Arabs and Somalis and also any Baluchi born in Africa, and 
Section 2 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Ordinance595 which defined `native' 
as any native of Africa not of European or Asiatic origin, but including an Arab, etc. The 
only difference, as Allott observes, in the two definitions is that one uses the word 
"extraction" while the other uses the word "origin"596. Both parties in the case were of 
Indian descent whose ancestors had settled on the East African coast 150 years earlier but 
had inter-married with local Arabs and had adopted Arabic customs. The judge ruled that 
the parties were of Asian "extraction" and therefore not natives within the meaning of the 
Ordinance of 1931. 
In West Africa, these difficulties did not arise as there were practically no permanent 
European or non-African settlers. Nevertheless race or ethnicity did play a role from time to 
time in determining the law which applied to a person. The majority of these cases involved 
former slaves who had `returned' to West Africa, from where their ancestors had been 
captured597. In Brown v Miller598, the Full Court of the Gold Coast held that West Indians 
were not Africans, despite long residence in the Gold Coast. In contrast, a West African who 
had left his home, willingly or not, for a prolonged period, remained a native of the region 
he had left. In Re Sapara599, the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria held that Dr. Sapara 
was a 'native' within the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1876 Section 19, and therefore could 
claim the application of `customary law'. Giving judgment, Osborne, J, held that: 
593 Allott, p. 186. 
594 (1932) 14 K. L. R. 117. Also discussed in Allott, p. 187. 595 1956, No. 38. Cap. 2,1956 Revision. 
596 Allott, p. 187. 
597 See for example, Nii Azuma III v Fiscian, (1953), 14 W. A. C. A. 287. 598 (1921) F. Ct. '20 -'21,48, F. Ct. G. C. Discussed in Alloff, p. 187. 599 (1911), Ren. 605. 
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"... but one's place of birth may be an accident, and the fact that his father was an 
Ijesha, forcibly removed from his domicil of origin, is in my judgment sufficient to 
600 
stamp Dr. Sapara with the nationality of an Ijesha..,  
Sapara's father had been captured and sold into slavery in Sierra Leone, where Sapara had 
been born. Sapara managed to return to his home in Lagos and lived there for the rest of his 
life. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria ruled in Savage v Macfoy60' that 
Macfoy, who had had been born in Sierra Leone but had settled in Lagos and went through a 
marriage ceremony according to Yoruba law, was not a `native'. 
In the two Nigerian cases, it would seem that the court had applied the rigid rules of the 
English principle of domicil of origin, which is difficult to displace. 
Where a person was of mixed race, one part African and the other non-African, colonial 
legislation in East and Southern Africa used to provide that such a person might qualify as 
an African (ie a native), if he lived in an African community observing an African mode of 
life602. In Carr v Suleman Abdel Karim603 the High Court of Nyasaland held that a man 
whose father was Indian and mother an African, was not a `native' for the purposes of the 
Credit Trade with Natives Ordinance 604. The Ugandan courts have similarly held in 
Makalasita vR 605 that the son of an Irish father and an African mother was not a `native'. 
One wonders what the decision would have been if in the two cases, the fathers had been 
black African and the mothers Indian and Irish. Most probably the children would have been 
proclaimed African. 
600 At p. 606. Text in Allott, p. 188. 
601 (1909), Ren. 504, S. Ct., Southern Nigeria. Discussed earlier, see footnote 539? 
602 Kenya Interpretation and General Provisions Ordinance 1956, S. 5 (1) (e). 
Uganda Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap. 1,1951, S. 3 (1) (b). 
603 (1929) 3 Ny. L. R. 75. Discussed in Allott, p. 188. 
604 1926, No. 15. 
605 (1944) 6 U. L. R. 129. Cited in Allott, p. 188. 
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Left to be considered is whether an African could opt out of the application of his or her 
customary law, either in respect of a particular transaction or from the application to him 
generally of customary law. Both the East and West African provisions cater for the 
possibility of an African opting out of customary law in respect of a "transaction" either 
expressly or through the "nature of the transaction"606 or "as far as practicable... " 607 
Choosing a legal regime to govern a transaction is a normal procedure in private 
international law. However, opting out of one's domicil of origin demands a far more 
elaborate procedure. Under the normal rules of private international law, anyone may 
acquire a domicil of choice, if there is sufficient evidence to support the intention to 
change608. This would apply equally to an African who acquires a domicil of choice outside 
his or her law district. Apart from this general rule, British colonial legislation on choice of 
law for its West African colonies made no provision for Africans or "natives", to opt out of 
their customary law regimes. This is in contrast to French colonial administration in West 
609 Africa which made such provisions 
In East Africa however, the racial element in social organisation was so strong that the need 
was found for such legislation. Thus in Kenya, the definition of an "African" did not 
include; - 
"... any person who, of his own motion, proves to the satisfaction of a subordinate 
court of first or second class - 
(i) 
(ii) 
that he is partly of non-African descent; and 
that he is not living among-the members of any African tribe or community 
610 in accordance with their customary mode of life" 




w esi Hmcan provision, supreme court Ordinance, No. 4 of 1876, Section 19. 
East African Provision, Native Court Ordinance 1897, Articles 2(a) and 2(b). 
narnson vnarrison L19JOI I w. L. K. tSbS. 
VV7 (1 71r. -" 
Lln ace pages i i: ) -it/ anove. 
°' The Interpretation and General Provisions Act, S. 5(1) (c), Cap. 2,1956. 
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In Uganda The Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance 61 also contained a similar 
provision by which a magistrate could issue a certificate exempting an African from the 
application of local law. 
(b) Religion 
African religions do not generally provide a connecting factor for their members, even 
though, like most legal systems, religion is a source of law. Members of African religions do 
not follow a special code of law and therefore present no choice of law problems to the 
court. 
Islam, on the other hand, provided and still provides, a full legal system and a person 
claiming to be a Moslem, presents the court with a choice of law problem. 
(c) Islam as a Connecting Factor 
As illustrated in the introduction to this thesis, Islam arrived in West Africa largely through 
missionary activity, except for Northern Nigeria where a Jihad took place. The British 
colonial attitude to Islam was never clearly articulated unlike the French. Thus, the British 
saw Islam in Northern Nigeria as the religion of the Emirs or rulers, while in Zanzibar, it 
was approached as a State religion and elsewhere, as in Kenya, or much of West Africa, as a 
purely personal matter612. The British Colonial Court did not even attempt to differentiate 
between `Customary Law' and the Sharia or Islamic Law and classified them both as 'native 
law and custom', even in Northern Nigeria. Most probably, this attitude was due to the 
visibly weak hold of Islam on West African societies. 
Nevertheless, Islam, like Judaism or the Hindu religion, provides a personal law which 
operates until the individual changes his or her religion, and thereby automatically acquiring 
611 Cap. 1,1951, S. 3. 
612 Allott, p. 204. 
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a new personal law. Such was the case in Manjang v N'Dongo613 
Husband (H), a Christian, purported to marry W, a Moslem, according to the Sharia law in 
1913. In 1933, W converted to Christianity and went through a civil law marriage with H 
under the Marriage Ordinance. H converted to Islam in 1954 and married a second wife 
according to the Sharia, as he was entitled to do. A few months later, W also converted, yet 
again, back to Islam. H died thereafter and the court had to decide who was entitled to his 
estate, W, W's daughter born in 1920, or the second wife? 
The Mohammedan Court at Barthust (now Banjul), held that the estate be divided among 
the two wives, excluding the daughter, on the grounds that the 1913 'marriage' between the 
Christian man and a Moslem woman according to Islamic law was void both by statute law 
and by Islamic law. The daughter was therefore illegitimate and according to Islamic law 
could not inherit from her father. 
On appeal, the decision was upheld. Wiseham, C. J. held that although the daughter was 
legitimated by the subsequent Ordinance marriage of her parents, she was a Christian and so 
could not succeed to the estates of a Moslem. The two wives, both being Moslem, were 
entitled equally. 
There are difficulties with this decision. There is no doubt that the 'marriage' of 1913 was 
invalid as both parties lacked the capacity to marry. But the subsequent Ordinance marriage 
in 1933 of the parties, clearly legitimated the daughter. The court did not base its decision on 
the Moslem Marriage Ordinance or on the Marriage Ordinance and the court did not cite the 
rule, Moslem or statutory, which forbids a Christian to inherit from a Moslem father. Only 
the personal law of the father, ie Islamic law in the Gambia, could have prevented the 
daughter from succeeding to her father's estate. 
Anderson, in a Case note614 also objects to the decision but on different grounds. He agrees 
613 1967 J. A. L. p. 137. This researcher first found this case in Anderson case comment 
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with the court that the daughter should be excluded because she was a Christian. He accepts 
that the 1913 Moslem `marriage' was invalid but the Ordinance marriage of 1933 was valid 
and remained unaffected by any changes in the religion of the couple. Therefore the second 
marriage was both void and bigamous under the statute law of the Gambia. The second 
'wife' should have been excluded from the inheritance. 
Anderson's conclusion is controversial. There had been some uncertainty in the past as to 
whether the nature of marriage (that is monogamous or polygamous) was to be determined 
at the date of the marriage or at the date of the proceedings. The earlier cases such as Hyde v 
Hyde615, tended to determine the question at the date of the marriage. It is now accepted that 
the relevant date of ascertaining the change is at the time of the proceedings 616. At the time 
of the proceedings, the deceased had been validly married to both wives and none of their 
children should have been declared illegitimate. 
In other African countries, the position is the same. In Howison's Application b17, a young 
Scottish girl of 18 domiciled in Scotland came to Kenya, converted to Islam and married an 
Asian Moslem according to Moslem law. Her mother sought an order to, inter alia, declare 
the marriage invalid. The court held that the marriage was valid under the law of Kenya 
even if invalid under Scots law61S. In Manjang v NDongo, the marriage to the second wife 
was- valid according to the law of the Gambia and Anderson is wrong to believe 
otherwise619 
in (1967) J. A. L. p. 137. However, Allott also discusses the case at p. 208. 614 ,. T,,, 7 (1 yb /)J. H. L. P. 1i /. 
0"' (1866) L. R. 1. P &D 130; Mehta v Mehta [194512 All ER 690; Sowa v Sowa [1961] 
All ER 687. 
616 Cheni v Cheni, [1962] 3 All ER 873, [1965] P. 85. 
617 (1959) E. A. 568. 
618 East Africa Order in Council 1911, Article 2 (2). 
619 Manjang v N'Dongo has precipitated a change in the law in the Gambia. After the 
decision, the Dissolution of Marriages (Special Circumstances)Act 1967, (No. 8 of 
1967) was passed and it provides in S. 2 (1) that: 
"Notwithstanding the provision of any other enactment having the force of law in 
The Gambia, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to dissolve by decree any 
marriage at the instance of either party thereto in the following circumstances- 
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The post-independence decisions on the status of the Sharia, as a connecting factor, are not 
satisfactory either. In the Ghanaian case of Kwakye v Tuba620, the court held that succession 
to a Moslem's property should be by the appropriate 'customary law', unless he had been 
married under the Mohammedan Ordinance621, in which case Islamic law would apply. 
Most probably the decision was based on public policy grounds to enable the wife, who was 
married under local customary law, to inherit from the Moslem husband. Any other 
explanation makes the decision untenable. It is the personal law of the deceased alone which 
determines which law governs the disposition of his property upon death and not the lax loci 
celebrationis. 
(d) Christianity 
Christianity has had little impact on law in colonial Africa and did not provide a connecting 
622 factor. Except for Sierra Leone, Christianity is not mentioned in any legislation. Thus, in 
(a) the marriage is in monogamous form recognised by the law of The Gambia; 
(b) since the celebration of the marriage one of the spouses has in good faith and to 
the satisfaction of the court become converted to a religion which 
recognises polygamous marriages and the other spouse has not been so 
converted. " 
It must be noted that the law does not render the marriage void but entitles a party 
to approach the court for dissolution of the marriage. 
620 (1961) G. L. R. 720. Also discussed in Allott, p. 210. 
621 Cap. 129. 
622 Cap. 95,1960 (Revision. of 1967) was passed and it provides in S. 2 (1) that: 
"Notwithstanding the provision of any other enactment having the force of law 
in The Gambia, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to dissolve by 
decree any marriage at the instance of either party thereto in the following 
circumstances- 
(a) the marriage is in monogamous form recognised by the law of The Gambia; 
(b) since the celebration of the marriage one of the spouses has in good faith and to 
the satisfaction of the court become converted to a religion which recognises 
polygamous marriages and the other spouse has not been so converted. " 
Iss 
the Christian Marriage Act of Sierra Leone, Africans married by Christian ceremony must 
remain monogamous 623. Thus, Christianity was employed to regulate the concept of 
monogamy only and not to impose a general body of law or to establish a connecting factor. 
VIII. Non-Africans Subject to Customary Law? 
From the wording of Section 19, it would seem that anyone could be subject to customary 
law but in Brown v Miller624, Crampton Smyly CJ, thought differently. In that case he said, 
"... mere residence alone on the Gold Coast, even if prolonged or even if he 
should purchase Accra land, does not make a stranger coming to the Colony 
a Native son to bring him within the jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals as 
established under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 1882 as amended" 625 
The facts of the case were as follows. M, a spinster, was a West Indian resident in the Gold 
Coast Colony for 62 years. She'acquired land from a local Ga chief and was now being sued 
in a Ga Native Tribunal regarding title to the land. M claimed that she was not a "Native" 
under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 1883 S. 2626 and was therefore not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the native court. 
On appeal, the Full Court of the Gold Coast held that M was not a native but a West Indian. 
The court was asked if it was at all possible for a non-African to "naturalise" as a native. 
Wilkinson J, answered for the court; 
It must be noted that the law does not render the marriage void but entitles a party to 
approach the court for dissolution of the marriage. 
622 (1961) G. L. R. 720. 
623 ibid. 
624 (1921) F. Ct. '20 -'21,48. 625 _ __-I____-2 -__ ..,, _.. -- , neprouuceu in tiiiott, p. iyt. 
No. 5 of 1883. The section defines a "Native" as "Any person who is under Native 
Customary Law or under any Ordinance a member of a Native Community of the 
Colony, Ashanti or Northern Territories. " 
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"If there were a Native Customary Law according to which strangers to this 
country (let alone to West Africa) could become for the purposes under 
reference members of a native community without any exercise of conscious 
volition on their part, and by mere length of residence or by mere holding of 
property, or merely by being domiciled here, or merely by marriage, I do not 
think that would be a law or custom which this court would be bound to 
627 
enforce under Section 19 Ordinance No 4 of 1876. 
The learned judge did not think such a custom existed and if such a clear choice were made 
by a non-African, then; 
"... it must be clearly shown that he has, by definite and unmistakable signs 
and acts committed himself to the adoption of membership of the native 
"628 community which claims him as one of its body. 
The unmistakable signs were, inter alia, 
a) voluntary participation in liability för stool debts (crown debts); 
b) voluntary submission to a stool levy (crown tax); 
c) formal avowal of allegiance to a native stool; 
d) active participation qua member in formal stool ceremonies. 
However, the judge warned that each case must be dealt with on its own merits and no 
single factor per se would be conclusive. What this seems to mean is that a domicil of 
choice is nearly impossible to acquire in a West African community. It would seem that the 
court was applying the English attitude to domicil of choice and was not interpreting Section 
19. The Section states clearly that "any person" could take advantage of customary law. 
However, this was not how the courts saw it. 
627 
Cited in Alloff, 197. 
628 (1921) F. Ct. '20 -'21, at p. 51. 
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In Savage v Macfoy629, M, a domiciled Englishman, of the settler freed slave origin residing 
in Sierra Leone, moved to live in the Yoruba community of Western Nigeria. He went 
through a ceremony of marriage to a native Yoruba woman, S, by customary law. After M's 
death, S sued for a declaration that she and her children by M were entitled to succeed to 
M's estate as against M's brothers and sisters. The question that arose was whether the 
marriage between M and S was valid. A marriage by Yoruba law would be potentially 
polygamous and would therefore be valid only if M had acquired a domicil of choice in 
Yorubaland. If M had not acquired a domicil of choice in Yorubaland, then the marriage 
would be invalid as a potentially polygamous marriage which would be against public 
policy in English law. 
Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876 provided that "any person" could claim 
the benefit of customary law and it was argued before the court that "any person" should be 
taken to mean what it said and consequently a European should be capable of contracting a 
valid marriage in the colony according to native custom. Osborne, CJ, thought that although 
M may have acquired a domicil of choice in Yorubaland, that did not necessarily make him 
subject to the local law. His ordinary relations would be governed by English law. Therefore 
according to English law, M lacked the capacity to enter into a potentially polygamous 
marriage. The court however applied the lex sites, Yoruba law, which made no distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children, to govern the immovable property and made a 
declaration in favour of M's children by S. 
It is granted that English law does not easily recognise acquisition of a domicil of choice. As 
Scarman, J, put it in In the Estate of Fuld; 
"... two things are clear - first, that unless the judicial conscience is satisfied 
by evidence of change, the domicil of origin persists; and secondly, that the 
acquisition of a domicil of choice is a serious matter not to be lightly inferred 
629 (1909) Ren. 504. 
Iss 
from slight indications or casual words" 
630 
Nevertheless, the decision in Savage v Macfoy is wrong. Once the court accepts that a 
person has acquired a domicil of choice, all his personal matters must be governed by the 
law of the domicil of choice. Happily the decision was not followed by other courts631. The 
decision in In Re Sapara632, a later decision, suggests that the courts had moved on to more 
modem times. Although domicil was not discussed, it appears apparent that Dr Sapara had 
been born in Sierra Leone but had moved to Southern Nigeria where he lived for most of his 
life. By deciding that he was a "native", the court must have accepted that he had been 
domiciled in Southern Nigeria. 
A question that was never resolved was whether a European woman married to an African 
man and who therefore had acquired a domicil of dependence in an African community was 
subject to local customary law. Until the coming into force of the Domicil and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973, a married woman automatically acquired as a domicil of dependence, 
that of her husband. It would follow that an English woman who married an African 
domiciled in the Gold Coast and subject to customary law, would automatically acquire the 
husband's domicil. There are no decided cases on the issue although there were such 
marriages in existence. 
Faced with a situation as described above, the court would probably have one of two ways 
of approaching the problem. First, the court could find that the wife had acquired her 
husband's domicil of dependence and was therefore a "native", for the purposes of Section 
19 of the Ordinance, thus conforming strictly to the English notion of domicil of 
dependence. Second, it could say that customary law applied to the wife only in cases where 
"substantial injustice" would be done otherwise, for example in cases of succession to the 
deceased husband. 
The first option is to be preferred but the conduct of English courts at the time could not 
630 ý .7 ,-.. _PT -11 ^7_ -ý% r+niiý ý f11 
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°" Allott at p. 128. 
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preclude the second option. However, it is interesting to note that the issue never came 
before the courts but it is possible that couples of mixed marriages conducted their affairs in 
such a manner as to avoid the application of customary law in their private matters. 
632 (1911) Ren. 605. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CHOICE OF LAW IN POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA 
GHANA 
I. Introduction 
On 6 March 1957, Ghana became the first black African country to attain its independence 
and on 1 July 1960, introduced the Republican Constitution but remained in the 
Commonwealth. It. was then decided to overhaul the entire judicial and legal system. As part 
of that exercise, a new Courts Act was enacted, Section 66 of which, for the first time, 
provided a complete set of choice of law rules. The Courts Act has been re-enacted as NLC 
Decree Paragraph 64, which in turn has been superseded by the Courts Act 1971, but 
Section 66 of the Courts Act is worth some examination. 
II. The Position before 1960 
Parts of the wording of Section 19 of the Courts Ordinance 1876 were no longer suitable in 
a sovereign state and needed amending. The Section provided that where all parties were 
"natives", customary law applied, unless the parties had agreed that English law should 
apply. The distinction between "natives" and "non-natives" was no longer meaningful and it 
was out of place for English law to apply. Further, Section 19 gave no guidance for 
determining which of two or more conflicting customary laws should apply. 
The old law also provided that in a case between a "native" and "non-native" English law 
was to apply unless strict adherence to it would cause substantial injustice. In such a case 
however, applying English law would be unjust to one party, while applying customary law 
would be unjust to the other. Such was the case in Koney v Union Trading Co. Ltd633. 
Koney, an educated African carpenter, bought a sawing machine from the defendant 
company. After using it for nine years, he returned it to the company and sued for breach of 
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contract, claiming that the machine was unfit for its purpose. The defendant company 
pleaded the Statute of Limitation. The Divisional Court held that to apply English law 
would cause substantial injustice to the plaintiff since limitation periods did not exist in 
customary law. 
The decision was reversed by the West African Court of Appeal which pointed out that the 
party alleging that application of English law would cause substantial injustice should prove 
it634. In the circumstances that Ghana was now a sovereign state, it was no longer 
appropriate for foreign law to be accepted by the courts as the applicable law which would 
apply automatically unless domestic law was pleaded. 
The old provision also stated that customary law was applicable only when a party claimed 
the benefit of it. Thus, the existence of a customary law rule was treated as a question of 
fact. The failure to claim the benefit of a customary law rule would therefore call for the 
automatic application of English law. 
Section 19 went on to provide that customary law, though applicable, was not to apply if the 
parties had agreed to the exclusive application of English law. The courts made only one 
exception in this case. If the application of English law, though agreed by the parties as the 
applicable law, would deprive a third party of a right acquired under customary law, the 
court would apply customary law. Such was the case in Nelson v Nelson635. In that case, a 
piece of land was bequeathed under customary law rules to N to hold for himself and for all 
other children of the deceased. Part of the land was compulsorily acquired by the 
Government and with the compensation money, N bought another piece of land by a 
conveyance in English law. N then sold the piece of land by conveyance in English law, to a 
limited company. The other members of N's family now sued for the sale to be set aside as 
they were not consulted before the land was sold. In customary law, the proceeds of a sale of 
family property will be traced to any other property that is purchased with the proceeds. The 
court set aside the sale and remarked that the onus of determining whether all parties were 
633 (1934) 2 W. A. C. A. 188. 
634 ibid, at p. 194. 
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consulted lay on the purchaser under the nemo dat quod non habet rule. Generally, however, 
there were difficulties determining when the parties had agreed that English law should 
exclusively govern the transaction. Some of these difficulties are discussed below. 
(l) In a case involving a "native" and a "non-native', does an agreement to apply 
English law override the "substantial injustice"provision? 
It may be recalled that Section 19 provided that English law was to apply unless substantial 
injustice would be done to one party. It appears that the agreement to apply English law 
would prevail over the substantial injustice provision. In Nelson v Nelson, Verity, Ag. P, 
remarked that if the parties 
... agreed or must 
from the nature of the transaction be taken to have agreed 
that their obligations are to be regulated by English law, then the question as 
636 to what law is applicable has been determined by their conduct" 
The result would seem to be that where mixed parties are concerned, the court may 
perpetrate "substantial injustice". One would have thought that the provision was meant to 
protect a weaker party to the agreement, a party who did not fully understand the 
consequences of the agreement to apply English law exclusively. In Nelson v Nelson the 
court did not apply the common law possibly because the agreement to apply English law 
was not obvious. 
(ii) Did reference to an express contract exclude implied contracts? 
The question to be determined is whether "express contract" and "the nature of the 
transaction" are meant to describe two types of contracts, express and implied contracts, or 
whether "nature of the transaction" merely refers to cases where the parties to the express 
contract fail to select English law but the nature of the transaction points to that law. The 
point was raised in Ferguson v Duncan where Windsor-Aubrey, J, remarked that; 
635 (1951) 13 W. A. C. A. 248. 
636 ibid, at p. 249. 
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"Counsel for the appellant particularly stresses the words `express' and `exclusive' 
though to my mind the weight to be attached to the first-mentioned word should not 
be over-stressed since it refers only to one particular form of contract and is not 
637 applicable to all contracts" 
Thus, "nature of the transaction" did not refer to implied contracts but only to 
express contracts. 
ON Must the agreement relate only to obligations to bring into operation English 
law? 
The Courts Ordinance provided that: 
"No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any local law or custom if ... such 
party agreed that his obligations should be regulated by English law". 
It is not clear why English law would apply if the party claiming the benefit of customary 
law had obligations to perform but would not apply where he was receiving benefits. In a 
normal contract there would be obligations and benefits, as where goods are to be delivered 
for payment. 
(iv) What was the significance of the word "exclusively"? 
The courts appeared to have attached great significance to the word "exclusively". As 
Windsor-Aubrey, J, put it in Ferguson v Duncan; 
"The word `exclusive' (sic) however, applies to all forms of contract. In other words, 
as I understand the position, native law and custom are not ousted even when the 
parties had no clear conception in their minds and contemplated a mixture of 
637 (1953) 14 W. A. C. A. 316, at p. 317. 
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English law and native law and custom" 638 
The dispute in the case involved a loan of money evidenced by a receipt bearing a twopenny 
stamp. The court observed that a receipt of this kind "... is not technical in form and is 
exceedingly common even among illiterate Africans639" and therefore declined to infer from 
it an agreement to be bound exclusively by English law. In a community, such as the Gold 
Coast was, where there were many nationalities, it may not have been unusual for certain 
issues in a contract to be governed by customary law while others were governed by English 
law, such as in land cases. The courts failed to see this plural element in the colony and 
applied only one legal system to the whole case. 
(v) Could the parties have chosen some other law, such as German law? 
The provision mentions only English law and customary law but could the parties have 
chosen any other law? In private international law, parties to a contract are at liberty to 
choose any law to govern the contract and the court will enforce it, subject to public policy 
considerations60. No guidance is given on this point and there appear to be no decided cases 
on the subject. 
What is uncertain is the meaning the court would have attached to "... in cases where no 
express rule is applicable to any matter in controversy, the court shall be governed by the 
principles of justice, equity and good conscience". If the parties to a contract were to have 
chosen German law to govern the contract, would the court have interpreted the clause 
liberally and have applied German law? Or would the court have stuck to the provision that 
where customary law is not invoked then English law applied? Most probably the court 
would have resorted to the "substantial injustice" clause and applied the common law unless 
one party were able to prove to the court that he would suffer substantial injustice unless 
German law were applied. 
638 ibid, at p. 317. 
639 ibid, at p. 318. 
640 Article 3, The Rome Convention. See Cheshire & North's Private International 
Law, 13`h Ed. p. 552. 
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(v) Inter-customary law conflicts. 
The Courts Ordinance provided no guidance for determining conflicts between the various 
customary laws. Theoretically, each customary law system ought to contain its own rules for 
resolving conflicts with other customary law systems. However, it is just possible that on 
certain issues, the customary law system did not have a solution. The courts did not seem to 
notice that there were differences between the various customary law systems. As Bennion 
puts it; 
"For many years, however, the courts regarded `native law and custom' as more or 
less uniform in the Gold Coast and no developed theory of internal conflict of laws 
641 is discernible from the earlier cases" 
Bennion observes however, that with the advent of African judges, the courts began to 
recognise the differences in customary laws 642. For example, the private international law 
rule that the lex situs applies to the disposition of immovable property cannot easily apply in 
the Ghanaian situation. In certain parts of the country, succession to property is matrilineal, 
that is, one inherits from one's maternal family, while in other parts, inheritance is from the 
patrilineal family. Thus, if an Ewe (patrilineal) dies intestate and leaves a house in Kumasi a 
(matrilineal area), the application of the lex situs rule would deprive his wife and children of 
the house, quite contrary to the requirements of the personal law and expectations of the 
deceased. 
641 Bennion, F. A. R; The Constitutional Law of Ghana, 1962, p. 447. 
Bennion was one of the drafters of the Republican Constitution. 
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III. Ghana Choice of Law Rules, 1960 
PART VII-COMMON LAW AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
66. Application of common law and customary law -(1) Subject to the provisions of any 
enactment other than this sub-paragraph, in deciding whether an issue arising in civil 
proceedings is to be determined according to the common law or customary law and, if the 
issue is to be determined according to customary law, in deciding which system of 
customary law is applicable, the court shall be guided by the following rules, in which 
reference to the personal law of a person are references to the system of customary law to 
which he is subject or, if he is not shown to be subject to customary law, are references to 
the common law: 
Rule 1. Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot, by dealing in a 
manner regulated by some other law with property in which the other has a present or 
expectant interest, alter or affect that interest to an extent which would not in the 
circumstances be open to him under his personal law. 
Rule 2. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties to which have 
agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction be taken to have agreed, that such 
an issue should be determined according to the common law or any system of customary 
law effect should be given to the agreement. 
In this rule "transaction" includes a marriage and an agreement or arrangement to marry. 
Rule 3. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of any unilateral disposition and it 
appears from the form or nature of the disposition or otherwise that the person effecting the 
disposition intended that an issue should be determined according to the common law or any 
system of customary law effect should be given to the intention. 
642 ibid, at p. 447. 
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Rule 4. Subject to the foregoing rule, where an issue relates to entitlement to land on death 
of the owner or otherwise relates to title to land- 
(a) if all the parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the land or a right 
relating thereto trace their claims from one person who is subject to customary law, 
or from one family or other group of persons all subject to the same customary law, 
the issue should be determined according to that law; 
(b) if the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families or other 
groups of persons, who are all subject to the same customary law, the issue should 
be determined according to that law; 
(c) in any other case, the issue should be determined according to the law of the 
place in which the land is situated. 
Rule S. Subject to Rules 1 to 3, where an issue relates to the devolution of the property 
(other than land) of a person on his death it should be determined according to his personal 
law. 
Rule 6. Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue should be determined according to the 
common law unless the plaintiff is subject to any system of customary law and claims to 
have the issue determined according to that system, when it should be so determined. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, but 
subject to the provisions of any other enactment- 
(a) the rules of the common law relating to private international law shall apply in 
any proceedings in which an issue concerning the application of law prevailing in 
any country outside Ghana is raised; 
(b) the rules of estoppel and such other of the rules generally known as the doctrines 
of equity as have heretofore been treated as applicable in all proceedings in Ghana 
too 
shall continue to be so treated. 
The major differences between the old and the new rules stand out clearly. First, The new 
rules are meant to guide the court as to how to determine whether the common law or 
customary law (and if so which system of customary law) governs an issue in a case. In the 
Courts Ordinance, the choice was not given to the court but was left to one of the parties, 
who had to convince the court that unless customary law applied, he would suffer 
substantial injustice. Second, the court now had to decide which of different systems of 
customary laws applied. Third, the subsection applies to issues involved in the case, so that 
rules from several legal systems, customary and common law, may apply in the same case. 
In a legally plural society as Ghana is, it would not be unusual that a number of issues arise 
in one case, some to be decided according to the common law, while others fall to be 
decided by one or more systems of customary law, as in land cases. This method of picking 
and choosing legal rules from several legal systems to govern different issues is known in 
private international law as depecage and can be a useful tool in a legally plural society 643. 
By way of illustration, where a person sells property by way of conveyance in English law, it 
might be necessary to determine whether the vendor was also the owner by referring to a 
customary law regime. If it is established under the applicable customary law that he was the 
owner, then common law would apply to determine the legal effect of the conveyance. In the 
majority of cases there may be no need to apply this method of choice of law but it is 
important that the court is aware that rules from different legal systems may apply to 
different issues in the same case. 
Another important distinction is that the court is to be "guided" by the rules. This implies 
that the rules are laying down principles as opposed to the rigid rules laid down by the 
Courts Ordinance, such as "express contract" etc. There are bound to be cases which would 
not fit exactly according to the rules as they stand. For example, Rule 6 mentions the 
"plaintiff' but there could be joint plaintiffs, each subject to a different regime of customary 
law. In such a case, the court could easily interpret the rules to fit the case at hand. 
643 Elias, T. 0; British Colonial Law, 1962, p. 222. 
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One point which is not quite clear is that sub-section 1 ends with a definition of "personal 
law", being the customary law to which a person is subject. However, "personal law" is 
used only in rules 1 and 5, while a person "subject to" a customary law is used in rules 4 and 
6. If the use of the two expressions is deliberate, then there must be a reason. Does it mean 
that "personal law" is referring to the law of domicil, while "subject to" a customary law 
refers to the law of habitual residence? The law of habitual residence may be displaced 
easily, so that a non-Ashanti person may be "subject" to Ashanti law as long as he resides in 
Ashanti territory but once he moves to, say Ewe territory, he discards Ashanti law and 
becomes subject to Ewe law. A personal law, as defined by the Act, or law of domicil, on 
the other hand, is far more difficult to discard and requires a more detailed enquiry by the 
court before the change of domicil would be accepted. 
It is also possible that the two expressions are used to cater for unusual possibilities, such as 
where it is alleged that one person is subject to two different regimes of customary law. For 
example, where an Ashanti woman (matrilineal society), marries an Ewe man (patrilineal 
society), the woman's personal law remains Ashanti law but in relation to certain incidents 
of the marriage, she may be deemed subject to Ewe law, such as in the case of succession. 
Possibly, this is an occasion where the person must be "shown" to be subject to a customary 
law. For example, if the married couple were to purchase joint property with joint resources, 
the court would have to decide which customary law governs the disposition of the property. 
If Ashanti law applies, the wife's share of the property would go to her nieces and nephews 
of her maternal family. If, however, Ewe law applies, then her share would go to her own 
children and her spouse jointly. This is probably a situation where it may be "shown" to the 
court that the wife, in matters of inheritance, is "subject' 'to Ewe law while her personal law 
remains Ashanti law. 
Rule 1. This rule appears to restate the position in the old rules, although the language is 
different and removes uncertainty. The old Section 19 stated that: 
"Such laws and customs shall be deemed applicable in causes and matters where the 
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parties thereto are natives of the Colony... in causes and matters relating to marriage 
and to the tenure and transfer of real and personal property and to inheritance and 
testamentary dispositions.... " 
The expression "expectant interest" in Rule 1 seems to refer to family property in customary 
law which cannot be disposed of in disregard of the customary law governing the 
disposition. 
The Rule also reproduces the position already known to the law and refers mainly to family 
property. Thus, a member of a family cannot, by a form appropriate to the common law or 
some other legal regime, convey an interest in family property other than in the law to which 
the family is subject. If under that law, the consent of the other members of the family is 
required before the conveyance is made, the property cannot be validly conveyed without 
such consent. The same applies to a will drafted in the English form. In short, the nenzo dat 
non quod habet principle applies. 
Rule 2 again preserves the old provision that where parties agree or are deemed to have 
agreed through the nature of the transaction that the Common Law should apply, effect is to 
be given to this. Rule 2 however extends the meaning of "transaction" to cover marriage or 
agreement to marry. This must be meant to cover the cases of "inter-marriage" across the 
customary legal systems. The nature of the transactions at the contracting stage would 
determine which law governed the legal issues arising out of the marriage, such as the right 
of the spouses to each other's property in case of divorce or death; or the determination of 
the community to which the children belong. Allott thinks Rule 2 does not solve the 
problem adequately. 644 Thus, he argues that the child of a Fante father (matrilineal system) 
and an Ewe mother (patrilineal system), would have difficulty determining which law 
declared him "legitimate", or determining to which ethnic group he belonged. It is not clear 
why Allott thinks Rule 2 is incapable of solving this problem. The negotiations which take 
place between the spouses' families before the marriage are recognised by Rule 2 as 
"transactions" and therefore if by those transactions it can be shown that children of a legally 
644 A11ott, p. 137. 
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"mixed" marriage are to belong either to the father's community or to that of the mother, the 
court must give effect to that. As to Allott's worry about legitimacy, it is baffling how a child 
born in wedlock, under any legal system, could ever be described as "illegitimate". 
French colonial administration attempted to solve the same difficulty and it was decided 
that; 
"On doit appliquer, en matiere de marriage et de divorce, la coutume qui a preside ä 
la negociation du contrat de marriage 
645 ou, s'il n'y a pas eu de contrat, la coutume 
de la femme. "646 
Thus, the law which governs the negotiations or transactions, is seen as vital in determining 
the legal issues which arise in a marriage, including the status of children, where applicable. 
Thus, if an agreement to marry has been reached and a child is born but the marriage never 
takes place, due to, say, death of one of the parties, the child would be subject to the law 
governing the transaction. 
The Rule also improves upon the position in the Courts Ordinance which referred to 
"express contract". Now there is only a reference to the agreement of the parties regardless 
of whether there is an express or implied contract. 
The Rule provides that "transaction" includes a marriage or an agreement to marry. Thus, 
any person in Ghana, including Europeans may now enter into a marriage irrespective of his 
or her personal law or law of domicil. 
Rule 3 clarifies the situation where a unilateral disposition is concerned. The old rules did 
not provide specifically for this but merely stated that customary law was to apply in matters 
relating "... to the tenure and transfer of real and personal property, and to inheritance and 
testamentary dispositions.... " The new rule permits the testator to choose between the 
645 Emphasis mine. 
646 Rolland et Lampue, ; Precis de droit de pays d'outre-mer. 4th Edition, 1949, p. 305. 
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Common Law and other customary legal systems. 
Rule 4 is merely a restatement of the position which existed in the old law, except for the 
introduction of lex situs. The customary law (or the personal law) of the deceased governs 
the disposition of the land, otherwise the law of the place where the land is situated governs 
the disposition. 
Subject to the effects of Rules 1,2 and 3, if all parties to the proceedings trace their claim to 
the land from a person or persons who are all subject to the same customary law, effect 
should be given to that law. In any other case, it should be decided according to the lr sites. 
Does this mean that in a case where property is jointly owned by a "mixed" couple 
(matrilineal/patrilineal), the lex sites will always prevail? This would produce undesirable 
results as the expectations of the couple are likely to be different. An Ewe husband and an 
Ashanti wife having joint property in Ashanti territory must be presumed to have agreed that 
only one customary law, Ewe or Ashanti, governs certain incidents of their marriage. If Ewe 
law applies, the wife's share of the property would go to the children of the marriage and the 
surviving spouse but if Ashanti law (lex sites) applies, the property would go to the maternal 
nieces and nephews of the wife, to the exclusion of her own children and the surviving 
spouse. This solution produces drastic results and a court is likely to decide that the wife had 
agreed to be subject to Ewe law in relation to certain incidents of the marriage and 
inheritance would be one of them. 
Rule 5 entrenches the Private International Law rule that the "personal law" of the deceased 
governs the disposition of his movable property. However, this rule is subject to Rules I to 
3, which may restrict the scope of the law. governing the disposition. Thus, the customary 
law rights of the surviving spouse under Rule 2 may restrict the scope of the personal law of 
the deceased. 
Again there could be difficulties regarding a "mixed" marriage such as described in the 
context of Rule 4 above. An Ashanti woman. married to an Ewe man continues to retain 
Ashanti law as her personal law. However, can the court decide that as regards" certain 
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incidents of the marriage, she is subject to Ewe law? Most probably the court would accept 
that for the purposes of inheritance, she was subject to Ewe law, as to her movables acquired 
during the marriage. In fairness however, there should be a distinction between the 
immoveable property she acquired before the marriage, which should be governed by her 
personal law, Ashanti law, and that acquired during the marriage, which should be 
governed by Ewe law. 
It is also possible that the deceased may have left his movables in a will governed by a law 
other than his personal law (Rule 3). 
Rule 6 lays down a mandatory application of the Common Law unless the plaintiff claims to 
be subject to a customary law system and wants the issue determined by that law. The 
plaintiff is thus given the right to elect the law which governs the issue. Rule 6 appears to be 
most appropriate for tort cases but there is no reason why it cannot apply to contract cases as 
well. 
The effect of rule 6 is that the common law will apply in a case not governed by rules 1-5, 
unless the plaintiff is subject to a regime of customary law and claims to have the issue 
determined according to it. If, on the other hand, a person suffers a wrong for which he 
believes his customary law provides adequate remedy, he may pursue the case under his 
customary law, even against a defendant who is not subject to that customary law. This is in 
keeping with the new approach to customary law, as an integral part of the laws of Ghana. 
Therefore the content and existence of customary law is a matter of law and not of fact 7. 
Although the rule applies mainly to tort cases, it can also apply to contract cases, where, for 
example, no agreement can be inferred from the conduct of the parties to indicate an 
intention to be bound by a particular legal system. In a case of a simple debt, for example, 
where there is no indication as to the parties' intention as to the applicable law, the common 
law will apply, unless the plaintiff claims he is subject to a customary law system and wants 
647 Courts Act (C. A. 9) S. 67 (1). 
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the matter judged by that law648. 
It would seem that where the plaintiff is not -a member of a Ghanaian community but of a 
community of another part of Africa, he cannot claim to have the matter settled under that 
foreign customary law, unless he can show an agreement between the parties that this 
foreign customary law is to apply. In any case the recognised rules of private international 
law would apply in such a case, which might end up applying his foreign customary law. 
Paragraph (b) of rule 6 is intended to keep in use, rules of equity, such as res judicata in 
order to modify the harshness of some customary law rules. 
Although section 66 refers to the "personal law" of the person, it seems clear that the 
expression is not meant to convey the same meaning as in private international law. As 
shown in the introduction to this thesis, West African legal systems are not personal but 
community-based. Thus, membership of the community confers a connecting factor on the 
individual. "Personal law" is used in this legislation to reflect the fact that the individual 
carries his law of domicil with him within the country. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear why the concept 'personal law' is used while a connecting factor, 
`community', appears to have been selected to form the basis of legal relations. The term 
'personal law' first appeared in legal literature after the destruction of the Roman Empire by 
the barbarians, mostly Germans. The main reason for the introduction of the term was due to 
the fact that the barbarian conquerors themselves, not constituting one nation, came from 
several legal systems and could only profess the law of their 'natio' or their birth-lawTM9. If 
'community, as used, refers to territory, then clearly territorial law is being created and the 
term 'personal law' ceases to have a meaning. In that case, the only persons in Ghana to 
whom the term could apply are those to whom the common law applies. 
The major criticism of the provision is that 'customary law' is defined as 'rules of law' which 
648 Rule 6 (2) (a). 
649 Savigny; Private International Law: A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. William 
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by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana'. Thus, the definition excludes 
those who cannot show that they form a community, especially isolated foreigners. It is 
however possible that the common law notion of domicil would be applied to determine that 
these persons are still domiciled abroad but that can sometimes bring hardship. 
It appears that the drafters seem to have decided first that everyone ought to have a personal 
law, then set about looking for a connecting factor to supply the basis for it. The reverse 
should have been the case. The concept 'community should have been clearly defined as a 
connecting factor and then allowed to regulate relations of individuals of that community. In 
most African societies the ancestral home is the connecting factor which also provides the 
applicable law in personal matters. As far as being subject to a local legal system is 
concerned, "there has never been a decision in the Ghanaian courts to the effect that a 
person had lost his or her personal law" 
650 Residence alone has never been sufficient to 
determine 'personal law'. It is however arguable that in the modem industrial age, people are 
likely to 'disappear' into an urban community and abandon their ancestral homes. In that 
case, the concept of "habitual residence" should have been included to cater for such cases. 
The purpose of inter-local conflict rules must be to determine which law applies to which 
person; to regulate matters of status, unilateral dispositions (eg a will); and to indicate which 
law is to apply and which remedies will be available in matters regarding tort and contracts. 
The Courts Act 1960 was a commendable attempt to achieve this purpose. It is unfortunate 
that judicial activism has not been able to keep up with the legislative aspirations of the 
drafters. 






Generally, African local legal systems are familiar with various areas of the law of contract, 
such as sales, pledges of land, sale and bailment of goods, labour contracts etc. However, 
there could be problems when the court has to find the proper law of the contract where the 
parties are not agreed as to what law governs the contract. Let us take the following example 
to illustrate the problem. Y, a dressmaker of limited education, orally agreed to make a 
wedding dress for X, a university lecturer for the sum of £35. X paid a deposit of £ 10. Y 
finished the dress one week before the wedding but before X could collect it, Za petty trader 
offered Y £40 for the dress and Y quickly disposed of it. When X came to collect the dress, 
Y apologised for having failed to make the dress and refunded the deposit of £10. By 
coincidence, X went to the market and bought the same dress for £45. What law is 
applicable, the local legal system to which both Y and X are subject or the common law as 
received? Under the Ghana rules of 1960, the local law applies if both parties are subject to 
it and therefore Y is probably not liable for X's extra expense in obtaining the dress but 
perhaps she might be liable for the profit she had made on the sale to Z651. At common law, 
Y would be liable to compensate X for the extra expense incurred in obtaining the dress. 
Suppose X had paid no deposit at all, she would probably have no remedy at local law but at 
common law Y would have been liable for breach of contract. 
Although contract law in African customary law follows the basic rules which are known to 
European legal systems, there are some major differences. For example, the concept of 
executory contract, that is the mere exchange of promises, is not known to many customary 
651 This is a real case which was withdrawn before it could come to court. See 
Agbede, I. 0; Legal Pluralism, 1991, p. 103. 
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law systems. In a case brought before the Meru African Court652 in Kenya, Y agreed to buy 
land at an agreed price from X. The final agreement was in the written form and was tended 
in evidence. After the agreement was reached, X changed his mind and wanted his land 
back. The court found for X on the ground, that although Y had occupied the land, he had 
made no payment to X, and the mere agreement was held not valid. 
On the other hand, what Ghai calls "executed consideration"653 is recognised to create 
contractual liability, although there is no agreement. In a case brought before the same Meru 
African Court, B had paid a fine on behalf of his brother C to the Resident Magistrates' 
Court, as well as compensation awarded against C. C was in prison at the time and had not 
requested the payment to be made nor was there an understanding that C would repay B. B 
sued for recovery of the sums paid on behalf of C and the court refused to accept C's plea 
that there was no agreement of any sort for him to repay the money to B. The court held that 
B had made payments on behalf of C and C had the obligation to repay the debt. 
The closest analogy to this concept in the common law would be unjust enrichment which, 
in the common law, is not contractual. The rational of the judgment seems to be a desire to 
do justice rather than to enforce a strict rule of law. 
A. Ghana 
Under the old law, Ghana contract law was generally the Common Law as received from 
England. Nevertheless, Section 87(1) of the Courts Ordinance made considerable 
amendments to the Common Law position. The Section provided that where all parties to 
the contract were "natives", customary law was to apply unless the parties had agreed that 
English law should apply. So that if the wedding dress case cited above had taken place in 
the Gold Coast during the colonial period, customary law would have applied. The position 
would be the same under the present Ghanaian law. However, under the old law, there was 
no guidance to the court as to how to determine which of two or more conflicting customary 
652 No. V of 1964. 
653 Ghai, Y. P; "Customary Contracts and Transactions in Kenya", in Ideas and 
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laws applied. However, it is not necessary for choice of law rules to state which law should 
take precedence over the other as the court applies its municipal law with its own choice of 
rules which allow for the application of "foreign" law in the appropriate cases. A Ghanaian 
court faced with a conflict between two local legal systems needs only to look at the law of 
the forum, which might in turn instruct it to apply, for example, lex situs or the personal law 
of the party concerned. 
Section 87(1), in paragraph 2, mentioned examples of cases which may be governed by 
customary law, ie transfer of real and personal property, inheritance and testamentary 
dispositions. While these may be the more frequent areas where customary law may apply, 
there is no reason why they should have been singled out. Paragraph 2 went on to provide 
that where one party was a "native" and the other was a "non-native", English law applied 
unless "strict adherence" to it would cause substantial injustice. 
The law as it stood, posed difficulties in application. Suppose, for example, that a person 
subject to the local legal system acquired a right by a procedure based on English law but 
using the proceeds from property in which others have an interest. According the law as it 
stood, the rights acquired by him will be determined by local law, as was the case in Nelson 
v Nelson6sa In that case, in a death-bed disposition, self-acquired land was left to N for 
himself and all the other children of the deceased who constituted his family. Part of the 
land was later acquired compulsorily. by the government and with the proceeds from the 
compensation money, N acquired land in his own name by a conveyance in the English 
form and later, conveyed the same land to a limited company. 
Although the conveyance to N in the English form conveyed good title in English law, the 
transaction was held to be governed by local law according to which N required the consent 
of all the family before conveying the land and as this was not obtained, the conveyance was 
void. It made no difference that the conveyance was in the English form, for one could not 
transfer a title one did not have, nemo dat quod non habet. 
L[A 
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Another difficulty with the old provision was that if one of the parties was a "native" and the 
other was not, English law applied unless "substantial injustice" would be caused if English 
law was to apply. The onus lay on the party claiming that substantial injustice would be 
caused if English law applied to establish his case. Thus, in Koney v United Trading Co. 
Ltd, mentioned earlier655, the plaintiff was a "native" whose customary law did not know the 
Statute of Limitations, a common law defence which the defendant raised. It should have 
been the duty of the court to ascertain the proper law of the contract if no law was 
specifically chosen by the parties and not to automatically apply English law where one 
party was not a "native". 
As regards the expression "express agreement", the courts interpreted the old law to mean 
that where the plaintiff contracts with several defendants, only the defendant appearing 
before the court was entitled to raise the issue that an express agreement was made between 
him and the plaintiff. Thus, in Amankwa v Anyan656, it was held that the plaintiff was not 
precluded from claiming the benefit of customary law by the fact that he had agreed with 
other parties for the matter to be governed by English law, since those others were not 
before the court and there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and those others. 
What is puzzling about the decision is that the defendant himself claimed that those others 
were his agents. Therefore there ought to have been privity of contract. 
It would seem that the courts ' were reluctant to reject a claim by the "native" party that 
"substantial injustice" would be done to him if English law were applied. In Nelson v 
657 Nelson, the court held that even if N's family had agreed expressly that the transaction be 
governed by English law, the agreement would still be set aside as N's family were not 
parties to the transaction and therefore, customary law could not be displaced. The principle 
seems to be that a person who was not a party to the transaction but later agreed to the 
application of English law could not betaken to have agreed to the application of that law. 
So that the "nature of the transaction", which the Section laid down as determining which 
655 n--"-- n----- /TT -jee unapier zieven kit). 
°'° (1936) 3 W. A. C. A. 22. 
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law applied, became irrelevant in this case. 
A further obstacle in ousting local law was the requirement that the agreement must provide 
that the transaction be governed "exclusively" by English law. This point arose in Ferguson 
v Duncan658 and the court refused to infer from a receipt for a loan, secured by a mortgage 
in the English form, that the contract was governed exclusively by English law. This 
extreme position was not followed and was rejected in Cobbina Ackon v Solomon 659 
The Cobbina Ackon case was an appeal to the Divisional Court from the District Court, 
Cape Coast. The plaintiff had claimed the sum of £68.9s. 2d. as due under two I. O. U. s 
given him by the defendant in Hamburg, Germany, when the two were on a visit to Europe 
in 1925. The I. O. U. s were in the following form; 
"I owe Mr. J. B. Cobbina Ackon the sum of Fifty-five pounds one and two pence 
(£55.1 s. 2d. ) being amount received from him 
(Sigd. ) J. S. Solomon 
Hamburg -27/2/25. " 
Both parties were "natives" and the magistrate had rejected the defendant's plea that the 
I. O. U. s demonstrated an intention that English law was to apply exclusively and therefore 
that the claim was barred under the Statute of Limitations. 
Upon appeal, Adumua-Bossman, J. reasoned that although Ferguson v. Duncan placed the 
onus on the defendant to satisfy the court in a dispute between "natives" that customary law 
had been displaced by English law, the decision was based on a misunderstanding of Koney 
v U. TC660 . In his view, the learned Judge thought that no such onus existed, except perhaps 
where evidence had already been brought to show that the transaction was one recognised 
by customary law and that some customary requirement, for example, the presence of 
657 (1951) 13 W. A. C. A. 248. 
658 (1953) 14 W. A. C. A. 316. 
659 Civil Appeal No. 6/1959. Unreported. 
660(1934)2 W. A. C. A. 188. 
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witnesses, had been observed. The learned Judge doubted the likelihood of parties to a 
simple transaction such as an ordinary loan of money contemplated a mixture of English and 
customary law. He went on to suggest that; 
"... it is submitted that even if the parties have not a clear conception in their minds, 
their language and/or utterances and actions will operate to make the contract fall on 
one side or the other of the line, i. e. indicate that from a legal point of view the 
661 contract between the parties is a customary or else an English one " 
(i) Inter-local Conflict of laws 
Section 87(l) did not address the possibility that local legal rules could conflict with each 
other. Possibly this was because each legal system should contain rules for settling conflicts 
with other legal systems. Nevertheless, the courts continued to regard "native law" as 
uniform in all of the Gold Coast and no developed theory of inter-local conflicts was 
discernible. In time though, with the advent of African judges, differences in local legal 
systems were recognised but still the courts failed to lay down rules. In Ghamson v 
Wobi11662, Essie Osuomba, subject to Fanti law, was entitled to a house in Winneba, where 
Efutu law applied. Essie Osuomba died. Under Efutu law (lex situs), the house would pass 
to her daughter Essie Kuma also subject to Fanti law but under Fanti law, it would pass to 
Kwesi Kra, the head of the family for the use of all the family. Upon Essie Kuma's death, 
her children took possession of the house which was later sold to Wobill. Kwesi Kra applied 
to the court to have the deed set aside. The trial judge applied Efutu law as the lex situs. The 
West African Court of Justice resorted to Section 15 of the Native Courts (Colony) 
Ordinance (Cap. 98), which provided that each "native" court was to apply the provisions of 
any law binding between the parties, and applied Fanti law because the. issue was 
succession which called for the application of the law to which the parties were subject. In 
land cases, the lex situs usually applied663 but in the Ghanaian situation where some local 
legal systems practice matrilineal inheritance while others practice the patrilineal system, it 
is not surprising that the ler situs may be set aside sometimes. Apart from the few land cases 
661 ibid. 
662 (1947) 12 W. A. C. A. 181. 
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however, there are practically no decided cases on inter-local conflict of laws in contract. It 
is therefore to land law that we have to turn for further guidance. 
(ii) Land Contracts: Validity of Land Contracts 
"... all land in Ghana is regulated by customary law and any alienation thereof must be in 
664 
accordance with customary law". 
For a contract for the sale of land to be valid a special local custom has to be performed 
signifying the change of ownership. The Akans refer to it as "cutting of quaha" or tramma in 
Ashanti665 The ceremony signifies the cutting off of the title of the vendor from the land 
and vesting it in the purchaser. First, the land is demarcated by the planting of boundary 
trees, particularly at the corners. These are special trees which have certain peculiarities. 
They do not grow too big, are durable and survive drastic climatic changes. The Akans 
usually prefer the ntome tree while the Ewes tend to use Anya. 
After the demarcation, a portion of the purchase money, or all of it, is paid on the spot and a 
sheep is slaughtered. For the contract to be valid, there must follow cutting of guaha, the 
performance of which differs from place to place. The usual pattern however is as follows. 
A- member of the vendor's family plucks a leaf, a twig or a blade of grass from the land and 
hands it over to a member of the purchaser's family. Alternatively, a member of the vendor's 
family holds one end of a leaf or twig while a member of the purchaser's family holds the 
other end and the two break the leaf or twig. The vendor then says a prayer invoking his 
ancestors to bear witness to the transaction and from that moment onwards he divests 
himself of the land and it becomes vested in the purchaser, his family and successors. In 
olden times the breaking of the twig or leaf was done by young members of the two families 
666 so that living memory could be provided for as long as possible The rationale was that 
663 See for example, Ekem v Nerba (1947) 12 W. A. C. A. 258. 
664 Ollenu, N. A; Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, 1962, p. 108. Hereafter 
cited as Ollenu. 
665 Ollenu at p. 115. 
666 ibid, at p. 117. 
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the young would survive the old and would serve as eye-witnesses who would pass on the 
facts of the contract to future generations. In the absence of writing, this was the best that the 
parties could achieve. In modem times however, documents of transfer are prepared to serve 
as evidence of the transaction 667 
As Ollenu points out however, documents merely serve as evidence of the contract and do 
not alter the nature of the transaction 668. The position is illustrated in the case. of Cofie v 
Otoo669 In that case, a vendor made a valid sale of land to the purchaser by customary law 
and later executed a deed of conveyance in the purchaser's name. Subsequent to the sale by 
customary law but before the execution by deed, the vendor purported by deed of 
conveyance to convey the same land to the plaintiff, who applied to the court for a 
declaration of title and possession. It was held that the defendant's title dated from the day of 
the transfer by customary law and that the deed of conveyance was merely documentary 
evidence of a valid contract. 
In Ghana, a person cannot opt out of customary law in contracts concerning land. Therefore 
a conveyance of land or an estate in it which is unknown to the local legal system concerned 
is invalid. To take Ollenu's example, if an abusa (licensee) tenant purports to transfer 
determinate title in the land, the purchaser gets nothing more than the interest which the 
abusa tenant had in the first place670. Thus, the nemo dat quod non habet rule applies. 
Equally, a deed of conveyance purporting to convey a fee simple absolute, free of all 
encumbrances, must fail as such an estate is unknown in any Ghanaian local legal system. 
The estate closest to the fee simple in the English sense is the determinable estate. 
Where the guaha ceremony or demarcation has not been performed, sale is not complete 
and title to the land does not pass. In Nkansa v Atia & anor671, the plaintiff paid the whole 
amount on a plot of land said to be situated at Akropong but payment was done at Manfe, 
667 Ollenu, p. 117. 
668 ibid, at p. 117. 
669 (1959) G. L. R. 300. 
670 ibid, at p. 119. 671 (1958) 1 W. A. L. R. 94. 
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about three miles from where the land was situated. The guaha ceremony was also 
performed at Manfe but the land was never demarcated. When the plaintiff attempted going 
into possession, he came into conflict, first with the licensees in possession and with the 
adjoining land owners over the inaccuracy of his boundary markings. The court held that the 
sale did not conform to the local law and that the contract was therefore void. 
(iii) Capacity to enter into Contract 
In Ghana law, property, especially land, may be self-acquired, family property, ancestral 
land or stool property. The concept of caveat emptor applies in Ghana local legal systems 
and the purchaser has to make careful enquiry as to what type of property he is purchasing in 
order to determine who has the capacity to enter into a contract with him. If the property is 
self-acquired, the individual owner may freely dispose of it without seeking the consent of 
anyone. However, to be valid, the contract has to be made in the presence of witnesses, one 
of whom is usually from the vendor's family. 
If the property is not self-acquired, then the procedure is different. Where the property is 
either family or stool property, then no single individual can make a valid transfer. The 
consent of the family or of the Chief, acting with consent of the elders, must be sought. The 
indispensable persons in the transaction are the occupant of the stool or the head of the 
family, in the case of family property. On their own, however, neither the head of the family 
nor the occupant of the stool have capacity without consent of the family or of the elders. 
Any contract entered with them without appropriate consent is void ab initiob72. If the 
contract is concluded by the head of the family or occupant of the stool purporting to be 
doing so with consent and concurrence of the family or of the elders, and in the presence of 
a member of the family or of an elder, the contract is voidable, not null and void. If however 
the family or elders disapprove of the sale, they must act quickly in order to restore the 
purchaser to the position he was in before the sale 673 
672 
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B. Senegal 
(i) Developments in Senegal 
In a referendum organised by the French Government, Senegal voted on 24 January 1959 to 
accept De Gaulle's 1958 Constitution and thereupon became an Autonomous Republic 
within the Communaute francaise (the French Community). It adopted its first constitution 
and established a parliamentary system674. Senegal and French Soudan (modern Mali), then 
decided to form the Mali Federation and adopted the Federal Constitution of 17 January 
I959675. The federal constitution granted extensive powers to the Federal Government and 
the Assembly and limited the powers of the individual States to administrative 
competence676. Federal matters included civil, commercial and criminal legislation, 
education, the judiciary and public security. 
On 20 June 1960, the Mali Federation gained independence from France but two months 
later, the federation broke up. Senegal formally legislated to withdraw from the 
federation677, proclaimed its independence and abrogated all laws and decrees which had 
granted the federation power to legislate and to regulate matters affecting Senegal678. By the 
law of 26 August 1960, Senegal revived its Constitution of 1959, taking into account its 
679 independence from both France and Mali 
(ii) Senegalese Law of Contract 
674 Law No. 59-003 of 24 January 1959. Journal Officiel de la Republique du Senegal 30 
675 Journal Officiel de la Federation du Mali, 25 April 1959. 
676 Luchaire, Droit d'Outre-mer, p. 184. 
677 Law No. 60-041 of 20 August 1960. Journal Officiel du Republique du Senegal, 24 
August 1960, p. 856. 678 Cohen, R; "Matters Arising from the Dissolution of the Mali Federation", 36 BYIL, 
p. 375. 
January 1959, at p. 62. 
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In spite of political independence, the legal system continued to be the French colonial 
legislation, in spite of the obvious defects which this system had. Some of its legal 
principles were outdated and /or unsuited for African societies. Further, the dualism of 
French Law and Droit coutoumier created a dual court system, which did not provide the 
most efficient means of administering justice. 
Despite the defects of the colonial legal system, it continued to operate until 1972, when 
Senegal enacted the Code de Famille680 which regulated conflict of laws situations. The new 
law made a radical break with the past by abolishing the statut personel as the connecting 
factor and replacing it with nationality. What the Senegalese authorities appear to have done 
is to adopt the French national solutions to conflict of laws and its application in the 
colonies as the source of their new law, instead of looking at it as a simple model of 
reference, capable of being adapted to suit local situations. The principles are purely those of 
France. Thus, there is hardly any departure from the system which had been inherited from 
the colonial master. 
As far as choice of law is concerned, the new law of nationality provides no guidance to the 
court. Article 830 expressly abolishes the difference in conflicts cases between the national 
legal system and the local legal systems, as well as between the local legal systems 
themselves. It is probably even more important now for the courts of Senegal to rely on the 
rules of private-international law to solve inter-local conflict of laws problems. All aspects 
of family law are governed by the law of nationality but there is no guidance whether a court 
may characterise the law of nationality and come to the conclusion that, for the purposes of, 
say, succession, Islamic law applies to the issue. Contrasting this philosophical position with 
Ghana, one notices a major difference. Whereas the Courts Decree 1960, based the 
connecting factor on the community from which the individual came, Senegal bases it on 
nationality. Most probably, the advantage Senegal has is that on the international plain, 
private international law rules would apply without reference to local legal systems. The 
advantage of the Ghana code is that each issue may be governed by another legal regime. 
679, 
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Thus, a Ghanaian who changes his nationality to that of, say British, may still be domiciled 
in the community in Ghana which provides his connecting factor in personal matters. In 
certain cases, such as testamentary dispositions, this can be a real advantage. 
Having disposed of inter-local conflict of laws, the legislation goes on to provide the usual 
rules which are known to private international law. Thus, Article 843 provides that capacity 
to marry is determined by the law of each party; that the law governing the form of marriage 
is the law of the place where the marriage takes place and so forth. What is not clear from 
Article 843 is whether foreigners residing in Senegal may perform their marriages in a form 
other than that prescribed by the new law. Since Article 144 of the new law has withdrawn 
recognition from customary marriages, it would seem logical that foreigners residing in 
Senegal cannot go through a marriage other than before the civil authorities681. The 
Senegalese law seems to rely on the maxim locus regit actum. While the Senegalese law has 
relied heavily on the French legal system, it has failed to notice that matters such as gifts, 
testamentary dispositions, succession and marriage are excluded from the French 
requirement of law of nationality 
682 
. 
681 It would seem that some legal systems recognise marriages entered into under laws 
other than those of the State but may require registration of the marriages. Thus, 
in England and Wales, the registration of Jewish marriages is governed by the 
Marriage Registration Act 1836, which requires that the President of Board of 
Deputies of British Jews appoint a secretary for synagogues to handle registration of 
marriages. The Board is the depository of registrations of marriages. 
682 Code Civil, Article 841 (French Code). 
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY 
In English law; 
"English courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, 
disability or legal relationship arising under the law of a foreign country, if 
the enforcement or recognition of such right, power, capacity, disability or 
legal relationship would be inconsistent with the fundamental public policy 
683 of English law" 
Most legal systems reserve for themselves the residual power and discretion, to be exercised 
when needed, to prevent the application of a foreign law or rule on the basis of its notions of 
justice and social order. These notions are collectively referred to as "public policy" or 
"ordre public" in French law. The function of public policy is to protect the way of life in 
the forum in which it operates684 to enhance and preserve the notion of justice of the 
forum685 and to prevent the application of foreign law which might jeopardise good relations 
with friendly foreign states686. Although the doctrine is a useful tool in international conflict 
of laws, it is not frequently used in inter-local conflict of laws. However, with the arrival of 
European legal systems in Africa, an alien body of law was introduced, which in many 
cases, was incompatible with the basic African concepts of justice and equity. To resolve 
this problem; the colonial powers turned the public policy doctrine on its head and excluded 
the application of indigenous law where it conflicted with British or French notions of 
justice or equity. Thus, in the colonial situation, the doctrine was constructed to exclude 
what must be called the lexfori. 
A. Repugnancy Clauses 
In British African colonial legislation public policy, as an expression, was never used but 
instead, a local law was to be excluded if it failed the repugnancy test. The repugnancy test 
683 Rule 2, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 13th. Edition, 2000. 
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was formulated in various ways, such as customary law was applicable so far as it was "not 
repugnant to natural justice and morality"687; "not repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good. conscience"688; or "conforms with natural justice and equity" 
689 
(i) Origin of the Rule 
The expression "justice, equity and good conscience" most probably developed within the 
Canon Law69o In England, the expression was employed as a standard external of positive 
law. Thus, an appeal to "equity, justice and good conscience" was more of an appeal to the 
ideal law to which positive law was expected to approximate, rather than to positive law 
itself. 
It was, however, during the colonial administration in India that the expression became a 
residual rule on which to draw when the rules of native law were inadequate or unsuitable in 
the particular case. English judges in India however, tended to use the rule indiscriminately 
to apply English law and concepts whenever it pleased them 
691 Derrett argues that it was in 
order to avoid the repetition of the Indian experience in Africa that the word "natural" was 
added to the word "justice", as is found in most African legislation on the subject692 
( ii) Meaning of the Expression 
When the expression "natural justice, equity and good conscience" entered African 
jurisprudence, it was not clear whether the words should be interpreted jointly as one 
concept or separately as though they were independent of each other. In Lewis v Bankole 693, 
Speed Ag. C. J, thought the words had their independent existence but the decision was 
687 Kenya, Local Courts Ordinance 1962, S. 12. 
688 Gold Coast (Ghana), S. 19. 
689 Sierra Leone, Local Courts Act 1963, S. 2. 
690 Derrett, J. D. M; "Justice, Equity and Good Conscience", Changing Law in 
Developing Countries, 1961 Edited: J. N. D. Anderson, p. 114. Cited hereafter as 
Derrett. 
691 Agbede, I. 0; Legal Pluralism. Shaneson, 1991, p. 34. Cited hereafter as Agbede. 692 Derrett at pp. 148 - 9. 
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overruled on appeal to the Full Court. As Daniels put it: 
"When we look for the meaning of equity in the broad sense, we are told that it is 
equivalent to natural justice. When we try to ascertain the meaning of natural justice 
we are told that it is practically equivalent to equity in the popular sense. Then both 
are said to mean natural justice. At this juncture we re-enter the realm of 
uncertainties, but one thing is being made clear: it is that the theory of assigning 
specific meaning to each of the phrases in the content... is untenable.... Even though 
equity is not synonymous with good conscience... yet it can be said that the meaning 
of equity in the broad sense embraces almost all, if not all, the concept of good 
conscience. Therefore in the phrase `equity and good conscience' the words `good 
conscience' can be regarded as superfluous" 694 
This view is now shared by the judiciary and academics alike: 
"... we must read the repugnancy provisions as if it were repugnant to natural justice 
and treat the following words, `equity and good conscience' as superfluous"695 
Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether the repugnancy rule has a precise meaning. 
According to Derrett, "natural justice, equity and good conscience" is a comfortable formula 
meaning as much or as little as the judges for the time being care . to make it mean696 An 
examination of the case law indicates that Derrett is correct to take a cynical attitude to the 
meaning of the expression, for, the use of the expression has often produced contradictory 
results. In the Indian case of Jaganneth Gin v Sher697 , the court upheld the claim that an 
illegitimate child had the right to inherit from his father on the ground that natural justice 
favours claims by natural relations as opposed to the claim of the State by escheat. On the 
other hand the expression has been relied upon by the West African Court of Appeal to hold 
693 (1908) 1 N. L. R. 81. 
694 Daniels; Common Law in West Africa, pp. 270 - 271. Cited in Agbede, p. 35. 695 Derrett, p. 271. 
696 ibid, at p. 115. 
697 Cited in Agbede, I. 0; Legal Pluralism, 1991, p. 36. 
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that to uphold such a claim would undermine legitimacy69s 
It is not surprising that the expression does not have a fixed meaning. The public policy 
doctrine, by its very nature, cannot have fixed rules on behaviour patterns. Each case must 
stand on its own merit and public opinion on the issue must be taken into account. The 
repugnancy rule is applied to regulate the consequences customary law produces and not the 
customary law rule itself. Therefore, while a customary law rule may produce favourable 
consequences at one time, the same rule may produce quite a negative consequence at 
another time. It is submitted that a rule by itself, is rarely repugnant. The role of public 
policy is to protect certain interests in society, not to strike down positive law as repugnant. 
(iii) Marriage and Repugnancy 
Colonial administration in Africa made little or no pronouncements on local laws on 
marriage, nor was there a ruling that polygamy and dowry payment were ' repugnant. 
However, there were certain aspects of customary marriage which may have attracted the 
disapproval of the courts. Allott mentions the following: 
(a)' Infant betrothal and all forms of marriage in which one or the other party has not given 
his or her full consent. This will include marriage by abduction. 
(b) Sexual prerogative of the husband, exercisable over the wife whatever the state of her 
health. 
(c) The absolute claim of the husband to legal paternity of any children born to his wife 
during the continuation of the marriage, whether or not the husband is the natural father. 
(d) The obligation on a widow to many, or allow connexion with, the male relation of her 
deceased husband 699 
699 Re Adadevoh, (1951) 13 W. A. C. A. 304. Per Verity, CJ: "... the encouragement of 
promiscuous intercourse must always be contrary to public policy. " At p. 310. 
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(iv) Family Relations 
The majority of cases regarding family relations concerned custody of children. In the 
Southern Rhodesian case of Vela v. Mandanika and Magusta700 the plaintiff and M were 
married under local Shona law. The plaintiff now sued the second defendant, who was now 
living with his wife, for the custody of the children born by M to the second defendant. 
Under Shona law, the plaintiff was entitled to bring such an action. However, the second 
defendant had already paid adultery damages to the plaintiff under Shona law and Russell, 
CJ, was obliged to observe that; 
"In the circumstances of this case it seems to me that the husband would be acting 
contrary to natural justice if he refused reasonable extra payment of cattle or 
otherwise by the second defendant as damages. " 
Thus, if extra damages were paid, custody would be awarded to the second defendant. 
Application of the repugnancy rule in this fashion is acceptable, as equity would have 
worked in this way in most jurisdictions. It would be against public policy to award custody 
of children to another man while the natural father is quite capable of playing his role as a 
father. 
In the Nigerian case : of. 
Edet v Essien701 the appellant Essien, paid dowry for B when she 
was still a child. Later, B married Edet instead after Essien had paid full dowry to her 
parents. Essien now claimed custody of the children who were the natural issues of the 
marriage between Edet and B, with the argument that he was "entitled to any children she 
may bear (to whomsoever) until the money I paid as dowry for her is refunded to me. " 
Carey, J, had no hesitation to observe that; 
"... even assuming that the native law and custom as alleged by the appellant had 
been definitively established, I am inclined to think it should properly have been 
over-ruled in this case as being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
699 Allott, p. 166. Inn 
"' 1936 S. R. 171. 
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conscience having regard to the circumstances"702. 
(v) Repugnancy and Property 
In Eastern and Southern Africa, the repugnancy clauses were limited to personal relations 
but in West Africa, they applied largely to property rights703. Neither the British nor the 
French administrations regarded personal relations, such as polygamy, as repugnant. In West 
Africa, unjust dealings with property attracted the application of the formula "repugnant". 
Appeals from the native courts were heard by high courts presided over by English judges, 
who applied the principles of equity to strike down behaviour they regarded as "repugnant". 
Thus, rules of equity were applied as public policy rules, to limit the excesses of local 
African laws regarding property rights. For example, a claim by an owner of land who 
asserts his title to land when he had for many years acquiesced in its occupation by another 
was regarded repugnant704. Hence the owner of the land was merely prevented from 
enforcing his strict rights. In other words, it was against public policy to allow a landowner 
to enforce his strict rights where he had deliberately slept on them. 
In the Ghana case of Ani v Amoh, Ollenu J, as he then was, held that "it would be against all 
principles of equity and natural justice" to deny a person of a farm cultivated by him on land 
which was later shared with the plaintiff705. Again, the same judge held in another case that 
the Ewe law by which family land became vested in the Stool (Crown) absolutely once it 
became "outskirts" land was repugnant, in other words, against public policy706. In similar 
vein, the old Ghanaian local rule that if a relative helped a person in building a home then 
? o7 the home became family property was held to be repugnant. 
In the Courts Act 1960 of Ghana, the repugnancy rule was omitted mainly because, in the 
701 (1932) 11 N. L. R. 47. 
702 At p. 48. 
703 Allott; New Essays in African Law, 1970, p. 172. 
704 ibid, at p. 172. 
705 (1959) G. L. R. 214. 
706 Ashiemoa v Bani (1959) G. L. R. 130. 
707 Larbi V Cato (1959) G. L. R. 35. 
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words of Bennion; 
"It will be observed that another provision of S. 87 (1), namely that a customary law 
will not be enforced if it is repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience 
has not been reproduced. It was considered unfitting to the dignity of the indigenous 
laws of the people of Ghana to suggest that this repugnancy might continue to exist. 
For over 100 years, customary laws which were considered to be repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience have not been enforced because the law 
forbade their enforcement. It seems reasonable to assume therefore that such 
708 customary laws as remain will not offend in this respect". 
B. "Ordre Public" in French Colonies 
According to Francescakis, "ordre public" could be interpreted in one of two ways. First, the 
doctrine could be seen to comprise a set of rules of a given State, which by their very nature, 
would exclude the application of certain foreign laws. Second, the doctrine could refer to a 
number of fundamental principles which, even if there were no legislation, would operate to 
exclude the application of a foreign law, which would otherwise be applicable. Francescakis 
prefers the second interpretation 709 
In the French African colonies, however, "ordre public" was applied to any rule of 
customary law which was found morally unacceptable, such as slavery, or which offended 
"... basic notions of justice, therefore considered contrary to the principles of French 
civilization710". Thus, the right of the head of the family to inflict severe corporal 
punishment on adult members of the family for adultery was considered contrary to French 
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rsennion, r. A. tc; i ne c. onstlruriona[ Law of cJnana, 1902-, p. 416. 
"" Francescakis; "Problemes de droit international prive de 1'Afrique noire 
independante", 1112 Rec. des cours (1964), p. 308 - 309. Cited hereafter as 
Francescakis. 
710 Salacuse, p. 60. 
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civilisation". Similarly, the right of a Chief to banish a person permanently from his village 
was contrary to public policy712. 
An example of how the courts applied public policy is demonstrated in a Mauritanian case 
which came before the courts in 1953713. A truck struck and killed a man. The two men in 
charge of the vehicle were tried and found guilty of manslaughter, fined and imprisoned. 
After their release, the deceased's relatives demanded damages from the ethnic group to 
which the two men belonged. It was argued that in Moslem law, the members of the guilty 
- men's ethnic group were collectively responsible, in civil law, for their acts. The court 
below granted damages under the Islamic law. The Court of Appeal however, held that the 
rule of collective responsibility was contrary to public policy. 
In a society where there were no social services, it is safe to assume that the dependants of 
. the 
dead man would be left destitute and the Islamic law cited in the case may have been 
meant to minimise their plight. However, the public policy rule in Islamic law, appeared to 
have conflicted with the French public policy rule. The court did not examine the public 
policy basis of the local rule but declared it contrary to public policy on the ground solely 
that it conflicted with French civilisation. What the court should have considered was the 
application of the rule in the present case. Was it against public policy to pay compensation 
to the family of the deceased? If collective responsibility were being evoked for purposes of, 
say, revenge killing, then clearly that would be contrary to public policy. However, the court 
declared collective responsibility, as a rule, repugnant, thus abolishing that rule altogether. It 
is the application of a rule that may be repugnant but not necessarily the rule itself. In 
applying the public policy of the forum the court should not seek to substitute the foreign 
law with its own. What may offend against public policy is not the foreign rule itself but as 
the foreign rule applies in the particular case before the court; 
"What is usually in question, however, is not the foreign law in the abstract, but the 
711 N'Doumba Doualla, Ch. Homologation, Cameroons, 1 February 1933,43 Penant I, 
(1934), p. 157. 
712 Salacuse, p. 60. 
713 Judgment of 30 September 1953,66 Penant 1 (1956), p. 80. 
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result of its enforcement or recognition in England in the concrete case"714. 
A rule may be declared repugnant, as a rule, only in a small number of cases where the rule 
is in breach of human rights conventions, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights. or the African Convention on Human and Peoples' Rights, or other international law 
715 
norms 
The Mauritanian case mentioned above does not fall into the category of the Kuwaiti 
Airways case, for it is difficult to accept that the payment of compensation for unlawful 
killing could be viewed as a rule against international law or human rights. French colonial 
attitudes to inter-local conflict of laws in Africa were remarkably different from those of the 
British.. In the first place French authorities never believed that there could be a genuine 
conflict situation between local African law and the law of France. They recognised only 
"conflits coloniaux", a situation in which French colonial legislation was always superior to 
local law and in case of conflict, local law always gave way. Thus, for French colonial 
policy, "ordre public", as understood in French law was inappropriate and a new 
terminology had to be found. The term that came to be applied throughout the colonial 
period was "ordre public colonial". The purpose of the doctrine was two-fold. First, to 
abolish local law or institutions which were regarded as anti-social, for example, servitude 
in lieu of repayment of a debt716. Second, to foster the creation of the civil society717. "Ordre 
714 Dicey and Morris on Conflict of Laws, Thirteenth Edition, 2000, p. 90. 
715 In the recent case of Kuwaiti Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co, [2002] AC 883, 
the House of Lords had the opportunity to consider the occasions when a court 
would refuse to recognise a foreign substantive rule of law. In that case the Iraqi 
Government, after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, directed the defendant to 
fly ten of the claimant's aircraft to Iraq. On 17 September, Resolution 369, which 
purported to dissolve the claimant and transfer its assets, including the aircraft, to 
the defendant, came into force. Because Iraq failed to comply with resolutions 
passed by the United Nations Security Council requiring its withdrawal from Kuwait 
by 15 January 1991, military action was taken against Iraq. Their Lordships held that 
it was legitimate for an English court to have regard to the content of international 
law in deciding whether to recognise foreign law. They came to the conclusion that 
the recognition and enforcement of the Iraqi Resolution 369, authorising Iraq to 
seize Kuwaiti aircraft, would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under 
the United Nations Charter and manifestly contrary to the public policy of English 
law. 
716 Francescakis, p. 309. 
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public colonial" was therefore part of the French colonial system of social engineering and 
did not concern conflict situations in which a choice had to be made between French law 
and local African law. The British "repugnancy rules" were different. They applied to 
exclude or limit the application of certain local rules which conflicted with English notions 
of equity and justice and were not overtly political as the French doctrine was. 
French colonial powers however, allowed one major exception to this sweeping rejection of 
local African laws and that was in commercial matters. The Decree of 1906 (for French 
West Africa) and of 1920 (for French Equatorial Africa, extended to Togo and Cameroon in 
1924) permitted transactions between Africans "... selon les regles et formes coutoumieres 
non contraires aux principes de la civilisation francaise718. Thus, contracts according to 
customary law were permitted, as long as they did not contradict the principles of French 
civilisation. The dual effect of this law was that, the doctrine did not simply abolish an 
undesirable customary law rule, it also abolished the custom itself. Even in the colonial 
days, there were objections to this practice. Lampue, relying on Eliesco, thought that ordre 
public colonial should not be used to abolish customs which are contrary to French 
civilisation but should be used to promote the progressive development of customary law719. 
Eliesco had spoken of ordre public d'assimilation, while Lampue spoke of ordre public 
d'evolution720. It is not altogether clear where the difference lies. If African legal systems are 
to evolve, there must be standards which they must set for themselves. It may not be 
difficult to guess that French standards are those Lampue had in mind for them. 
According to Francescakis, modern views on ordre public differ considerably from those of 
the colonial era. Thus, Paul Lagarde argues that the purpose of ordre public must not be to 
eliminate- undesirable foreign law but to realise reciprocal adaptation of foreign law and the 
law of the forum, with a view of achieving harmonisation 721. It is conceded that 
717 ibid, at p. 309. 
718 Emphasis mine. 
719 Eliesco; Essai sur les conflits de lois dann I'espace sans conflit de souverainite, 
Thesis, Paris 1925. 
720 ibid, at p. 311. 
721 Recherche sur fordre public en droit international prive, Paris 1959. Cited by 
Francescakis, p. 312. 
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harmonisation is a major goal in private international law, but it is doubtful that Lagarde had 
French colonies in mind when he recorded these views in 1959. It is more likely that he was 
speaking of the European situation rather than that of the colonies. 
When French colonies became independent, it was accepted that ordre public must be 
interpreted to express African values. This goes for conflicts between African legal systems 
themselves an d between European and African legal systems. For Francescakis, however, 
the change should be from ordre public d'assimilation to ordre public du developpement to 
which the interpretation of all law must be subordinate 722. The purpose of the new concept 
is to promote "... un ensemble de principes prefigurant la societe unitaire de 1'avenir, societe 
alignee sur une civilisation de type universaire723. One is tempted to conclude that 
civilisation de type universaire is a European oriented concept which French colonial 
administration had attempted to impose on its colonies. While there might be universal 
principles of law, the role of the public policy is to limit or prevent the application of some 
foreign principles of law, not to impose foreign law on the forum. 
According to Francescakis, the repugnancy clause in referring to "justice, equity and good 
conscience" could also play the role of ordre public du developpement. However, 
repugnancy clauses were applied on an individual basis. There was no general principle 
underlying them, such as the "elevation" of African legal systems to the higher standards of 
a foreign legal system. The concept was applied by the court if it was felt that the person 
before it should not be allowed to benefit from a wrongful act. The aim was not to promote 
a superior principle. 
Francescakis cites two cases from Cameroon, one of which is a good example of ordre 
public du developpement, and the other of the general principle of law724. In the first case, 
the Supreme Court of Eastern Cameroon was faced with the customary law rule that the 
paternity of a child, regardless of the actual blood paternity, is attributable to the man who 
722 ibid, at p. 332. 
723 ibid, at p. 333. 
'24 ibid, at p. 333. 
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paid the dowry 25. The court ruled that this rule was against public policy. The court, 
according to Francescakis, preferred the notion of the modern family to the traditional 
African notion. 
It is difficult to see the difference in the attitude of the Cameroonian court and the colonial 
approach. The Cameroonian court overruled the African rule for the same reasons that the 
French colonial court would have done. The repugnancy rule in the English colonies could 
have arrived at the same decision but on the ground that it would be unconscionable to 
award paternity to the man who paid the dowry, while in reality the mother was living with 
another man. In other words the traditional African rule is a rebuttable presumption that the 
man who goes through the marriage ceremony is also the father of the children of the 
marriage. 
In the second case, the Supreme Court of Eastern Cameroon had to decide a case which 
turned on the customary law rule that a widow could not remarry until she had refunded the 
dowry paid by her deceased husband726. The general customary law rule was that a man who 
wanted to marry a widow or a divorced woman had to refund the dowry paid by the 
deceased or divorced husband. The court ruled that the widow was free to remarry without 
having refunded the dowry. The court based its decision on the general principles of law. 
Again an outright rejection of the customary law rule, based on the general principles of law, 
is untenable. The case should have been judged on its own merits. If the widow wished to 
marry at the Registrar's Office or at church, then it would be unconscionable to impose a 
customary marriage law rule on her. However, if her intention was to enter into a traditional 
African marriage, then it would be correct to expect her to follow the relevant customary 
law rules. 
It would seem that the French policy of assimilation is responsible for the intolerant 
interpretation of ordre public. While the repugnancy clause sought to limit unconscionable 
725 Cour supreme du Cameroun oriental, 20 mars 1962. Recueil Penant 1962, p. 576. 
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behaviour, ordre public colonial went to abolish local law which conflicted with the notions 
civiliation francaise. 
In France itself, public policy did not have the function of abolishing foreign rules which 
were contrary to morality or decency. For example, polygamy was recognised as long as 
none of the wives was a national of France727. So that what matters is not whether polygamy 
was, by itself contrary to public policy but whether a French national was involved. in it. 
Apart from French nationality, there could be other links a French court may take into 
consideration to decide that the French public policy doctrine applied to the case. In a case 
decided in 1965, the question turned on whether the first. wife in a. polygamous marriage 
may petition a French court for divorce when the husband married a second wife 728. In that 
case, the husband, an Algerian Moslem, had married the first wife at the Registrar's office in 
Algeria before Algeria became independent. The court accepted jurisdiction stating that 
since Algeria was French territory at the time of marriage, the first wife had links with 
France which permitted the court to apply French notions of public policy, and granted the 
divorce. 
In a second case, the court appeared to rely on social developments to reach its judgment. 
The court accepted jurisdiction to grant the divorce on the grounds of "the Constitutional 
principle of the equality of the sexes"729. However, in this case, as in the first, the petitioner 
was a French national. Where all parties were foreigners, the courts reacted differently. The 
court refused to apply public policy to grant the divorce because both wives and the 
husband, were Moroccans730. According to Paul Lagarde, it was crucial that both wives 
were subject to the same law, namely, Islamic law. If the petitioner had been a French 
national, the court would have applied public policy and granted the divorce731. One 
wonders whether it is merely French nationality which matters in this case or whether it is 
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the personal law which matters. Suppose the first wife were a French national but of the 
Moslem faith. Would nationality have taken precedence over her personal law? 
731 Lagarde; p. 36. 
2®2 
CHAPTER NINE 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, the attempt has been made to demonstrate, first that the rules of 
private international law are applicable to inter-local conflict of laws in Africa. Second, 
that most of the colonial legislation on inter-local conflict of laws are still in operation. 
What this implies is that African lawyers have to constantly refer to the colonial rules, 
even where there are new rules, and compare the two sets of rules. Where the country has 
not enacted new rules, there would be no alternative but to refer to the old rules and apply 
the rules of private international law to them to aid interpretation, in order to make them 
suitable for modern needs. 
What becomes immediately important is that new concepts of the connecting factor need 
to be developed. In the colonial period, the French applied the concept of status 
(statut)732, while the British applied "native" and "non-native" in West Africa and "tribe" 
in East Africa733. These concepts will no longer be adequate to deal with a modern 
complex society, quite apart from the racial connotations implied in them. Modern 
societies are highly mobile and it may not always be easy to classify people according to 
"tribes", especially in a time of increasing inter-ethnic marriages. In the same way, while 
"native" and "non-native" were used to classify Africans from Europeans in West Africa, 
they are of very little use in a sovereign state and give no guidance as to the law which 
may apply to the issue before the court. 
In the circumstances there is the need to develop a new connecting factor which would be 
more useful for a modern society. The Ghana Choice of Law Rules of 1960 introduced the 
concept of "community" as the new connecting factor. The drafters did not indicated how 
the concept is to be interpreted but it is most likely that ethnicity' is the basis of the 
concept. How else would "community" provide a connecting factor? There is still no case 
law on the issue but with progressive interpretation, "community" could come to provide 
732 See Chapter Five. 
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a supplementary connecting factor, such as "habitual residence", thus expanding the 
narrow ethnic base which the concept may now have. 
The French colonial concept of statut coutumier is just as unhelpful as "native" or "tribe" 
in a modern society and needs to be replaced. Senegal has replaced the concept with that 
of "nationality" 734 but without any indication how the local law may be identified. Most 
probably, the rules of private international law would be helpful to identify the applicable 
local legal system. 
The other major issue which has remained from the colonial era is the use of the 
repugnancy clauses in English-speaking African countries. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Eight under Public Policy, the clauses were expressed in various forms but acted a as 
public policy rule to limit or prevent the application of local legal rules which may be 
unequitable or socially damaging. The Ghana Choice of Law Rules of 1960 abolished the 
concept. While it is understandable that after more than one hundred years of judicial 
activity repugnant local laws would have been weeded out, there was no provision for the 
application of public policy as a concept. However, the omission did not mean that the 
inherent power of the court to refuse the application of a rule of law on the ground of 
public policy had been removed. Nevertheless, the repugnancy clauses have been re- 
instated by Section 49(1) of the Courts Act 1971 735 but judicial activity has not yet 
attempted to shed light on the modem interpretation of the concept. 
The French-speaking African countries have also inherited an interpretation of ordre 
public which is bound to pose problems. Ordre public colonial, which was applied in the 
colonial period is quite inappropriate today and there is need for judicial re-appraisal 'of 
the term. 
There were major differences between French and British colonial administration, some of 
which have remained to this day. British colonialism in Africa appears to have been 
733 See Chapter Six. 
734 See Chapter Eight. 
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unplanned and was left mainly to private companies until administration became too 
complex and expensive for private companies to bear. In Eastern and Southern Africa, 
matters were quite different, for although it was again private companies which took the 
initiative to colonise Eastern and Southern Africa, these parts of Africa were meant for 
permanent European settlement. The result was that relations between European and 
African populations were far more hostile and intolerant than was the case in West Africa 
and this was readily reflected in colonial legislation. Very little attention was paid to choice 
of law problems as indirect rule, as practised in West Africa, was absent. 
The French, on the other hand, had a clear idea of the purpose colonialism was to serve. The 
colonised African was to be assimilated although French law was not to apply fully to the 
assimile, for it was "... dangereux de leur accorder tous les droits politiques et les libertes 
individuelles ä la jouissance desquelles ils ne sont pas prepares. "736 What became known as 
assimilation in French colonial policy actually began in good faith when revolutionary 
France passed legislation to extend the same privileges to all colonial peoples. The policy 
however degenerated into assimilation of the "native" into the "higher" French civilisation. 
Thus, the notion of status ( Statut) became an obsession for the French colonial 
administration. British colonial administration, in contrast, knew nothing of status and 
simply divided the population into "natives" and "non-natives"737. In West Africa, at least, 
race was not the deciding factor, for black people from the Caribbean were classified as 
"non-natives". Perhaps the word "native" was construed strictly according to its logical 
meaning but it is more likely that the English judge understood "native" to mean domicil of 
origin in the English sense, which could not be easily displaced. Most important is the fact, 
however, that the colonial administration did nothing to devise a policy on "natives". 
Another notable difference between British and French administration was in their 
respective attitudes to the local legal systems they came to find. British administration did 
not impose English law on its colonies nor did it establish a hierarchy of legal norms. Unlike 
French rule, British rule in West Africa was established through treaties and agreements 
735 Act 732. 
736 Solus, H; Traite de la condition des indigenes en droit prive, 1927, p. 13. 
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with local chiefs and kings. These agreements usually contained provisions fully recognising 
the laws and customs of the people. Thus, local law and custom could be pleaded at any 
court in the West African colony. In Eastern and Southern African however, English 
colonial policy resembled that of the French. 
A further area in which British and French attitudes differed substantially was in regard to 
Islam. When colonial administration was established, both the British and French soon 
found that Islam and traditional ways mixed freely 73ß. However, there was a sharp difference 
between British and French attitudes to Islam in West Africa. The French went out of their 
way to control the "peril of Islam"739. This was due to several reasons but chief among them 
was the fact that many of the officials had come from Algeria, where the French had fought 
a bitter war for control. Secondly, many French officials held strong anti-clerical views 
which they extended easily to Islamic leaders. 
British attitudes to Islam were not uniform and in West Africa, the administration hardly 
distinguished between Islamic law and "Native Law and Custom". Thus, Lord Lugard 
writes: 
It is essential for Political Officers in Provinces where there is a considerable 
Muslim population, to have some-knowledge of Muhammadan law, in order that 
their supervision of the Native Courts may be intelligent and effective, and in order 
that they may know how to observe and enforce native law and custom ... 
740 
Thus, the two systems of law were one and the same to him, but Lord Lugard's language, 
betrays the accommodating spirit which British administration adopted towards Islam and 
the local "native law and custom". In the Gold Coast, Anderson observes; 
737 See Chapter Six. 
"° Lewis, I. M; Ed, Islam in Tropical Africa, 1966, p. 74. 
739 ibid, at p. 78. 
740 Lugard; Political Memoranda. Cited in Anderson: Islamic Law in Africa, 1970, p. 
172. 
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Islam applied in the Gold Coast, where it is applied at all, either as native law and 
custom or as a factor which is regarded by certain native courts as modifying the 
normal native law and custom in so far as Muslim litigants are concerned741. 
This British attitude may be due to the fact that there was no clear colonial policy from the 
beginning and policy was made as time went on. 
The discussion, on British colonial legislation on choice of law in Chapter Six is of 
importance if only because much of the approaches, if not the rules themselves, have 
remained in modem times. However, what becomes apparent is the difference in the British 
attitude to choice of law in East and West Africa. Section 19 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance 1876, enacted for the Gold Coast was quite progressive for its times but limited 
largely to West Africa. The application of local (or customary law), became a right which 
was not to be taken away742. Further, the legislation was made to cover a whole range of 
legal relations and not only status. 
I 
The British attitude to choice of law in Eastern and Southern Africa was different. The 
colonial policy was to settle these parts of Africa. There was no indirect rule and the choice 
of law process could not develop to the standards achieved in West Africa. While the West 
African legislation covered disputes between-"natives" and "non-natives" and applied at the 
common law courts as well as the "native courts", the Eastern and Southern Africa 
provisions applied only between "natives" and only in "native courts". 
The racial or ethnic element was absent in the West African legislation but was clearly 
noticeable in the Eastern and Southern African provisions. Efforts were made to define the 
races, so that a "native" was a black African, to the exclusion of Asians. and whites 743 In 
West Africa, the term "native" received a different meaning. There was no statutory 
definition of the term but the courts applied it to exclude the so-called "returnees", former 
741 Anderson, p. 251. 
742 "Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court ... or shall deprive any 
person of the benefit of any law or custom existing in the colony. " gas See for example, Tanganyika Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance. Cap 75. 
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slaves who had returned from the Americas 
744 
, 
from the benefit of customary law. 
After Ghana's independence in 1957, it was recognised that the entire judicial system 
needed reviewing. As concerns the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, certain provisions were 
no longer appropriate. The distinction between "natives" and "non-natives" was no longer 
appropriate in a sovereign state. Second, customary law applied only if invoked by one 
party, otherwise the common law applied. The new Courts Act 1960, was enacted to remedy 
these faults. Now, customary law was made to rank equal to the common law. Customary 
law now operated as a matter of law not as a matter of fact to be proved. The new provision 
also provided the courts with guidelines as when to apply the common law or customary 
law. Third, the new legislation created a connecting factor for all Ghanaians, namely the 
community from which they come. 
However, it appears that old habits die hard. The Ghanaian provision was replaced by the 
Courts Act 1971745. Our old friend "natural justice, equity and good conscience" is back. As 
has been demonstrated above, regarding Public Policy, "natural justice" alone would be 
sufficient, while "equity and good conscience" were superfluous. The old colonial system 
still lives with us in independent Africa. 
The history of choice of law in Africa has remained stagnant since 1960 and there are 
fewer and fewer inter-local conflict cases coming before the courts. This may be due to 
three reasons. First, it is likely that people are seeking advice before embarking on their 
activities, thereby eliminating conflicts situations. Second, the high cost of civil litigation 
may be discouraging people from going to court and is encouraging settling out of court 
or seeking arbitration. Third, it is just possible that judges are failing to classify cases 
correctly, thus being unable to recognise conflicts situations. Throughout the existence of 
the 1960 Choice of Law rules, this researcher has not found a single decision based on 
them. The Courts Act 1971746, which replaced these rules, has so far produced only one 
744 
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judgement based on it 
747. 
APPENDICES 
Since Ghana's Courts Act 1960, was enacted to produce choice of law rules, a few other 
African countries have enacted similar acts. These are reproduced below for reference. 
A 
TANZANIA 
Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance, Cap. 453 (as amended by the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1963, No. 55 of 1953, Cap. 537) s. 9. 
"9. Applicability of Customary Law. - (1) Customary law shall be applicable to, and 
courts shall exercise jurisdiction in accordance therewith in, matters of civil nature- 
(a) between members of a community in which rules of customary law relevant to 
the matter are established and accepted, or between a member of one community 
and a member of another community if the rules of customary law of both 
communities make similar provision for the matter; or 
(b) relating to any matter of status of, or succession to, a person who is or was a 
member of a community in which rules of customary law relevant to the matter 
are established and accepted; or - 
(c) in any other case in which, by reason of the connection of any relevant issue with 
any customary right or obligation, it is appropriate that the defendant be treated 
as a member of the community in which such right or obligation obtains and it is 
fitting and just that the matter be dealt with in accordance with customary law 
instead of the law that would otherwise be applicable; 
except in any case where it is apparent, from the nature of any relevant act or transaction, 
manner of life or business, that the matter is or was to be regulated otherwise than by 
customary law: 
Provided that- 
(i) where, in accordance with paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of this sub-section 
747 See Mate v Amanor (1973) G. L. R. 469. Reproduced at page 209. 
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customary law is applicable to any matter, it shall not cease to be applicable 
on account of any act or transaction designed to avoid, for an unjust purpose, 
the applicability of customary law; and 
(ii) nothing in this sub-section shall preclude any court from applying the rules 
of Islamic law in matters of marriage, divorce, guardianship, inheritance, 
waqf and similar matters in relation to members of a community which 
follows that law. 
(2) It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubts that- 
(a) a person may become a member of such a community as is referred to in 
subsection (1), notwithstanding he was hitherto a member of some other 
community (and whether or not any customary law is established or accepted 
in such other community), by his adoption of the way of life of the first- 
mentioned community or his acceptance by such community -as one of 
themselves, and such adoption or acceptance may have effect either 
generally or for particular purposes; 
(b) a person may cease to be a member of a community by reason of his 
adoption of the way of life of some other community (whether or not any 
customary law is established or accepted in such other community) or 
acceptance by some other community as one of themselves, but shall not be 
treated as having ceased to be a -member of a community solely by his 
absence therefrom. 
(3) In any proceedings where the law applicable is customary law, the. court shall apply the 
customary law prevailing within the area of its local jurisdiction, or if there is more than one 
such law, the law applicable in the area in which the act, transaction or matter occurred or 
arose, unless it is satisfied that the proper customary law to be applied is some other law: 
Provided that the court shall not apply any rule or practice of customary law which is 
abolished, prohibited, punishable, declared unlawful or expressly or impliedly disapplied or 




The Tanzania choice of law rules are unique in several ways. First, customary law is 
applicable only when all parties are from the same community or from different 
communities but the customary law rule on the issue is the same. Second, the rules are 
weighted in favour of the defendant [9 (1) (c)], while it is usually the plaintiff who is the 
aggrieved party. Third, the application of Islamic law is subject to the existence of a 
community that practices it. Islamic law is a personal law which is applicable only because a 
person claims membership of the religious group. That law would cease to apply to the 
person if he or she converts to another religion which also has a legal system. Thus, Islamic 
law would apply to a Moslem, for example in matters of succession, or marriage even if 
there were no Moslem community in the country. 
B 
KENYA 
Judicature Act, No. 16 of 1967, s. 3 (2) 
"The High Court shall and all subordinate courts shall be guided by African customary law 
in civil cases in which one or more of the parties is subject to it or affected by it, so far as it 
is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with any written 
law, and shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice without undue regard to 
technicalities of procedure and without undue delay. " 
Comment: 
The Kenya rules are astonishingly brief and may be of very little help to the court. Unlike 
the Tanzanian rules, customary law is applicable if one or all parties are subject to it or 
affected by it. This may mean that customary law is applicable to non-Africans. In a multi- 
racial society such as Kenya, this should have been made much clearer and reliance should 
have been placed on issues involved in the case, rather than individuals being affected. 
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The repugnancy clause has been retained but then the provision goes on to say that all such 
cases (based on customary law), should be decided according to "substantial justice without 
undue regard to technicalities of procedure.... " The only way to understand this provision is 
that the court is being invited to keep procedure to a minimum. How is this to be done 
without doing injustice to one of the parties? 
C 
UGANDA 
Judicature Act, 1967, Act 11 of 1967, s. 8 
"(1) Nothing in this Act shall deprive the High Court of the right to observe or 
enforce the observance of, or shall deprive any person of the benefit of, any existing custom, 
which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and not incompatible 
either directly or by necessary implication with any written law. 
(2) No party to a suit shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any custom if it appears 
from express contract or from the nature of the transaction out of which the suit or question 
has arisen that such party agreed that his obligations in connection with the transaction shall 
be regulated exclusively by law, other than by customary law. " 
Comment: 
The Ugandan provision is an unsatisfactory abbreviation of the Gold Coast Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 1876748. When Ghana adopted its new rules in the Courts Act 1960, the 
drafters gave reasons why the Ordinance was no longer adequate749. Thus, for example, 
local law applied only when a party claimed its application, instead of it being applicable as 
of right in all personal matters. The Ugandan provision has retained this shortcoming. It has 
also retained the "express contract" expression which caused so much discussion in the 
Gold Coast. 




Courts Act 1971 (Act 732), S. 49 (1) 
The Courts Act of 1971 introduced new choice of law rules in Section 49(1) of the Act, 
apparently to correct the inadequacies of the 1960 rules. It provides as follows: 
"49 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, the Court when 
determining the law applicable to an issue arising out of any transaction or situation, shall be 
guided by the following rules in which references to personal law of a person are references 
to the system of customary law to which he is subject or to the common law where he is not 
subject to any system of customary law: 
Rule 1. An issue arising out of a transaction shall be determined according to the system of 
law intended by the parties to the transaction to govern the issue or the system of law which 
the parties, from the nature or form of the transaction -must be taken to have intended to 
govern the issue. 
Rule 2. In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to an issue arising 
out of the devolution of a person's estate shall be the personal law of that person. 
Rule 3. In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to an issue as to 
title between persons who trace their claims from one person or group of persons or from 
different persons all having the same personal law, shall be the personal of that person or 
persons. 
Rule 4. In applying rules 2 and 3 to disputes relating to titles to land due regard shall be had 
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to any overriding provision of the law of the place in which the land is situated. 
Rule S. Subject to the foregoing rules, the law applicable to any issue arising between two or 
more persons shall, where they are subject to the same personal law, be that law; and where 
they are not subject to the same personal law, the Court shall apply the relevant rules of their 
different systems of personal law to achieve a result comfortable to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience. 
Rule 6. In determining any issue to which the foregoing rules do not apply, the Court shall 
apply such principles of the common law or customary law, or both, as will do substantial 
justice between the parties, having regard to equity and good conscience. 
Rule 7. Subject to any direction that the Supreme Court may give in exercise of its powers 
under Article 107 of the Constitution in the determination of any issue arising from the 
common law or customary law the Court may adopt, develop and apply any such remedies 
from any system of law (whether Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian) as appear to the Court to be 
efficacious and to meet the requirements of justice, equity and good conscience. 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, such rules of law and 
evidence (including the rules of private international law) as have been applicable in 
proceedings in Ghana shall continue to apply, without prejudice to any development of such 
rules which may occur. " 
Comment: 
There are major differences between the new rules and those of 1960. The 1960 rules had a 
clear hierarchical order, thus rules 2 and 3 applied subject to rule 1 etc. The 1971 rules do 
not have a clear hierarchy. Thus, rule 4 starts with "in applying rules 2 and 3... ", while rule 
5 is subject to the foregoing rules. Rule 6 is available "in determining any issue to which the 
foregoing do not apply. " 
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The most perplexing provision is rule 7, which empowers the court to apply a remedy from 
any legal system, Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian, where a local legal system fails to provide 
one. It is difficult to imagine the situation where a legal system provides a legal basis for a 
claim and yet, fails to provide a remedy which must go with it7so 
There are other ambiguities in the rules. Rule 4 states that in applying rules 3 and 4 relating 
to land, due regard shall be had to any "overriding provisions" of the law of the place in 
which the land is situated. It is not clear what "overriding provisions" are supposed to mean. 
The 1960 rules were specific on transfer of title to land, thus rules I and 4 provided 
adequately for transfer of land inter vivos and upon death intestate. This is partially a 
restatement of the local legal position that a person cannot dispose of property in which 
others have an interest without the consent of those others751 
The 1960 rules left out the concept of "natural justice, equity and good conscience" but for 
some reason, it has been brought back in rule 5 and is repeated in rule 6 as "substantial 
justice" and again in rule 7 as "requirement of justice, equity and good conscience. " The 
meaning of this provision has been discussed above752 and it was argued that the expression 
"natural justice" alone would be quite sufficient and that "equity and good conscience" were 
superfluous. It is no longer necessary to remind the judge that the rules of equity should be 
observed. 
The difficulties in applying the new rules quickly became apparent when the case of Mate v. 
750 In the English case of Phrantzes v Argenti, [1960] 2 QB 19, the plaintiff, daughter 
of the defendant, brought an action to compel her father to pay her husband a 
dowry, as Greek law demanded and for the court to assess the level of the-dowry 
due. The court held that while Greek law on the subject was recognised and would 
have been enforced if the Plaintiff had come before the court with a judgment debt, 
the common law did not possess the mechanism to enforce "a right to obtain an 
order condemning someone to enter into a contract in a particular form with a 
person not even a party to the proceedings". At p. 3. Thus, the English court could 
not have borrowed a Greek remedy of compelling a third party into a contract 
because the common law did not know such a remedy. 
751 Nelson v Nelson (1951), 13 W. A. C. A. 248. 
752 See Chapter Eight, Public Policy. 
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Amanor753 came before the courts. In that case, H and W were married under the local law 
of the Krobo but lived in Accra, about one hundred kilometres away. As they were in 
financial difficulties, H. consented that W could work at a hotel at Krobo Odumase, owned 
by the defendant. H later withdrew his consent for W to continue to work at the hotel and 
asked her to resign. W refused to resign. H then asked the defendant to terminate W's 
appointment and when he refused to do so, H complained to the local chief. An arbitration 
ensued as a result of which the defendant was ordered to discharge W from his services. W 
rejoined her husband in Accra but promptly returned to the same employment without her 
husband's consent. 
H now sued at common law alleging that the defendant induced or enticed his wife away 
from him. Abban, J, sitting at the High Court in Accra, held that the Courts Act 1971, 
Section 49(1) Rule 5 had made the application of customary law obligatory in tort suits 
between Ghanaians whose personal law was the same system of customary law. Therefore, 
the suit could only be brought under Krobo law. However, although the judge could find no 
rule in the applicable Krobo law which recognised the tort of inducement or enticement of a 
wife, he reasoned that the combination of rules 6 and 7 had given the court "unfettered 
discretion" to adopt and apply remedies available in any legal system, where no remedy was 
available under the local legal system, with a view to achieving substantial justice between 
the parties. Thus, the judge felt he had to apply the common law tort of enticement because 
that piece of legislation was still on the statute book of Ghana, although, he admitted, such 
an action was clearly not in keeping with the times and had been abolished in English law. 
Rule 5, which governs tort cases, states quite clearly that where all parties in the dispute are 
subject to the same personal law, that law shall apply and if they. are not, then the relevant 
rules from the two customary law systems are to apply. It is only when none of the parties is 
subject to a customary law system that rule 6 could be called in aid. A combination of rules 
6 and 7 do not leave the judge that "unfettered discretion" to apply any legal rule he pleases. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the rules which suggests that the court may (or is obliged 
to) apply a. law from another legal system if the plaintiff's claim is unknown to the 
753 (1973) G. L. R. 469. 
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applicable legal system. Such a cause of action would seem to suggest that there were 
lacunae or `gaps' in the applicable legal system and the judge is called upon to fill those 
gaps. 
The argument is faulty, for the judge's role is to interpret existing law and where the claim 
to be determined is non-existent in the applicable legal system, the judge must interpret the 
law by dismissing the case on the ground that the prevailing law does not stipulate the 
asserted obligation. If a plaintiff were to claim damages for injury to honour in England, the 
claim would almost certainly be dismissed as unknown to English law. It would be quite 
wrong for the English court to borrow a remedy from another legal system which recognises 
754 such a claim 
The provision in rule 7 is novel, not only to local Ghanaian legal systems but also to the 
common law. The sole guidance given the judge is that the remedy chosen must be 
`efficacious' and must meet the `requirements of justice and good conscience'. The 
direction is far too vague for the judge to rely on. It would seem that the absence of a clear 
hierarchy in the rules has misled the judge into overlooking the application of rules 5 and 6, 
which are exhaustive for tort purposes and thus make rule 7 redundant in this particular 
case. At best rule 7 may be seen as a residuary rule for the court to fall back on in case rules 
1 to 6 fail to provide a remedy but rule 7 on its own should not have been allowed to take 
precedence over rules 1 to 6. 
754 Phrantzes v Argenti (1960) 2 QB 19. The position is the same in the United States, 
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